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Abstract 
Living conditions in developing countries are often difficult. Since a large proportion of 
the population is engaged in farming activities, their income is not only low but also 
very volatile. As a result most people live in poverty or are threatened to fall into 
poverty. One important requirement to improve their situation is financial development. 
At the country level, functioning institutions and a broad range of products promote 
overall economic growth. At the household level, financial development enables people 
to bridge income gaps, save parts of their income and to undertake investments to 
improve production processes.   
This research focuses on these so-called vulnerable people and examines how 
specifically rural credit affects their economic situation and contributes to reducing 
poverty in Thailand.  
Chapter 2 examines a policy-induced microfinance programme which has been 
set up in Thailand in 2001. The data suggests that this programme successfully targets 
poor people and helps to improve their economic situation for a short period of time. 
However, it is questionable whether the subsidized loans have sustainable impacts since 
they do not substitute more expensive credit sources and do not affect lending behaviour 
of households.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the segmentation of rural credit markets in which relatively 
expensive informal lenders still play an important role. By showing that poor as well as 
rich households demand informal loans but use them for different purposes, this chapter 
provides an explanation for market segmentation.   
Chapter 4 examines loan terms and in particular collateral issues more closely. As 
a standard ingredient of loan contracts, collateral is often demanded but this demand 
cannot always be met by the poor. Collateral requirements depend on the riskiness of a 
borrower. Chapter 4 explains how different types of lenders (formal and informal) gain 
information on borrowers’ risk and therefore are able to lower collateral requirements.  
 
Keywords: Thailand, rural credit markets, microfinance, informal loans, collateral 
Zusammenfassung 
Menschen in Entwicklungsländern sind oft schwierigen Lebensbedingungen ausgesetzt. 
Viele von ihnen verdienen ihren Lebensunterhalt mit landwirtschaftlicher Tätigkeit, was 
häufig zu niedrigen und gleichzeitig schwankenden Einkommen führt. Folglich leben 
viele dieser Menschen in Armut, oder sind davon bedroht, in Armut zu fallen. Eine der 
Grundvoraussetzungen für die Verbesserung ihrer ökonomischen Situation ist ein 
entwickeltes Finanzsystem. Auf Länderebene kann dieses Wirtschaftswachstum 
fördern. Für Haushalte bedeutet ein entwickeltes Finanzsystem eine Möglichkeit, 
Einkommensengpässe zu überbrücken, sichere Sparmöglichkeiten zu nutzen und durch 
Investitionen den (landwirtschaftlichen) Produktionsprozess zu verbessern.  
Diese Arbeit widmet sich den Menschen in Entwicklungsländern, die Gefahr 
laufen, in Armut zu fallen oder bereits in Armut leben. Dabei steht der ländliche 
Kreditmarkt in Thailand im Fokus und die Möglichkeiten, die dieser bietet, Armut zu 
reduzieren.  
Kapitel 2 untersucht ein Mikrofinanzprogramm, das 2001 in Thailand eingeführt 
wurde. Aufgrund der ausgewerteten Datenlage lässt sich sagen, dass dieses Programm 
die Zielgruppe der besonders armen Haushalte erreicht und deren Situation kurzfristig 
verbessert. Allerdings ist es fraglich, ob diese subventionierten Kredite einen 
nachhaltigen Effekt haben, da sie weder teurere Kredite substituieren, noch 
Kreditentscheidungen von Haushalten anderweitig beeinflussen.  
Kapitel 3 befasst sich mit dem stark segmentierten Kreditmarkt auf dem relativ 
teure informelle Kredite immer noch einen hohen Anteil haben. Es wird gezeigt, dass 
sowohl reiche, als auch arme Haushalte informelle Kredite nachfragen und dass sie 
diese Kredite für unterschiedliche Zwecke nutzen. 
Kapitel 4 untersucht Kreditbedingungen und im Speziellen Kreditbesicherung. 
Kreditsicherheiten sind ein gängiger Bestandteil von Kreditverträgen, jedoch können 
viele arme Menschen keine solchen Kreditsicherheiten stellen. Je riskanter ein 
Kreditnehmer auf den Kreditgeber wirkt, desto wahrscheinlicher muss er Sicherheiten 
stellen. Kapitel 4 zeigt, wie Kreditgeber durch mehr Informationen das Risiko besser 
einschätzen können und daher weniger Kreditsicherheiten verlangen.  
 
Schlagworte: Thailand, ländliche Kreditmärkte, Mikrofinanzierung, informelle Kredite, 
Kreditsicherheiten 
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1. Introduction 
 
In developing countries people often face difficult living conditions. Especially 
households in the rural areas are often engaged in farming activities so that their income 
is very volatile and strongly dependent on weather conditions or world market prices of 
their products. Hence, households often live in poverty or are threatened to fall into 
poverty.  
Financial development is a crucial issue, not only for promoting overall economic 
growth for the whole country but also for improving the economic situation of every 
household. Financial institutions and their products enable people to buy inputs for the 
next harvesting season, they help to bridge income shortcomings in lean times, offer 
possibilities for (agricultural) investments to improve the production process and 
provide safe savings opportunities.   
One important precondition for financial decision making is that people have 
access to finance. Indeed, access to credit, potential savings and insurances have been 
identified to be a crucial issue for people in developing countries. Many attempts have 
been made to enhance access to finance. Microfinance institutions all over the world 
attest to the efforts of governments and non-governmental organisations in this respect. 
However, programmes often follow their own agenda and have different aims apart 
from helping the poor as recent discussions about commercialization of microfinance 
show. Therefore any microfinance programme should be evaluated carefully.  
Although microfinance has been put into place, many households in developing 
countries still opt to borrow from informal credit sources which are often more 
expensive than banks or microcredit institutions. Furthermore, even if finance is 
available, people may be excluded from financial sources because lenders require 
collateral poor people are not able to pledge. Or, if they can bring up collateral, loans 
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are still risky and a loss of collateral could mean further deterioration of their economic 
situation.    
This dissertation examines how financial institutions influence the well-being of 
people by analysing several aspects of rural credit markets in developing countries. In 
particular, the following questions are addressed: How efficient are policy-induced 
microfinance programmes and what are their effects? Why and when do people choose 
to borrow from informal sources and how do informal loans effect their economic 
situation? When do households have to pledge collateral, and how can a reduction in 
asymmetric information ease collateral requirements?    
In order to answer these questions appropriate data is needed. This research relies 
on data emanating the DFG-funded project “Impact of shocks on the vulnerability to 
poverty: consequences for development of emerging Southeast Asian economies” 
(Research Group FOR 756). Within this project a cross-sectional survey first took place 
between April and June 2007 in Thailand. This initial survey has been expanded for the 
years 2008 and 2010 so that a panel data set of three waves is available. The three 
provinces are Buri Ram, Nakhon Phanom and Ubon Ratchathani, which are located in 
the North-eastern part of Thailand, the poorest region of the country with low income 
and high agricultural activity. Household identification follows a three-stage stratified 
sampling procedure: within each province sub-districts were chosen with probability 
according to their size and two villages in each sub-district were randomly identified. 
Finally, 10 households of each village were randomly selected to be interviewed. The 
overall sample which is used in this research consists of 2,105 households that have 
been interviewed in all three waves. It is the large sample and the broad information 
basis that makes the data set very useful for the following research. In particular, there 
is information on household characteristics, their economic situation and finance-related 
activities, such as borrowing, saving, default history, credit rationing and lending. 
Furthermore a broad range of different lending institutions is operating in Thailand so 
that the data contributes to a better understanding of rural credit markets and 
households’ borrowing decisions.   
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The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 examines a policy-induced 
microfinance programme, the so-called village funds (VF) programme, which has been 
set up in all Thai villages in 2001. Former studies find that this programme targets 
people with lower economic status and improves access to finance. Furthermore it 
seems to increase income, asset endowment and household’s expenditures. But given 
the high costs of this programme it is questionable whether the costs of approximately 
1.5% of the GDP in 2001, or US$ 1.8 billion, can be justified. The results in Chapter 2 
show that households who borrow from VF are more likely business owners, larger 
households with less land holding and unlikely to be farming. As a consequence they 
are limited in their income generation, especially regarding food production and have 
less land or other assets. With respect to the effect of VF loans, the results show that 
they seem to stabilise the economic situation of permanent VF borrowers in that income 
and overall asset endowment do not fluctuate much over time. The loss of a VF loan, 
however, leads to a downturn of economic variables. Concerning borrowing purposes, 
VF loans do not have great impact on borrowing behaviour on household level. Indeed, 
they seem to be a one-time event and do not substitute more expensive informal loans. 
Due to their limited maturity they cannot be used for long-term investments either.  
Despite some efforts to enhance access to finance, poor as well as rich households 
in Thailand still borrow from relatively expensive informal sources which account for 
19% of all credit contracts. Related literature finds that the decision to borrow from a 
specific lender depends on borrowing purposes. The common view is that formal loans 
are used for production or investment purposes whereas informal loans are used for 
consumption purposes. Chapter 3 contributes to existing literature by looking at the 
effects of these loans across income groups of households: poor households increase 
their asset endowment and in particular farming assets after informal loans have been 
received. Rich households demand informal loans especially if they are hit by a shock 
or credit rationed in the formal sector. They use informal loans to increase their (food) 
consumption, especially if they are less likely farmers, hit by a shock and/or credit 
rationed in the formal sector.  
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Chapter 4 examines loan terms and in particular collateral issues more closely. 
Collateral is a standard ingredient of loan contracts but the rural poor are often not able 
to meet collateral requirements which is why they are excluded from formal credit more 
often than others. Furthermore, the loss of pledged collateral may worsen their 
economic situation. Whether or not collateral is required depends on the riskiness of a 
borrower: the higher the observable risk the more likely collateral is required. This is 
known as the ex ante theory of collateral and is thoroughly examined in literature. In 
line with this theory there are some predictions regarding collateral for different types of 
lenders. One can broadly distinguish between formal lenders and informal lenders; 
informal lenders live nearby or among the rural poor and therefore have better 
information on their riskiness. As a consequence, given the same riskiness of a 
borrower, informal lenders would demand less collateral. Chapter 4 uses two measures 
to capture asymmetric information between lender and borrower: relationship duration 
in years and geographical distance between lender and borrower. The results show that 
an increase in information has different effects among lender groups. Relationship 
duration lowers collateral requirements for formal lenders because they can make use of 
additional information, whereas it does not lower collateral demanded by informal 
lenders. Short distances reduce collateral requirements only for informal lenders who 
can exploit their informational advantage via their proximity to borrowers.        
According to the results the following implications can be drawn: firstly, 
microfinance institutions are no panacea since they do not always have long-lasting 
impacts on households. Setting up expensive programmes should be considered 
carefully. 
Secondly, informal loans are in general an expensive source of credit but they 
serve specific purposes which are not limited to serving the very poor. Any programme 
that aims at reducing the reliance on informal lenders should take this into account.  
Thirdly, informal lenders behave differently in setting collateral requirements 
since they have more information on borrowers’ risks. Measures to develop the 
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financial system should particularly strengthen formal lenders by providing 
informational networks and enhance transparency. 
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2. The Village Fund Loan: Who Gets It, Keeps It and Loses It?∗ 
 
 
Abstract 
The Village Funds programme in Thailand is one of the biggest microfinance 
programmes in the world aiming at improving access to finance and income in rural 
areas. Earlier studies indicate that the programme is successful in realising its ambitions 
to some degree. We extend this work by analysing a second wave of a household survey 
and find that village fund borrowers are consistently characterised by a lower economic 
status; accordingly village fund loans are an important lifeline to those households. 
However, we cannot identify any significant substitution between village fund loans and 
other loans, raising doubts about the long-run impact of the Village Fund programme. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Village Fund (VF) programme in Thailand is one of the largest microfinance 
programmes in the world. It aims at improving access to finance and income in rural 
areas. These are worthwhile objectives for policy as finance is often limited in rural 
areas and incomes are low. In this sense the introduction of a programme that sets up an 
additional fund of one million Baht, roughly US$ 28,000, per village leading to a 
significant increase of loanable funds is welcome. Indeed, the rural population seems to 
be highly sympathetic to the 2001 government’s decision to start the VF programme, as 
election results continuously show. 
                                                 
∗
 I would like to thank my co-author Lukas Menkhoff. A similar version of this paper was originally 
published in Stephan Klasen and Hermann Waibel (Eds.), Vulnerability to Poverty: Theory, Measurement 
and Determinants, with Case Studies from Thailand and Vietnam. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, under the 
title “The Village Fund Loan Programme: Who Gets It, Keeps It and Loses It?” This material may not be 
copied or reproduced without permission from Palgrave Macmillan.    
We like to thank participants at the Money, Macro and Finance Conference in Birmingham, Oliver 
Gloede, Stephan Klasen and Ornsiri Rungruxsirivorn for helpful comments. Financial support by the 
German Research Foundation (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged. 
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However, at the same time there are several concerns with a programme such as 
this one. First, it is a matter of record that many large state-sponsored lending 
programmes have failed in the past as documented for example in Krahnen and Schmidt 
(1994). All of them were started with high ambitions, but in the end the money was too 
often lost and diverted into dubious purposes. Second, and related to the first concern, 
political economy models suggest that governments may use gifts of this type to win 
political support in upcoming elections. Third, there are simple practical concerns about 
how such a huge programme could be successfully implemented given that no 
experienced bankers would be relied on. 
As this programme has been operational for some time now, there are a few 
analyses available studying the outcomes of the VF programme. Two studies indicate 
that, as intended, it increases income (Boonperm et al., 2013, Kaboski and Townsend, 
2012). Moreover, a study shows that VFs helped to improve access to finance 
(Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011). However, considering the size and relevance of 
the VF programme, the available evidence is surprisingly thin. It would be most 
interesting for policy-making in Thailand and possibly for decision makers in other 
countries as well, to learn more about the functioning of VFs in order to make informed 
policy decisions. 
We contribute to the issue of access to finance by extending the cross-sectional 
evidence in Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) by incorporating a time dimension. 
In effect, we rely on two waves of a large household survey conducted in three 
provinces of north-eastern Thailand in the years 2007 and 2008. It is this time 
dimension – even though consisting of only two consecutive years – that helps us 
understand how changes in the provision of VF credit may be related to household 
characteristics: which kinds of households get a VF loan, which ones keep it, and which 
ones lose it? 
We find that VF borrowers are indeed somewhat different from other households 
and that these differences are consistent across the two periods. VF borrowers are 
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characterised by a lower economic status and the loss of a VF loan seems to worsen 
their economic situation. Also, VF borrowers are more often business owners. Finally, 
we cannot identify any significant substitution between VF loans and other loans, 
indicating that the VF loans are rarely used for longer-lasting credit-financed projects 
thus that they have only a slight impact on permanent behaviour at household level. 
We proceed in this study as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reports the findings of 
earlier studies in order to motivate our own research. The data basis is described in 
Section 2.3, characterising borrowing households and the rural credit market. In Section 
2.4 we analyse borrowers of the VFs regarding the four types of households who get it, 
keep it, lose it and do not use it. Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Expectations on the Thai Village Fund programme 
Expectations and motivations about the VF programme are shaped by debates about 
microfinance in general and in Thailand. We briefly refer to these discussions before we 
discuss the specific research on the Thai VF programme. 
In the last decades a lot of research has been conducted on the functionality of 
microfinance concepts and programmes. An early overview of different lending 
institutions in rural credit markets is given by Bell (1990). For an empirical impact 
study of microfinance on poverty reduction, see Khandker (2005). Separating lenders 
within rural credit markets into informal, formal and semiformal lenders, Pham and 
Lensink (2007) focus on different lending practices of those types of institutions. Policy 
induced microfinance programmes especially were subjected to closer scrutiny as they 
are expensive programmes whose impacts are not easy to assess. Most researchers agree 
that microfinance institutions can enhance the living conditions of poor people in 
developing countries. In particular, these institutions can contribute to reducing poverty; 
they allow farmers to borrow, especially when harvests are bad, and so give them the 
opportunity to smooth their consumption even if current production possibilities are 
scarce. In addition they allow entrepreneurs to set up businesses and permit a 
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diversification of income generation and the establishment of a more sustainable sector 
based on non- agricultural business and innovation (World Bank, 2008). So the overall 
assessment of many microfinance programmes tends to be positive.  
With respect to Thailand, an early benchmark study by Siamwalla et al. (1990) 
analyses the Thai rural credit market. Although the interventions of the Thai 
government into the rural credit market date back to the beginning of the 20th century, 
the establishment of the state-owned Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC) in 1966 was the major intervention in recent decades. Aiming at 
an improved access to finance for rural farmers, the BAAC has customers that are 
mainly people in the rural areas. Another intervention, in the 1970s, was the 
requirement that commercial banks had to spread their business into the rural areas of 
the country. These measures were undertaken to ease the dependency of rural 
households on informal lenders. 
The introduction of the VFs in each of the Thai villages is another step to improve 
access to finance in rural Thailand. But despite the effort to establish formal and semi-
formal institutions in the rural areas informal lenders still play an important role. The 
segmented rural credit market, its institutions and their impact on the poor are therefore 
an interesting target for researchers (for a general discussion, see Hermes and Lensink 
(2007). 
Coleman (1999) examines the impact of group lending in Thailand using a panel 
data- set with two waves. In a quasi-experimental setting he studies the effect of group 
lending on the welfare of borrowers. He finds that group lending procedures of so-called 
village banks (another microfinance concept introduced prior to the VF in Thailand) 
which are based on the idea of the Grameen Bank, are limited in their ability to enhance 
the living conditions of borrowers. Focusing on the rural small-scale entrepreneurs and 
especially on women, the author does not find any significant impact on physical assets, 
enhanced spending or even education. But the data Coleman is using reveals many 
interdependencies and substitution effects among the different sources of credit. It 
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seems that some households borrow to pay back other loans, and some even borrow to 
lend the money out at higher interest rates. Therefore it will be interesting to know 
which category the current VF loans can be assigned to. 
In a later study, Coleman (2006) evaluates the impact of two microfinance 
institutions, namely the Rural Friends Association (RFA) and the Foundation for 
Integrated Agricultural Management (FIAM) which are operating in Northeast 
Thailand. According to Coleman the impact evaluation of policy-induced programmes 
suffers from two biases: first, self-selection of members and non-members and second, 
programme placement in certain villages based on unobserved characteristics of the 
villages chosen. Only households which are better able to use credit funds and therefore 
realise higher returns will self-select into the programmes; these might be placed in 
villages that are more appropriate for funding due to unobservable characteristics like 
high entrepreneurial skills and good organisation. Both biases lead to an overestimation 
of programme impacts. Fortunately, in the case of VFs, the second bias does not occur 
because the fund is established in all Thai villages making placement selection 
impossible. Coleman finds that the wealthier households are more likely to borrow from 
those programmes and by controlling for the selection biases he discovers larger 
positive effects of finance on the welfare of programme committee members than on the 
welfare of “rank-and-file” members. 
Schaaf (2010) examines the effect of community groups with microfinance 
components on the well-being of poor village people. Using data from a single village 
in north-eastern Thailand her focus lies on the assessment of improvements in living 
conditions through microfinance institutions. Extending a model of Chen (1997) she 
uses a multi-dimensional framework to measure people’s well-being with the following 
dimensions: material, cognitive, perceptual and relational. She finds that the VFs, 
together with community banks, have the highest number of members compared to 
other microfinance institutions, though women are not specially targeted. But compared 
to other community groups such as product groups, the VFs concentrate on finance and 
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they are therefore restricted to improving primarily the material dimension of people’s 
well-being. 
Kaboski and Townsend (2005) evaluate microfinance programmes also using data 
from Thailand (before the VF programme was implemented) and find that microfinance 
promotes asset growth, helps to smooth consumption, eases occupational mobility and 
is able to decrease money lender reliance. 
In a later study, Kaboski and Townsend (2012) analyse the impact of VF credits 
on rural households. They use a panel data-set which captures data on 960 households 
in 64 villages over a seven-year time period. Their most striking findings are that the 
introduction of VFs enhances consumption, short-term credit, investment in agriculture, 
income growth and wages in the labour market and for businesses. Asset endowment of 
households, however, decreased. The authors rely on two theories to explain these 
patterns. The buffer stock model suggests that formerly credit-constrained households 
increase their consumption if the credit constraints have eased due to the availability of 
VF credits. The second model relies on the assumption that more available credit will 
lead to more business start-ups. As a consequence higher wages in the labour market 
can be expected; indeed, the study finds higher wages but no more new businesses. 
Furthermore this study finds that the overall credit amount increases if VF loans 
are available. The authors take this as evidence that VFs do not crowd out other sources 
of credit. This assumption is amplified by the observation of no lower interest rates, 
indicating still some scarcity of capital in the rural markets. The injection of capital via 
VFs does not reveal an additional effect, as one unit of injected capital does not lead to 
more than a single unit of further credit. Our study confirms this finding by and large, 
however, by choosing another perspective; we focus on household characteristics 
distinguishing between households who receive such loans successively and those who 
receive a VF loan only once. 
Boonperm et al. (2013) address in their analysis the effect of VF loans on income, 
expenditure and the endowment with assets. Using the Thailand Socioeconomic 
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Surveys of 2002 and 2004, with an overall sample of 35,000 households in each survey, 
they assess the extent of VF impact. By applying a propensity score-matching method 
they compare borrowing households with households which have similar characteristics 
but do not borrow from VFs. They find an effect for VF borrowers of 1.9% more 
income, 3.3% more expenditures and 5% higher endowment with durable assets 
compared to the control group. In combination with loans from the BAAC the effect on 
income is even higher. Furthermore the effects seem to be larger for households with 
lower expenditures indicating a good targeting of poor households. But VF loans are not 
used by everyone; about 24% of the households in the sample did not want to borrow 
from VFs because they had no need for credit, and another 25% did not want to go into 
debt. A majority of VF borrowers, according to their own statements, profited from the 
access to finance but most of them are not satisfied with the current form of the 
programme. For example they want the loans to be larger and the duration of the loans 
to be longer. This has to be expected due to the favourable terms of VF loans and is 
consistent with our own interview experiences in the field. 
Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) examine whether VFs are indeed 
improving access to finance and whether they are working in the intended way, that is 
targeting the relatively poor more than already existing institutions. Using a 
multinomial logit model to describe what determines borrowing from a certain 
institution, the authors find that the VFs serve especially those households which are in 
an intermediate state regarding income and wealth and are more prone to borrow from 
informal lending institutions. Although it remains unclear whether the VF programme is 
more efficient than other lending institutions, VF loans are reaching their aim in 
targeting the poor and reducing credit constraints, and therefore improve access to 
finance. We extend this work by stretching the analysis over two waves of the 
household survey.  
Thus there are some encouraging findings on the impact of the VF programme. At 
the same time, however, some scepticism seems to be appropriate, as Morduch (1999: 
1571) warns about new microfinance institutions in general: “Most of those funds are 
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being mobilised and channelled to new, untested institutions, and existing resources are 
being reallocated from traditional poverty alleviation programmes to microfinance. 
With donor funding pouring in, practitioners have limited incentives to step back and 
question exactly how and where monies will be best spent”. 
 
2.3 Our data 
In this section we briefly describe our data, from general to specific. The data is part of 
a larger household survey study from which we consider here only those households 
which get a loan. We characterise (a) the survey, (b) the borrowing households, (c) the 
lending institutions in general and (d) the VF in more detail. 
(a)  The data emanates from a research project funded by the German Research 
Foundation analysing vulnerability to poverty of rural households. For this project, 
representative household surveys were conducted from April to June in 2007 and in 
2008 respectively, in three provinces in north-eastern Thailand (namely Buri Ram, 
Nakhon Phanom and Ubon Ratchathani). Households were chosen in a three-stage 
random sampling procedure being representative for the rural population in the three 
provinces (see Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011). 
(b)  From the total of almost 2,200 households we consider a subset which fulfils 
three requirements: First, households must be covered by both waves of the survey; 
second, households must take at least one new loan during one period; and, third, we do 
not consider outliers defined as values beyond the median plus or minus eight times the 
standard deviation. Due to these requirements we get a sample of 1,575 households. 
This sample, covering about 74% of the representative survey sample, is characterised 
as can be seen in Table 1. 
Household heads are usually male and on average 54 years old. Their education 
reflects their age, that is schooling happened decades ago and according to the 
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compulsory schooling years at that time it was only 4 to 5 years long. Almost two thirds 
work as farmers, and their own land is as small as two hectares. Household size is about 
 
Table 1: Borrower characteristics 
Household characteristics 2007 2008
       mean std. deviation observations        mean std. deviation observations
Age of household head 53.9 (12.932) 1,570 54.7 (13.043) 1,569
Proportion of female- headed household 25.1% (0.434) 1,570 25.2% (0.434) 1,569
Number of adults per household 2.7 (1.179) 1,570 2.7 (1.216) 1,569
Number of children per household 1.3 (1.090) 1,570 1.4 (1.083) 1,569
Household occupation (%) 1,570 1,569
Farm household 64.1% (0.478) 1,570 62.5% (0.484) 1,569
Informal worker 9.7% (0.297) 1,570 11.7% (0.322) 1,569
Formal worker 7.2% (0.259) 1,570 7.0% (0.256) 1,569
Business owner 7.8% (0.269) 1,570 7.6% (0.266) 1,569
Inactive 11.1% (0.315) 1,570 10.8% (0.311) 1,569
Years of education 4.6 (2.684) 1,396 4.6 (2.810) 1,402
Income (1,000 THB) 112 (134) 1,546 122 (155) 1,568
Assets (1,000 THB) 219 (317) 1,570 202 (395) 1,569
Area of owned land (hectare) 2.1 (3.184) 1,570 1.9 (3.022) 1,568
 
 
4 persons. Household assets are worth above 200,000 Baht which is roughly US$ 5,600, 
and their annual income is above 110,000 Baht, which is US$ 3,100. Changes between 
2007 and 2008 are largely negligible for our purposes. Overall, most of these household 
members live in modest living conditions, as one might expect for the relatively poor 
north-eastern region of Thailand.  
(c)  Finally, we briefly characterise the lending institutions operating in rural 
Thailand. The rural credit market in Thailand is somewhat segmented, with many 
players granting loans. Whereas some authors follow the classification of formal vs. 
informal lending institutions our approach divides all lending institutions into seven 
groups. In order of tentatively decreasing formality these are (1) commercial banks 
(CB), (2) the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), (3) village 
funds (VF), (4) credit and savings groups and cooperatives (CRED), (5) policy funds 
(POLICY), (6) private moneylender (ML) and (7) relatives and friends (RELA). This 
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approach is also used by Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) and is applied here too 
to make the results of this research compatible with their results. 
CBs are normal commercial banks, including some government institutions such 
as the Government Savings Bank. The BAAC is a state-owned bank that was founded in 
the 1960s to support the rural population and, especially, to provide financial access to 
farmers. The VF are policy-induced funds that are organised at the village level; they 
exist in every one of the 77,000 Thai villages, and have operated since 2001. CREDSs 
are mainly community based, and include a variety of slightly different institutions, for 
example rice banks. POLICYs include all policy loans that have been given for the 
purpose of alleviating poverty and supporting the poor. MLs are private moneylenders 
and pawnshops who are often the only source of credit and therefore usually charge a 
high interest rate. The most informal source of credit are RELAs who lend money very 
informally and often at short notice, without charging interest in many cases. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the importance of these seven lending 
“institutions” with respect to volume and number of loans in 2007 and 2008. Please note 
that we do not cover all outstanding loans but only newly granted loans which are 
outstanding. 
In this respect, the BAAC is the largest institution regarding volume of loans, 
while the VF is the largest regarding the number of loans. More than 44% of all new 
loans granted in our sample stem from the VF, but due to their smaller size – about 
16,000 Baht each – they add up to a volume of market share of only about 24%. Still, 
this makes the VF the second largest lending institution behind the BAAC, following 
this criterion (share of new loans by volume). 
 
Any changes between 2007 and 2008 are small with two notable exceptions, that 
is the decreasing number of loans granted by CBs and MLs. As we observe only two 
periods and the absolute numbers are small, we are not sure whether these decreases 
reflect systematic changes. If so, the origins of these changes are unclear; possibly, they 
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are a consequence of the financial crisis, in that more market-oriented institutions (in 
contrast to state-run institutions) react to the crisis by a more rigid lending policy. 
 
Table 2: Share of different lending institutions on overall volume and credit contracts 
CB BAAC VF CRED POLICY ML RELA
2007
average loan size (1,000 THB) 92 51 16 39 14 44 30
volume of credit (1,000 THB) 3,900 25,900 15,800 10,800 1,500 5,900 4,200
average volume per hh (1,000 THB) 98 57 18 45 14 48 34
share on volume 5.7% 38.1% 23.2% 15.9% 2.2% 8.7% 6.2%
number of loan contracts 42 512 974 275 107 134 140
share on loan contracts 1.9% 23.4% 44.6% 12.6% 4.9% 6.1% 6.5%
number of borrowing households 40 457 879 240 106 122 124
2008
average loan size (1,000 THB) 71 50 16 42 9 58 27
volume of credit (1,000 THB) 1,600 26,700 15,600 12,000 900 3,500 4,100
average volume per hh (1,000 THB) 76 57 18 47 10 64 33
share on volume 2.5% 41.4% 24.2% 18.6% 1.4% 5.5% 6.4%
number of loan contracts 23 536 964 285 100 60 149
share on loan contracts 1.1% 25.3% 45.5% 13.5% 4.7% 2.8% 7.0%
number of borrowing households 21 471 862 253 95 55 124
 
 
(d)  Based on the idea of microfinance institutions – as established all over the 
world – the Thai government started the VF programme in 2001. Within a very short 
time, self-governed vehicles – the so-called VFs – were introduced in every one of the 
77,000 Thai villages. Each fund was equipped with 1 million Baht of initial capital. The 
overall costs of 77 billion Baht, or US$ 1.8 billion, which is 1.5% of the Thai GDP in 
the same year, makes the VF programme one of the largest in the world (Kaboski and 
Townsend, 2012). 
VFs are run by the village members themselves, who have to form a VF 
committee and have to open a bank account at the BAAC or another state bank or 
savings cooperation via which the money transfer is provided. The borrowers have to 
open an account at the same credit institution to receive the loan. Only members of the 
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VF can apply for a loan and to solve moral hazard and adverse selection problems they 
have to provide personal guarantors from among other members of the fund. 
 
2.4 Borrowers of the village fund 
Our research is focused on the borrowers of the VF and whether and how they change 
over time. We analyse these issues in three sections: in Section 2.4.1 we differentiate all 
borrowers into four groups, depending on whether they borrowed from the VF in either 
2007 or 2008, or in both years or never. This describes the outreach of the VF. Section 
2.4.2 examines characteristics of these groups, allowing comparisons across groups and 
tentatively over time. Section 2.4.3 describes in detail all new loans granted in 2007 and 
2008 for the four groups of interest, which allows a first impression on which direction 
the loss or gain regarding a VF loan may have influenced the household behaviour. This 
also indicates possible substitution effects between the VF and alternative sources of 
credit. 
 
2.4.1 Characteristics of four groups of borrowers 
We divided our sample into four categories of households according to their borrowing 
from the VF. We distinguish borrowing from the VF in two periods, that is the 12 
months up to the respective survey waves in 2007 and 2008: (1) The first group of 
borrowing households borrowed from VFs only in the first year but not in the second 
year. (2) The second group borrowed from the VF only in the second year, (3) the third 
group borrowed from the VF in both years, and (4) the fourth group never borrowed 
from the VF at all. 
Table 3 briefly gives some characteristics of these four groups. Interestingly the 
largest group by far is Group 3, that is those households who received a loan from the 
VF in 2007 and 2008. Of the total of 1,575 households in our sample, the “permanent” 
VF borrowers make up about 40%. The second largest group is Group 4, that is 
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households which never borrowed from the VF. Interesting for our purposes are also 
those households which either lost a VF loan or got one for the first time, that is Groups 
1 and 2 respectively. 
Analysing the descriptive statistics documented in Table 3, Group 4 seems to be 
better off in economic terms compared to the other three groups in both survey waves, 
as these households have slightly longer education, higher income, more assets and 
more land at their disposal. This is consistent with the finding in Menkhoff and 
Rungruxsirivorn (2011), covering the 2007 wave only, that the VF reaches households 
with slightly lower socio-economic status. It also indicates that the VF works differently 
from the microfinance institutions analysed by Coleman (2006). 
Regarding changes between the two waves, it seems interesting that despite a 
certain increase in income, other wealth indicators – such as assets and the area of 
owned land – drop. In this latter respect, it is Group 1 in particular which has to face a 
problematic situation, as the loss of the VF loan in 2008 coincides with the worst 
economic status of the four groups and the most significant losses in assets and land; it 
is a topic for speculation that the somewhat higher income in 2008 could have been 
caused by sales of assets. For Group 2, income increases in the second wave where the 
VF loans have been received, but the loans seem to stabilise the economic conditions 
rather than leading to an overall improvement of the economic conditions. Group 3 
relies on VF loans in both waves; obviously, those households are economically better 
off than one-time recipients and worse off than Group 4 households. Furthermore, the 
economic situation of the Groups 3 households can be described as fluctuating less over 
time than the households of all other groups. There are at least two explanations for this: 
first, these households do not really want to improve their economic situation, or, 
second, they are simply unable to change it. On closer inspection, we see that their 
situation gets worse in 2008, so the second explanation may be more satisfactory. 
According to this interpretation, VF loans help stabilise the situation at a medium level, 
but households are unable to improve their situation further. 
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Table 3: Borrower characteristics for lending groups and the weighted average over all 
Household characteristics      Group 1      Group 2      Group 3      Group 4 Average
2007
Age of household head 54.30 56.02 52.58 54.72 53.94
(13.050) (13.475) (12.733) (12.742) (12.932)
Proportion of female- headed household 29.3% 29.3% 23.9% 23.2% 25.1%
(0.456) (0.456) (0.427) (0.422) (0.434)
Household size 4.20 4.06 4.09 4.02 4.08
(1.769) (1.859) (1.684) (1.620) (1.698)
Household occupation (%)
Farm household 58.6% 62.0% 65.6% 65.2% 64.1%
(0.494) (0.487) (0.475) (0.477) (0.480)
Informal worker 11.3% 9.3% 8.2% 11.3% 9.4%
(0.317) (0.291) (0.2749) (0.317) (0.297)
Formal worker 5.9% 8.8% 6.2% 8.4% 7.2%
(0.235) (0.284) (0.242) (0.278) (0.259)
Business owner 12.2% 5.9% 10.0% 4.0% 7.8%
(0.3276) (0.235) (0.300) (0.198) (0.269)
Years of education 4.48 4.41 4.61 4.61 4.57
(2.892) (2.841) (2.487) (2.783) (2.684)
Income (1000 THB) 100 109 115 115 112
(118) (108) (152) (126) (134)
Assets (1000 THB) 204 208 216 236 219
(293) (300) (283) (374) (317)
Area of owned land (hectare) 1.74 1.92 2.10 2.25 2.07
(2.653) (2.791) (2.913) (3.844) (3.184)
2008
Age of household head 55.04 56.84 53.44 55.32 54.71
(12.89) (13.283) (12.780) (13.188) (13.043)
Proportion of female- headed household 29.3% 28.3% 24.5% 22.9% 25.2%
(0.456) (0.452) (0.430) (0.420) (0.434)
Household size 4.05 4.15 4.15 4.02 4.1
(1.762) (1.829) (1.742) (1.649) (1.730)
Household occupation (%)
Farm household 55.0% 58.0% 64.5% 64.7% 62.3%
(0.499) (0.495) (0.479) (0.478) (0.484)
Informal worker 14.4% 14.1% 9.3% 12.7% 11.7%
(0.352) (0.349) (0.290) (0.333) (0.322)
Formal worker 6.3% 8.8% 6.2% 7.6% 7.0%
(0.244) (0.284) (0.242) (0.265) (0.255)
Business owner 12.2% 5.4% 8.5% 5.7% 7.6%
(0.328) (0.226) (0.279) (0.232) (0.266)
Years of education 4.71 4.43 4.54 4.59 4.56
(3.310) (3.080) (2.537) (2.820) (2.811)
Income (1000 THB) 112 130 116 130 122
(128) (181) (136) (176) (155)
Assets (1000 THB) 161 200 193 233 202
(227) (389) (342) (506) (395)
Area of owned land (hectare) 1.45 1.70 1.93 1.96 1.85
(2.379) (2.794) (2.662) (3.725) (3.022)
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: Group 1 are households who received VF loans only in the first wave; Group 2 are households who received VF 
loans only in the second wave; Group 3 received VF loans in both waves, and Group 4 never borrowed from VF, but
did borrow from other institutions.
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2.4.2 Characteristics of village fund borrowers 
Table 4 shows what kinds of households in general do receive VF loans, using a 
multivariate panel probit model. Indeed, VF borrowers and non-VF borrowers are 
systematically different. Starting with the household-related characteristics, VF 
borrowers are likely to be large households (in terms of both number of adults and 
number of children) with a young household head who is less educated. Another 
interesting finding is the occupation of VF borrowers. We know from Table 3 that VF 
borrowers are frequently “business owners”, which does not necessarily imply a 
comfortable economic situation; having any of the occupations listed in Table 4 leads to 
a lower probability of having a VF loan. This has to be interpreted in relation to the 
omitted base category, which is business owner. Being a business owner therefore 
increases the probability of receiving a VF loan. 
Turning to the economic status variables, these do not give a clear pattern. 
Whereas income is negatively related to VF loans, asset endowment and the area of 
owned land is not. Thus none of these variables is significant, which makes any 
conclusions at this point problematic. 
Another interesting finding is the size of the villages the borrowers come from. 
Every VF received the same amount of initial capital – one million Baht – regardless of 
village size. As a result loan applicants from small villages are more likely to be 
successful with their application. This pattern is confirmed by Table 4 showing that an 
increasing village size leads to a lower probability of receiving a VF loan. 
In order to hone our analysis more finely, we compare the characteristics of VF 
borrowers (belonging to Groups 1 to 3) to Group 4 households (which never borrowed 
from the VF). We choose a multinomial logit as our estimation approach because we do 
not want to impose any structure on Groups 1 to 3. This analysis is conducted by taking 
the average of the observed values of both waves for each variable and for each 
household. This approach allows the time dimension problem of the data structure to be 
solved; however, we lose information about changes over time. To control for 
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individual effects, we use cluster robust standard errors at household level. Results can 
be seen in Table 5 where relative-risk ratios are presented. 
A relative-risk ratio of 0.579 for the dummy variable ‘farmer’ for Group 1 
households shows the relative probability of belonging to Group 1 relative to the 
reference category (Group 4) if the dummy changes from 0 to 1. In other words, the 
probability that a household will fall into Group 1 is about 58% if the probability of 
belonging to the reference category is 100%. 
The household size measured as number of adults is still important, even if it is 
significant for Group 3 only. Having a young household head increases the probability 
of being in Group 3 but not Group 2. Group 2 and Group 3 households are more likely 
to be less well educated, but this is not true for Group 1. Higher-income households are 
less likely to be assigned to Groups 1, 2 and 3, although this effect is only significant for 
Group 1 households. For all groups, being a farmer decreases the probability of being a 
VF borrower, but this is statistically significant only for Group 1. Living in a small 
village increases the probability of being a VF borrower, which is consistent with Table 
4. 
VF borrowers of Group 1 or 2 either are occasional borrowers by choice or are 
able to receive VF loans only once in a while. To address this issue, we take a closer 
look at the differences between the groups. Table 3 suggests that Group 1 has lower 
income than Group 3, but Group 2, after receiving the VF loan, has higher income than 
Group 3. In terms of education, income and assets, Group 3 seems to be in a central 
category, between Groups 1 and 2. The better educated Group 1 may receive VF loans 
only because of their relatively high education compared to Group 2 households, which 
indicates lower risk (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008). Group 2, which is richer in terms 
of assets, can pledge more collateral and can be considered as more creditworthy than 
Group 1 households. Even though the VFs usually do not require tangible collateral, it 
may still be an indicator for lower risk. Either way, the loss or the receipt of a VF loan 
generates changes in the economic situation of both groups, as can be seen in Table 3:
  
 
 
 Table 4: Panel probit model predicting VF loans 
Dependent variable VF loan
Household characteristics
Number of children 0.0867*
(0.0497)
Number of adults 0.101**
(0.044)
Dummy if household head is female -0.0712
(0.131)
Age of household head (in years) -0.0237***
(0.00517)
Income per household (in Baht) -2.71e-07
(2.16e-07)
Education of household head (in years) -0.0389*
(0.0202)
Asset endowment (in Baht) 5.37e-08
(8.79e-08)
Area of landholding (in hectare) 0.00816
(0.0167)
Occupation dummies
Household head is farmer -0.325*
(0.173)
Household head is informal worker -0.483**
(0.207)
Household head is formal worker -0.476*
(0.253)
Household head is economically inactive -0.244
(0.2237)
Village size -0.00253***
(0.0006)
Constant 1.309***
(0.370)
Observations 3,767
Number of households 1,953
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
 
Table 5: Multinomial logit model predicting being in different groups 
Dependent variable Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Household characteristics
Number of children 1.023 0.919 0.986
(0.0863) (0.0845) (0.0628)
Number of adults 1.125 1.145 1.133*
(0.0994) (0.111) (0.0757)
Dummy if household head is female 1.292 1.227 1.196
(0.267) (0.272) (0.195)
Age of household head (in years) 0.995 1.004 0.982***
(0.00794) (0.00874) (0.00594)
Income per household (in Baht) 0.741** 0.970 0.853
(0.0972) (0.121) (0.0826)
Education of household head (in years) 1.004 0.984 0.980
(0.0371) (0.0401) (0.0247)
Asset endowment (in Baht) 1.104 1.060 1.105
(0.118) (0.115) (0.0894)
Area of landholding (in hectare) 0.949 0.945 0.987
(0.0387) (0.0415) (0.0207)
Dummy variables
Household head is farmer 0.579** 0.779 0.823
(0.125) (0.181) (0.134)
Household lives in a small village 1.672*** 1.552 1.480***
(0.308) (0.295) (0.207)
Constant 5.003 0.211 5.322
(7.315) (0.315) (5.882)
Observations 1,389 1,389 1,389
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The table shows relative-risk ratios, for income and assets logarithmic values are used.
Note: Group 1 are households who received VF loans only in the first wave; Group 2 are 
housheolds who received VF loans only in the second wave, and Group 3
received VF loans in both waves.
The regression is run on average values of the first and second wave.
 
 
 
 
2
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Losing a VF loan downgrades the economic situation (see Group 1), and receiving a VF 
loan improves the economic situation (see Group 2). For those households who 
permanently rely on VF loans, namely Group 3, the loans seem to have no observable 
impact on income and assets over the two-year period considered. 
 
2.4.3 Changes in new loans 
As a last step in our analysis, we document the number and volume of new loans in both 
periods. From this, we can see whether the loss or gain of a VF loan in Groups 1 and 2 
respectively leads to noticeably different behaviour. 
Interestingly, Group 1 indicates that households losing a VF loan, that is after a 
VF loan in 2007 with a one-year duration and no new VF loan in 2008, do not seem to 
apply for (or receive) new loans from other lenders (see Table 6). In fact, neither the 
number nor the volume of loans from the six other sources increases much in 2008 
compared to 2007. Consequently, the VF loan is a limited event for these households – 
it is available for a certain limited period only. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the purpose for borrowing, too, is limited, and is fulfilled on termination of the 
loan. Another interpretation may be that VF loans are seen as windfall profits which 
come and go but do not affect behaviour much. 
The surprisingly unrelated role of VF loans can also be seen for Group 2. Even 
though the newly gained VF loans are important for these households, they do not 
change their behaviour much regarding other lenders: the number of loans from lenders 
other than the VF, and the volume that households receive from these loans, are hardly 
affected by the many newly received VF loans. This is a different finding compared to 
Coleman (1999) who observes much substitution between loans. 
The overall stability in households’ borrowing behaviour is also shown by the 
results for Groups 3 and 4 in Table 6, where number and volume of loans remain quite 
stable across the two periods. Thus it appears that the VF loans do not crowd out other 
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Table 6: New loans per household (in 1,000 Baht) and shares on overall loan volume 
2007 2008
number of volume share on number of volume share on
Household borrowing per overall loan borrowing per overall loan
category households household volume households household volume
Group 1
CB 6 148 9.2% 2 20 0.9%
BAAC 58 55 33.3% 56 62 76.2%
VF 222 17 40.0%
CRED 28 41 11.9% 17 31 11.8%
POLICY 17 5 0.9% 10 5 1.1%
ML 11 24 2.7% 8 35 6.2%
RELA 15 12 1.9% 11 16 3.8%
Total 357 43.1 100.0% 104 28.2 100.0%
Group 2
CB 5 88 8.8% 6 77 5.6%
BAAC 36 78 55.8% 51 55 34.0%
VF 205 17 41.1%
CRED 23 25 11.5% 30 30 11.0%
POLICY 7 18 2.5% 9 5 0.6%
ML 14 55 15.4% 8 38 3.6%
RELA 8 38 6.0% 11 30 4.0%
Total 93 50.3 100.0% 320 36.0 100.0%
Group 3
CB 10 80 2.3% 5 39 0.6%
BAAC 199 54 31.6% 194 57 34.9%
VF 657 18 35.1% 657 19 38.7%
CRED 120 41 14.5% 130 32 13.0%
POLICY 48 18 2.6% 45 7 1.0%
ML 41 65 7.9% 13 143 5.8%
RELA 43 46 5.9% 45 43 6.0%
Total 1118 46.0 100.0% 1,089 48.6 100.0%
Group 4
CB 19 92 8.9% 8 118 4.7%
BAAC 164 56 47.3% 170 55 46.8%
VF
CRED 69 60 21.4% 76 85 32.3%
POLICY 34 12 2.0% 31 17 2.6%
ML 56 40 11.4% 26 39 5.1%
RELA 58 30 8.8% 57 29 8.4%
Total 400 48.3 100.0% 368 57.2 100.0%
Note: Group 1 are households who received VF loans only in the first wave; Group 2 are households who received 
VF loans only in the second wave; Group 3 received VF loans in both waves, and Group 4 never borrowed from VF,
 but did borrow from other institutions.
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lending programmes but are rather seen as a supplementary lending source, presumably 
due their attractive conditions. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
This article examines the role of VFs in the rural credit market of Thailand. In order to 
better understand the role of VFs, we form four groups of borrowers, namely (1) 
borrowers who lose their VF loan in the second period, (2) borrowers who get a new VF 
loan in the second period, (3) those who have a VF loan in both periods and (4) those 
who have never had a VF loan. 
Based on the two-wave panel on the borrowing of north-eastern households, we 
contribute three findings to the literature on VFs in Thailand: first, despite the wide-
spread use of VF loans there is some structure across households as VF borrowers seem 
to have a worse economic status than non-borrowers which is underlined by the fact that 
households losing a VF loan report lower wealth than other households. Second, the 
regression approach indicates that VF borrowers are characterised not only by a lower 
economic status but also by having more adults in their household and more often being 
business owners. In combination with their lower economic status – less often owning 
land and less often being a farmer – this tentatively indicates underemployment of the 
workforce. Third, the examination of new loans across the two periods indicates that VF 
loans do not seem to have a permanent impact on borrowing behaviour at household 
level. Otherwise, one would expect either that VF loans partially substitutes other loans 
or that they are partially substituted by other loans – but we cannot observe any such 
behaviour. 
Obviously, this raises new questions regarding the targeting of lending and the 
behaviour of borrowers. In subsequent work, we plan to analyse households in more 
detail in order to find out which circumstances may lead to a deterioration of the 
economic situation after losing the VF loan. Furthermore, we would like to learn about 
a possible impact of VF loans on small-scale businesses. Finally, we plan to extend the 
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loans considered in order to come close to a full loan portfolio which may provide new 
insights into loan substitution. In any case, the VF deserves more thorough 
investigation. 
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3. Why are informal loans still a big deal? Evidence from Northeast 
Thailand** 
 
 
Abstract 
Using a difference-in-differences estimation approach this paper finds that borrowing 
purposes differ across income levels of rural households in Northeast Thailand. As a 
consequence different household groups profit from informal loans in different ways. 
Poor households increase their asset endowment and in particular farming assets 
whereas rich households’ (food) consumption rises, especially if households borrow due 
to a shock. By showing that informal loans serve different households for different 
purposes this paper provides an explanation why informal loans still play an important 
role.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Rural credit markets in developing countries are often very diverse. Households can 
choose from various sources of credit, ranging from conventional formal lenders to a 
variety of informal lenders. Since informal loans in general are more expensive than 
formal loans, many attempts have been made to enhance the access to finance for the 
poor and to alleviate reliance on informal sources. Yet, there are still households who 
opt to borrow from informal sources so that these enjoy great popularity in developing 
countries. This is even more striking since people are poor or threatened to fall into 
poverty more often than in more developed areas. They suffer from volatile income due 
                                                 
**
 I would like to thank Olaf Huebler, Lukas Menkhoff, Patrick Puhani and Maik Schmeling for helpful 
comments. Furthermore I thank participants of the annual conference of the German Economic 
Association and members of the Research Committee on Development Economics of the German 
Economic Association. Comments of participants at various seminars have been very helpful as well. 
Financial support by the German Research Foundation (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged. 
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to farming activities and small changes in their sensitive environment may cause severe 
income losses. Finance at reasonable prices is a crucial issue for them to bridge income 
deficits and to finance inputs for the next harvesting season. 
This paper examines in which way the use of informal loans differs across income 
groups of households and it provides insights into the effects informal loans have on 
wealth indicators of household groups. Therefore this paper contributes to the literature 
in that it explains why informal loans still play such an important role for household 
finance in rural areas of developing countries.  
A broad literature examines the existence of informal loans which is driven by 
imperfections on rural credit markets. These imperfections comprise screening, 
incentive and enforcement problems circumvented by informal lenders who have more 
information on borrowers than formal lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). Following this 
argument households are credit rationed in the formal sector and therefore have to rely 
on more informal sources (Guirkinger, 2008). In this sense the informal sector can be 
considered as a recipient of spillover demand from the formal sector. Another strand of 
literature addresses the use of informal loans. Most studies find that formal loans are 
used for production whereas informal loans are used for consumption purposes 
(Barslund and Tarp, 2008; Zeller, 1994; Yadav et al., 1992). As a consequence informal 
loans are rather small, short-term and usually not to be collateralised (Siamwalla et al., 
1990). However, there are other studies who find that the use of informal loans is not 
limited to consumption purposes (Brandt and Hosios, 2010; Duong and Izumida 2002). 
This paper complements the existing literature by distinguishing groups of 
households according to income and disentangles the use and effect of informal loans 
found above. This requires specific information on households’ characteristics, in 
particular on their economic status and detailed information on different (informal) 
lenders operating in the market. The data used here provides this information. This 
paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first which is able to distinguish the use and 
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effect of informal loans for different household groups which are defined according to 
income.  
Using a panel data set consisting of two waves of a household survey that was 
conducted between April and June 2007 and between April and June 2008 in rural 
Thailand, I employ a difference-in-differences estimation to calculate the effect of 
informal loans on different wealth indicators, that is asset endowment and per capita 
consumption. In a second step the effects for rich and poor households are compared. 
The results show that poor as well as rich households demand informal loans but use 
them for different purposes. 
For the whole sample, there is a large effect on total asset accumulation and on 
farming assets as well whereas there is no effect on (food) consumption per capita. To 
get further insights I split the sample into three groups according to household income. 
In increasing order of income these are: the vulnerable, the relatively poor and the 
relatively rich households. Regressions for different types of households reveal that 
asset endowment increases only for relatively poor households and that there is a 
positive effect on (food) consumption per capita which is only valid for the richest 
households.  
Informal loans are used by poor as well as by rich households, but obviously it 
seems as if they serve different purposes. They enhance asset endowment of relatively 
poor households whereas enable higher (food) consumption for relatively rich 
households, especially if households are non-farming, credit-rationed in the formal 
sector and/or negatively affected by a shock. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 distinguishes 
informal loans from formal loans and gives an overview of the use of informal loans as 
has been found in former studies. Subsequently an overview of impact assessment 
methods is given. Section 3.3 describes informal loans and household characteristics in 
the context of the rural area in Thailand’s Northeast. Section 3.4 shows the effect of 
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informal loans on wealth indicators. Robustness checks are presented in Section 3.5 and 
Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Informal loans and impact assessment in rural markets 
This section first gives an overview of loan terms of formal and informal loans and 
describes the use of loans across different types of lenders. In a next step, impact 
assessment of loans and in particular microfinance institutions is discussed to derive the 
method used in this paper. 
 
3.2.1 Loan terms and use of informal loans  
Typical informal loans are described to be small, unsecured and short in maturity. Often 
they are restricted to certain geographical regions or a specific clientele such as “rural 
areas, agricultural contracts, households, individuals, or small entrepreneurial ventures” 
(Ayyagari et al., 2010). Barslund and Tarp (2008) find that informal loans are half the 
size of formal loans, that they are seldom collateralised and much shorter in duration 
than formal ones. Often, informal loans do not demand interest rates. Using data on 
informal loans for the Northeast of China Brandt and Hosios (2010) examine the choice 
of households to apply for positive interest rate loans or zero interest rate loans. Positive 
interest rate loans require the borrower to pay back principal plus interest whereas zero 
interest rate loans involve paying back principal only. Instead, borrowers have to fulfil 
other obligations like providing the lender with land, labour, agricultural goods or 
productive livestock and even loans in a later point in time so that loan costs may be 
higher than observed. For informal loans Drèze et al. (1998) find that zero interest rate 
loans are granted by family members and friends whereas moneylenders usually charge 
positive interest rates. If interest rates are charged, they often depend on the relationship 
between borrower and lender. Loans are cheap, if the relationship with the borrowers is 
close but expensive if the borrower is hardly known and is not be trusted without risk 
(Bhattacharjee, 2009; Diagne et al., 2000). 
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Regarding the use of loans, the dominant view is that formal loans are mainly 
used for production purposes and asset accumulation whereas informal loans are mainly 
used for consumption smoothening (Barslund and Tarp, 2008 for Vietnam; Mohieldin 
and Wright, 2000 for Egypt; Zeller, 1994 for Madagascar; Yadav et al., 1992 for 
Nepal). Duong and Izumida (2002) use data for Vietnam and find that formal loans are 
used for production purposes and informal loans are used for various purposes and, to 
some extent, for production as well. Their results indicate that especially poor 
households are credit rationed in the formal sector and funding beyond what the formal 
sector provides is often granted by informal sources. Other authors argue that the 
purpose of borrowing and therefore the use of loans are, though not always, independent 
of the type of lender. Brandt and Hosios (2010) find that formal and informal loans are 
used for both, consumption as well as investment purposes. Drèze et al. (1998) find that 
loans granted by family members and friends are mainly used for consumption purposes 
whereas loans from professional moneylenders are used for investment purposes.  
Other studies identify further features of informal loans: Since informal loans are 
available rather short-at-hand they are an important strategy to cope with negative 
shocks (Heltberg and Lund, 2009). Loans from rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs), for example, reduce the costs of savings for asset accumulation. As a 
consequence asset endowment increases if households participate in ROSCAs (Besley 
and Levenson, 1996). The idea is that ROSCAs collect small amounts of money from 
each member at given points in time. After each payment round the sum containing of 
all payments of all members will be given to one selected member of the ROSCA. This 
concept allows “intertemporal trade” since ROSCA members are able to receive a large 
amount of money earlier than had they saved on their own (Besley et al., 1993). Using 
data from the urban poor in Ethiopia, Alvi and Dendir (2009) examine the effect of 
informal loans and transfers on risk and vulnerability. They show that informal loans 
are rather used to bridge a financing gap and serve a sudden demand if a household is 
budget constrained. Especially vulnerable households do not receive more or higher 
amounts of informal loans than other households. The authors argue that informal loans 
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do not respond to various measures of vulnerability and therefore do not contribute to 
reducing risks for the urban poor. For the Philippines, Fafchamps and Lund (2003) find 
that informal loans indeed facilitate risk-sharing among households and permit 
consumption smoothening. However, some shocks cannot be insured by informal loans 
and the positive risk-sharing effect of these loans is restricted to small groups of 
families and friends. 
The literature cited above shows that the stereotypical informal loan does not exist. The 
design and purpose of informal loans are as manifold as rural credit markets themselves. 
However, some general patterns can be identified: informal loans are rather small, often 
they do not charge interest rates and they are more likely used for consumption 
purposes than for production purposes. 
 
3.2.2 Impact assessment in rural markets 
To get further insights into the use and effects of informal loans their impact should be 
evaluated carefully. A recent discussion regarding the impact evaluation of 
microfinance programs shows that there are various methods at hand. There are four 
main concerns which have to be taken into account: First, any real data comprise the 
problem that program placement might not be exogenous. Second, participation in those 
programs may not be exogenous and results may be driven by self-selection bias. Third, 
the effect of the program might be due to unobservable determinants. Fourth, the so-
called attrition bias should be taken into account (Tedeschi and Karlan, 2010; Roodman 
and Murdoch, 2009). I will come to these objections when discussing the methodology 
in this paper.  
Most literature addresses the impact of microfinance. But since the differentiation 
of microfinance loans and other loans is fuzzy one may as well orientate on evaluation 
of microfinance programs. There are three dominant methods used in the literature. Pitt 
and Khandker (1998) suggest using an instrumental variable approach if the 
participation of the program is correlated with the dependent variable. For a cross-
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sectional data set from Bangladesh they estimate the impact of a microfinance program 
by introducing instruments for the eligibility to treatment. They find that indeed 
consumption increases if microfinance is available and that the effect is stronger for 
female borrowers than for male borrowers. However, studies show that this is not 
unproblematic (Roodman and Murdoch, 2009; Pitt and Khandker, 1998). 
In another study Khandker (2005) expands the 1998- Pitt and Khandker study by 
introducing a panel data dimension using a second wave of survey results. He examines 
the effect of borrowing on consumption using a fixed effects panel data model. This 
model is used to eliminate the bias that might emanate from unobservable household 
characteristics; in other words: the endogeneity problem. However, it should be taken 
into account that this approach does not necessarily result in consistent estimates 
because first, the fixed effects (unmeasured determinants) may vary over time and 
second, measurement errors will be enforced if only two time periods are used. 
Khandker finds that indeed microfinance programs have positive impacts on especially 
poor people and women in the sense that they boost consumption levels and realise 
spillover effects on non-participants in the same village. 
Roodman and Morduch (2009) question the results of all three studies above. 
They replicate the studies and introduce a Two-Stage-Least-Square estimation. They 
cannot confirm the positive impact of microfinance that has been suggested by the 
studies above. Yet, they cannot confirm a negative effect of microfinance either. They 
argue that especially the instrumentation strategy is failing and that results are driven 
either by omitted variables or reverse causation. Furthermore the relationship between 
microfinance and consumption differs across subsamples.  
The time dimension in our data set (two waves) makes it possible to estimate 
panel models and to control for individual effects. I do not use an instrumental variable 
approach since instruments are hard to find and the methods are problematic. A Two-
Stage-Least-Square estimation assumes that outcome variables are not known for 
households who do not get the treatment. However, information on the outcome 
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variable is available for all households in the sample so that Two-Stage-Least-Squares 
is not appropriate in this case. Instead a difference-in-differences estimation is used 
which will be discussed in Section 3.4.1 in more detail.  
To estimate the impact of informal loans appropriate indicators are needed. The 
choice of an indicator depends on the research question and the time dimension of the 
data since changes in the variables of interest may take some time. I use asset 
endowment and (food) consumption per capita to indicate the relatively prompt effect of 
informal loans. An effect on working capital or assets should be observable within 6–12 
months after treatment. Rural households in developing countries often use informal 
loans to build up their asset stock. In case of lean times assets can be sold immediately 
and the money can be used for consumption purposes. Higher endowment with assets 
may also lead to higher creditworthiness of the households (Kaboski and Townsend, 
2011). Furthermore more assets help to diversify the asset portfolio of a household 
which leads to less covariant risks (Zaman, 1999). Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 
(2010) use consumption levels as indicators as well. However, the effect on 
consumption depends crucially on the loan purpose. If a loan is taken for consumption 
purposes, then the effect of treatment should be observable immediately. But, if loans 
are for investment purposes, then the effect on consumption takes longer because it 
takes time until the investments yield profits which then in turn can be used for 
consumption.   
Relying on the microfinance literature Karlan and Goldberg (2007) suggest 
several other indicators to measure the impact of microfinance, such as income, 
business revenues, education levels or school enrolment and housing stock. The first 
observable change after loans have been received is, of course, the debt level. Another 
indicator which can be used to make the impact of informal loans observable, is income 
of a household. But the effect on income is observable only in the long run and difficult 
to measure for people who are engaged in informal activities and therefore lack formal 
income. One last effect of any program or single loans can be described as spillover 
effects on households who are not in the treatment group. Positive spillovers can be 
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more economic activity in the area or village and negative spillovers could be more 
competition or deterred market relations.1 In this paper I do not control for this kind of 
spillover effects. 
 
3.3 Data  
This section contains information on the data which has been used in this paper: Section 
3.3.1 describes the underlying survey and how households have been chosen; Section 
3.3.2 gives more detailed information on household characteristics and Section 3.3.3 
describes informal loans and compares them to more formal loans. 
 
3.3.1 Underlying survey 
The data emanates the project “Impact of shocks on the vulnerability to poverty: 
consequences for development of emerging Southeast Asian economies” which is 
funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). I use the first and second wave of a 
household survey that has been conducted between April and June in 2007 and between 
April and June in 2008, respectively. The reference period for each wave is a 12 months 
period starting in April so that the data is on a yearly basis. The interviewed households 
were chosen according to their location. First, three provinces were chosen, namely Buri 
Ram, Ubon Ratchathani and Nakhon Phanom which are located in the north-eastern part 
of the country which is known to be the poorest region in Thailand. Further household 
identification follows a three-stage-stratified sampling procedure, where provinces are 
considered as strata and the first sampling units are sub-districts. Sub-districts were 
chosen randomly with probability according to their size. Then two villages of each 
sub-district were chosen at random and 10 households out of each village were 
randomly identified (Hardeweg et al., 2012). The same households were interviewed in 
                                                 
1
  Further indicators can be taken from Microfinance Information Exchange, available via:      
http://www.mixmarket.org/data-center. Those indicators are for example debt/equity ratio and 
capital/asset ratio. 
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the second wave and the attrition rate is less than 5%. Eventually, the overall sample 
consists of 2,136 households who all have been interviewed twice.  
For these households we have information on: demographics, occupation, 
employment, health status, education, agricultural activities, income, consumption, 
expenditures, and assets. Furthermore detailed information regarding the financial 
situation, such as borrowing activities and the amount of savings is available.  
There are other studies which rely on the same survey2. Menkhoff and 
Rungruxsirivorn (2011) examine whether a policy-induced microfinance program, the 
so-called village funds, improve access to finance for the rural poor. They find that 
village funds target the poorest households and ease credit constraints but given the high 
costs of implementation their efficiency can be questioned. In another study, Menkhoff 
et al. (2012) identify relationship lending and personal guarantees as alternatives to 
tangible collateral if households lack assets to guarantee for their loans. 
Following the procedure in these studies, lending institutions are split into 
different categories which are in decreasing order of formality: the formal group, the 
semiformal group and the informal group. Each group consists of subgroups. Formal 
lenders include commercial banks and the state-owned Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives which is one of the biggest lenders in the rural area. 
Semiformal institutions include all kinds of locally organised credit cooperatives and 
savings groups which operate according to their own regulation framework. In principle 
they apply the same requirements to every borrower but sometimes participation is 
restricted to being a member of these groups. Loans given by the Thai revolving fund 
(the so-called Village Fund programme, see Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011; 
Boonperm et al., 2013) are considered as semiformal loans as well. Furthermore policy 
loans are assigned to this group because their lending procedure is more comparable to 
semiformal institutions than to formal or informal lenders. Policy loans include loans 
                                                 
2
 These studies use the first wave of the household survey, whereas in this study the first two waves of 
this survey are used. 
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which are given in line with the poverty eradication project or student loans. Informal 
lenders are very heterogeneous since they comprise of a large variety of lenders. These 
are (1) Professional moneylenders whose main business consists of giving loans to other 
households; (2) Business partners who are mainly traders and suppliers so that loan 
terms might be interlinked with other businesses; (3) Family members and (4) Friends.  
 
3.3.2 Description of data 
Altogether 2,136 households have been interviewed in both waves. 69% of the 
households borrowed any loans during the first wave and 64% borrowed loans in the 
second wave. 435 households never borrowed and some households (550) borrowed in 
only one of the waves. For the analysis only households are considered who borrowed 
in both waves. This reduces the sample to 1,151 households.  
For the analysis I split the households into three different groups according to 
their income. Vulnerable households are households whose income is below the local 
poverty line3 in 2007. Relatively poor households have an income of no more than twice 
the poverty line and relatively rich households have an income which is higher than 
two-times the local poverty line. This classification splits the sample into almost equally 
sized household groups whose characteristics and differences are described in Table 7. 
With respect to household demographics, household heads of vulnerable 
households are older than relatively rich household heads and younger than relatively 
poor household heads. However, their education level is below that of the other 
household groups, whereas relatively rich households have the highest education level. 
Vulnerable households tend to be the largest households and they are less often female-
headed than relatively rich households. Furthermore their household heads are married 
most often.  
                                                 
3
 The local poverty lines per capita per month are in Buri Ram 1,252 Baht, in Ubon Ratchathani 1,245 
Baht and in Nakhon Phanom 1,274 Baht. 
  
 
Table 7: Household characteristics for different types of households 
household characteristics vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich
Demographics
Age of household head 53.62 53.86 52.67 54.39 54.54 53.49
(13.39) (13.25) (11.83) (13.23) (12.93) (11.73)
Years of education of hh head (in years) 4.73 5.02 5.82 4.86 5.08 5.83
(2.05) (2.49) (3.34) (2.21) (2.49) (3.38)
Household size (adult equivalence scale) 3.08 2.99 2.59 3.08 3.00 2.69
(1.02) (0.99) (0.97) (1.08) (0.97) (1.02)
Female headed household (in %) 23.9% 24.6% 26.7% 24.9% 23.2% 26.9%
(0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.44)
Married household head (in %) 80.8% 79.4% 78.7% 81.8% 80.2% 80.5%
(0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40)
Health status
Sick (in %) 14.9% 13.8% 11.5% 16.1% 16.1% 14.7%
(0.36) (0.35) (0.32) (0.37) (0.37) (0.35)
Suffering from disease (in %) 24.9% 25.1% 18.9% 26.8% 26.6% 25.3%
(0.43) (0.43) (0.39) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
Occupation
Farmer as reported by household (in %) 72.0% 63.0% 56.3% 66.8% 64.1% 58.1%
(0.45) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49)
Farmer according to share of farm income (in %) 50.0% 39.8% 28.5% 53.3% 49.2% 41.1%
(0.50) (0.49) (0.45) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Economic status
Total annual income (in 1,000 Baht) 30 89 238 101 106 213
(47) (38) (217) (256) (115) (404)
Total per capita consumption (in 1,000 Baht) 23 25 41 25 25 40
(18) (12) (21) (30) (18) (36)
Food consumption per capita (in 1,000 Baht) 9 11 14 10 11 15
(5) (6) (8) (9) (6) (11)
Asset endowment (in 1,000 Baht) 131 112 209 153 129 263
(285) (168) (323) (290) (241) (834)
Production assets (in 1,000 Baht) 65 52 88 67 35 109
(179) (111) (167) (206) (170) (753)
Farming assets (in 1,000 Baht) 18 18 12 29 21 18
(63) (65) (75) (108) (71) (57)
Savings (in 1,000 Baht) 11 10 32 8 10 23
(49) (27) (105) (27) (26) (56)
Borrowing activities
Borrowed because of shock (in %) 9.0% 10.5% 7.7% 10.4% 8.5% 5.3%
(0.29) (0.31) (0.27) (0.31) (0.28) (0.22)
Credit rationed houshold (in %) 7.6% 7.6% 3.7% 4.5% 3.7% 2.7%
(0.27) (0.27) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.16)
Number of households 422 354 375 422 354 375
Standard errors in parentheses; consumption values are inflation adjusted
1st wave 2nd wave
3
8
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Health status variables indicate that vulnerable households have the lowest health 
status, followed by relatively poor and relatively rich households. 
There are two possibilities to categorise a household to be a farm household. In 
the survey households are asked about their occupation. The first definition uses this 
information. Since many households consider themselves to be farmers but actually 
their income from farming is just a small fraction of their total income a second 
definition is used in the regressions. According to this, a household is defined to be a 
farmer if the share of farm income to total income is at least 20%4. Independent of the 
definition, vulnerable households are most often farming households followed by 
relatively poor and relatively rich households which indicates their dependence on 
farming conditions such as flood, draught and crop pests.  
Variables indicating the economic status of households give an expected pattern: 
Vulnerable households have by far the lowest income level, the lowest (food) 
consumption level and, in 2008, the lowest amount of savings. The value of all asset 
and production assets, however, is lowest for relatively poor households. Farming asset 
endowment is lowest for relatively rich households since those households are not so 
often engaged in farming activities.  
Borrowing activities differ as well across household groups: Unsurprisingly 
relatively rich households do not borrow often because they were hit by a shock. Shock-
borrowing is most frequent for relatively poor households in 2007 (10.5%) and most 
frequent for vulnerable households in 2008 (10.4%). Vulnerable households are credit-
rationed to the highest degree followed by relatively poor and relatively rich 
households.    
 
                                                 
4
 According to the self-assessment definition 62% of all households are farmers but according to the share 
of farm income only 40% of all households are farmers. 
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3.3.3 Informal loans  
Table 8 shows loan characteristics of all loans for the years 2007 and 2008 according to 
different types of lenders. Panel A categorises loans into formal, semiformal and 
informal loans, Panel B itemises informal loans further into moneylenders (ML), 
business partners (BP), family members (FAM) and friends (FRI). Whereas most 
studies find that informal loans are expensive in terms of charged interest rates, short in 
duration, less likely collateralised and rather small (Barslund and Tarp, 2008; Bose, 
1998) our data confirms only some of these findings. Regarding loan characteristics 
informal loans are larger than semiformal or formal loans and their duration is only 
slightly shorter than the duration of formal loans. Like in most other studies informal 
loans are the most expensive source of credit. There are some differences in collateral 
requirements. Almost 36% of all informal loans require collateral. However, the overall 
share of informal loans which do not require any collateral is high (48%) and only 16% 
require personal guarantees. The different types of loans also differ in terms of 
borrowing purposes. Whereas formal and semiformal loans are mainly used for 
agricultural production, 58% of all informal loans are used for consumption purposes 
and only 17% are used for agricultural production purposes.  
Informal loans are very heterogeneous and can be split further into different types 
of informal institutions. Panel B shows the same information as before but this time for 
different informal lenders. Indeed, loan characteristics for different informal lenders 
differ a lot from each other. BP loans are very large and have a long duration of almost 
three years whereas loans from friends are quite small with durations of less than a year. 
Most of the BP loans are taken to buy by instalments. In this case the “business partner” 
is a retailer who sells durables (motorbikes, machines, cars…) to the household. The 
household pays back small amounts of the purchase price at given points in time until 
the price has been paid completely. Often the purchased items are used as collateral at 
the same time. I address this issue in the robustness checks in Section 3.5. With respect 
to the reliance on collateral two groups can be distinguished: the first comprises of ML 
and BP. They demand collateral relatively often (almost one half of the loans is  
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Table 8: Loan characteristics for different types of lending institutions 
Panel A
Characteristic
Average loan size (in 1,000 Baht)
Duration (in months)
Annual interest rate (in %)
Collateral
Collateralized loans (in %)
Rate of collateralization
   Personal guarantee (in %)
No collateral required (in %)
Purpose
Agricultural production (in %)
Non- agricultural production (in %)
Consumption (in %)
Pay back other loans (in %)
Other purpose (in %)
Number of loans 
Panel B
Characteristic ML FRI
Average loan size (in 1,000 Baht) 54 19
(97) (38)
Duration (in months) 18.8 11.6
(23.50) (10.41)
Annual interest rate (in %) 45.3% 35.8%
(63.39) (54.27)
Collateral
Collateralized loans (in %) 41.3% 9.2%
Rate of collateralization 4.2 5.3
   Personal guarantee (in %) 12.2% 8.3%
No collateral required (in %) 46.1% 82.6%
Purpose
Agricultural production (in %) 27.4% 20.2%
Non- agricultural production (in %) 13.5% 7.3%
Consumption (in %) 31.7% 54.1%
Pay back other loans (in %) 20.9% 16.5%
Other purpose (in %) 6.1% 1.8%
Number of loans 230 109
formal semiformal informal
67 22 86
(121) (55) (237)
30.7 14.8 24.9
(40.71) (16.56) (28.34)
9.6% 8.1% 23.1%
(14.82) (16.34) (43.46)
37.8% 5.1% 35.5%
4.2 4.9 2.3
58.8% 89.1% 16.1%
3.2% 5.7% 47.8%
47.8% 44.4% 17.1%
18.9% 14.1% 11.7%
18.3% 27.5% 57.7%
BP FAM
13.7% 13.8% 10.5%
1.0% 0.2% 2.3%
1,456 3,520 1,138
143 37
(336) (85)
33.0 17.4
(33.23) (18.08)
17.4% 10.5%
(33.40) (22.15)
53.3% 9.6%
1.3 4.5
24.8% 6.9%
20.7% 83.5%
7.1% 25.4%
8.1% 18.2%
508 291
82.5% 36.4%
1.0% 16.8%
0.2% 3.1%
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collateralised) and personal guarantees are a frequent feature of their loan contracts. The 
second group comprises of FAM and FRI. They demand tangible collateral in only 10% 
of all cases and more than 82% of all loans require no collateral at all. Borrowing 
purposes differ a lot across different informal lenders. ML loans are mainly used for 
consumption, but also agricultural production and pay back other loans are frequent 
borrowing purposes. Most loans of BP are used for consumption. The same is true for 
FAM and FRI but unlike BP loans, loans from FAM and FRI are also used for 
agricultural production and to pay back other loans. 
In the data informal loans are very heterogeneous but they can be clearly 
distinguished from semiformal and formal loans. To address the issue why informal 
loans are still important it is crucial to know who demands informal loans and whether 
they target a certain type of household.  
Table 9 shows how loans from different institutions are distributed over 
household groups. It becomes evident that, independently of household groups, 
semiformal lenders are by far the most frequently used group of lenders since more than 
50% of all loans are granted by semiformal institutions. Formal loans are the second 
important source of credit with an overall share of 24.2%. Informal loans are least 
frequently used and account for 16.6%. In general poor households tend to borrow more 
often from informal and semiformal institutions whereas rich households borrow more 
likely from formal institutions. Still, relatively rich households borrow from informal 
sources in 14.3% of all cases. 
 
Table 9: Borrowing activities for different groups of households 
vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich weighted av.
formal 21.0% 25.8% 26.6% 24.2%
semiformal 60.1% 58.8% 59.1% 59.3%
informal 18.9% 15.4% 14.3% 16.6%
∑ 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Note: Data is on loan level, overall sample contains 1,151 households and 5,134 loans.
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3.4 Results  
3.4.1 Methodology 
To estimate the effect of informal loans on asset accumulation and consumption a 
difference-in-differences estimator is used. Therefore a panel data set at household level 
has been generated for the two waves of our survey (2007 and 2008) and a fixed effects 
model is employed to account for individual-specific effects and possible unobserved 
heterogeneity. There are four general problems that have to be taken into account when 
assessing the impact of any newly introduced program. First, program placement should 
be exogenous (f.e. in an experimental setting) and second, participation in programs 
should be exogenous in order to avoid biased results due to self-selection into the 
program. In this study, the availability of informal loans is not an exogenously placed 
program and of course the decision to demand informal loans is made on households 
level and therefore not exogenous. However, the aim of this study is to examine the 
impact of informal loans on wealth indicators rather than to evaluate a new credit 
program. Third, unobservable determinants may drive the effects. To account for that a 
fixed effects model is used and all necessary control variables are included in the 
regressions. Of course, household fixed effects may vary over time but the time span is 
only one year so that fixed effects should not vary much. Fourth, there might be an 
attrition bias since some households drop out of the survey in the second wave. 
However, this figure amounts to less than 2.3% and affects 50 households only.  
The sample has been split into a treatment group and a control group in which the 
receipt of an informal loan in 2008 is considered as treatment independently of a receipt 
of informal loans in 2007. All regressions control for the total sum of formal, 
semiformal and informal loans at household level in both waves. This is to make sure 
that the amount of loans is taken into account and that loans granted in 2007 are 
considered as well. The treatment effect in this approach is given by changes in per 
capita consumption and asset endowment in 2008. I am aware of the problem that the 
treatment and its effects occur within the same year. But since the effect of informal 
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loans on assets and consumption is calculated by using data aggregated on a yearly 
basis, it is likely that effects on assets and consumption are observable within the same 
year the informal loan has been received. Since wealth indicators may also depend on 
other macroeconomic and individual household characteristics an extended classical 
approach (Huebler, 2001) is used. The model can be explained by the following 
equation: 
 
                                   yit = µi + x’itβ + zt + D’itα + uit                                   (1) 
 
where yit is the dependent variable which is one of the wealth indicators of interest so 
that yit represents either asset endowment or per capita consumption. µi is an individual-
specific effect for each household, X’it is a vector of household characteristics and zt is a 
macroeconomic indicator consisting of the GDP in Baht in the respective wave. D’it is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether a household is treated or not. D’it equals one if a 
household received informal loans in the year 2008 and zero otherwise. Uit is the error 
term with E[uit]=0. 
Table 10 gives an overview of treated and non-treated households for the groups 
of vulnerable, relatively poor and relatively rich households. In the whole sample about 
20% of all households received treatment in the second wave. Vulnerable households 
are most likely treated (24%) followed by relatively poor households (19%) and 
relatively rich households (17%).  
 
Table 10: Sample overview 
vulnerable rel. poor rel. rich  sum/ (percentage)
non-treated 322 287 311 920
(in percentage) (76.3%) (81.1%) (82.9%) (79.9%)
treated 100 67 64 231
(in percentage) (23.7%) (18.9%) (17.1%) (20.1%)
sum 422 354 375 1,151
(in percentage) (36.7%) (30.8%) (32.6%) (100.0%)
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As stated above, it can be argued that the treatment in this study is not exogenous 
since it is each household’s decision to borrow from informal sources themselves. 
Hence, it is important to know in which way treated and non-treated households differ. 
Table 11 compares household characteristics of treated and non-treated households for 
each group in 2007 (prior to treatment).  
Regarding household demographics, household heads of treated households are 
younger than non-treated. Treated households are less educated except for relatively 
rich households. In general, treated households have larger household sizes and the 
share of female-headed households is larger indicating an exclusion of females in the 
formal credit market.  
With respect to the health status, treated households are not sick more often nor do 
they suffer from any disease more often than their non-treated counterparts.  
According to self-reported occupation, vulnerable treated households are more 
likely farmers than non-treated whereas this cannot be found for the other groups. If the 
share of farm income to total income is taken to define farmers there is not much 
difference between treated and non-treated households for vulnerable and relatively 
poor households. Relatively rich households are less likely farmers when treated. 
With respect to economic status treated vulnerable households have lower income 
than non-treated households, but for relatively poor and relatively rich households 
income is higher for treated households. Consumption values do not differ much 
between non-treated and treated households. However, if consumption on household 
level is considered (not reported in Table 11) consumption values are higher for 
relatively poor and relatively rich households when treated. Asset endowment is higher 
for treated households except for relatively poor households who have comparatively 
low assets endowment when treated. Savings are always lower if households are treated 
in 2008.  
  
 
Table 11: Household characteristics for treated and non-treated households in 2007 
household characteristics non-treated treated non-treated treated non-treated treated
Demographics
Age of household head 54.71 50.10 54.07 52.97 52.85 51.81
(13.85) (11.13) (13.00) (14.33) (11.74) (12.32)
Years of education of hh head (in years) 4.74 4.70 5.04 4.97 5.67 6.56
(2.13) (1.77) (2.54) (2.30) (3.16) (4.07)
Household size (adult equivalence scale) 3.06 3.14 2.96 3.14 2.57 2.69
(1.01) (1.04) (0.94) (1.17) (0.96) (0.98)
Female headed household (in %) 23.9% 24.0% 23.7% 28.4% 25.4% 32.8%
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.45) (0.44) (0.47)
Married household head (in %) 79.8% 84.0% 79.8% 77.6% 78.8% 78.1%
(0.40) (0.37) (0.40) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42)
Health status
Sick (in %) 15.5% 13.0% 14.3% 12.0% 11.6% 10.9%
(0.36) (0.34) (0.35) (0.33) (0.32) (0.31)
Suffering from disease (in %) 25.8% 22.0% 25.8% 22.4% 19.3% 17.2%
(0.44) (0.42) (0.44) (0.42) (0.40) (0.38)
Occupation
Farmer as reported by household (in %) 71.4% 74.0% 64.5% 56.7% 57.2% 51.6%
(0.45) (0.44) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Farmer according to shareof farm income (in %) 50.3% 49.0% 39.4% 41.8% 29.3% 25.0%
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.46) (0.44)
Economic status
Total annual income (in 1,000 Baht) 32 25 88 96 234 262
(48) (45) (35) (47) (199) (288)
Total per capita consumption (in 1,000 Baht) 23 23 25 25 41 42
(17) (21) (12) (11) (21) (21)
Food consumption per capita (in 1,000 Baht) 9 9 10 11 14 13
(5) (5) (6) (6) (8) (7)
Asset endowment (in 1,000 Baht) 124 154 116 92 192 289
(259) (355) (177) (121) (299) (416)
Production assets (in 1,000 Baht) 58 87 55 40 79 130
(138) (274) (118) (76) (157) (206)
Farming assets (in 1,000 Baht) 18 19 20 11 13 9
(58) (78) (68) (51) (80) (36)
Savings (in 1,000 Baht) 12 7 10 7 35 17
(55) (22) (29) (19) (111) (65)
Borrowing activities
Borrowed because of shock (in %) 7.5% 15.0% 10.8% 10.4% 7.4% 7.8%
(0.26) (0.36) (0.31) (0.31) (0.26) (0.27)
Credit rationed houshold (in %) 6.0% 13.0% 5.9% 14.9% 3.2% 6.3%
(0.24) (0.34) (0.24) (0.36) (0.18) (0.24)
Number of households 322 100 287 67 311 64
Standard errors in parentheses; consumption values are inflation adjusted
vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich
4
6
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Interestingly, borrowing because of a shock and credit rationing of a household 
occurs more often for households that will receive treatment in the next year.  
Taken together, households who are treated (and therefore received informal loans 
in 2008) are larger, more likely female-headed and less educated. Regarding the 
economical status, there are important differences across household groups. Only 
vulnerable treated households have lower income, per capita consumption and savings 
but higher asset endowment than non-treated households. Relatively poor households 
have higher income, per capita consumption and savings if treated, but asset endowment 
is quite low. They may use informal loans to enhance their asset endowment. Relatively 
rich households have high income, per capita consumption, savings and asset 
endowment when they receive informal loans in 2008. There is no sign of any good 
reason to borrow from informal sources, except credit rationing and shock-related 
borrowing.  
 
3.4.2 The role of informal loans for asset accumulation and consumption of rural 
households 
This section shows treatment effects on asset endowment and on per capita 
consumption.5 To get further insights assets are split into total assets, farming assets and 
production assets. Farming assets are assets for which the household specified to use 
them mainly for farming purposes whereas production assets are used mainly for 
production purposes. One economic good can either be farming or production asset but 
there are assets which cannot be assigned to any of these categories. As a consequence 
farming and production assets do not sum up to total assets. To calculate the current 
value of assets I only consider assets bought within the last five years and reduce the 
purchase price by depreciation values. Total per capita consumption comprises the value 
                                                 
5
 If appropriate, logarithmic values are taken. This applies to income, consumption, food consumption, 
total assets, farming assets, production assets, savings, loan volume and GDP. 
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of all consumed items like food, clothing, education, transportation, health etc. Food 
consumption per capita is therefore a fraction of total consumption.  
Specification (1) in Table 12 shows the treatment effects on total asset endowment 
and specification (2) shows the effects on farming assets. Informal loans lead to a 40% 
higher total asset endowment for households who received informal loans in 2008 
compared to those households who do not receive informal loans in 2008. Farming 
assets are 55% higher for households who receive informal loans in 2008 compared to 
their counterparts who do not receive informal loans. The effect on total per capita 
consumption (specification (3)) and on food consumption per capita (specification (4)) 
is not significant. To see which group of households is responsible for the effects I rerun 
the regressions with different subsamples consisting of different groups of households. 
  
3.4.3 The impact of informal loans on asset accumulation and on consumption for 
different household groups 
Table 13 shows the results for the treatment effect on different asset categories across 
household groups. Specification (1), (2), and (3) show the effect of informal loans on 
the value of total asset endowment. Specification (4), (5), and (6) give the effects on 
farming assets, a very important assets group since many households are full-time or at 
least part-time farmers. The effect on both asset categories is significant and positive 
only for relatively poor households (specification (2) and (5)). If they have received 
informal loans in the second wave their assets have a value which is 78% higher than 
the value of relatively poor households who did not receive informal loans. The figure 
even rises if farming assets are considered: relatively poor households who received 
informal loans have a farming asset endowment which is 105% higher than that of their 
non-borrowing counterparts. 
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Table 12: Treatment effect on assets and consumption for the whole sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
total asset farming total food
Dependent variables endowment assets consumption consumption
Treatment effect 0.396*** 0.551* 0.0218 -0.00588
(0.119) (0.298) (0.0545) (0.0652)
Age of household head -0.00932 0.0368 -0.0137*** -0.000593
(0.00945) (0.0236) (0.00427) (0.00510)
Household size (adult equivalence scale) 0.224*** 0.0662 -0.255*** -0.222***
(0.0645) (0.162) (0.0285) (0.0341)
Dummy if household head is married -0.0317 -0.218 -0.0581 -0.0468
(0.187) (0.468) (0.0852) (0.102)
Female headed household head 0.0203 -0.190 0.158 0.101
(0.277) (0.694) (0.126) (0.151)
Dummy if household head is sick 0.0475 0.146 0.0846 -0.00420
(0.118) (0.295) (0.0535) (0.0640)
Dummy if household head suffers disease 0.0645 -0.0305 0.0202 0.0846
(0.0972) (0.243) (0.0442) (0.0528)
Dummy if household is farming -0.00533 0.0673 -0.00765 -0.00428
(0.0720) (0.180) (0.0327) (0.0392)
Income per household (in Baht) -0.0250* 0.0344 0.0102* 0.00653
(0.0131) (0.0328) (0.00596) (0.00713)
Total consumption per capita (in Baht) 0.221** 0.0884
(0.0929) (0.234)
Total food consumption per capita (in Baht) -0.0138 0.0899
(0.0779) (0.195)
Asset endowment of household (in Baht) 0.0433*** 0.0349**
(0.0135) (0.0161)
Production asset endowment (in Baht) 0.316***
(0.0260)
Savings (in Baht) -0.000277 -0.0199 0.00691 0.00975*
(0.0101) (0.0253) (0.00459) (0.00549)
Total loan volume from formal lenders (in Baht) 0.00238 -0.0459** -0.00115 0.00263
(0.00902) (0.0226) (0.00410) (0.00490)
Total loan volume from semiformal lenders (in Baht) -0.00486 0.0288 -0.000173 -0.00246
(0.0111) (0.0278) (0.00507) (0.00606)
Total loan volume from informal lenders (in Baht) 0.00601 -0.0119 -0.00957** -0.00575
(0.00846) (0.0212) (0.00384) (0.00459)
Borrowed from formal lenders due to shock -0.241 -0.0577 0.174* 0.175
(0.213) (0.533) (0.0968) (0.116)
Borrowed from semiformal lenders due to shock 0.0614 -0.181 -0.0178 -0.0248
(0.154) (0.385) (0.0700) (0.0837)
Borrowed from informal lenders due to shock -0.505*** -0.327 0.0436 -0.00430
(0.174) (0.435) (0.0795) (0.0951)
GDP 4.270*** 29.98*** -2.051*** 1.579*
(1.544) (4.011) (0.692) (0.827)
Constant -28.72** -265.5*** 29.15*** -4.672
(13.71) (35.62) (6.102) (7.294)
Observations 2302 2302 2302 2302
Number of hhid 1151 1151 1151 1151
R-squared 0.059 0.159 0.106 0.058
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Treatment effect on asset endowment for different household groups 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich 
Dependent variable
Treatment effect 0.137 0.780*** 0.203 0.269 1.048** 0.352
(0.139) (0.255) (0.249) (0.448) (0.493) (0.649)
Age of household head -0.00545 -0.0133 0.00359 0.0504 0.0401 0.0387
(0.0137) (0.0149) (0.0320) (0.0442) (0.0289) (0.0836)
Household size (adult equivalence scale) 0.0745 0.428*** 0.212* 0.0799 -0.429 0.337
(0.0787) (0.143) (0.128) (0.256) (0.279) (0.332)
Dummy if household head is married 0.222 -0.474 0.162 -1.639** -0.0404 0.597
(0.257) (0.362) (0.369) (0.828) (0.699) (0.959)
Female headed household head 0.544 -0.434 0.173 -1.208 -1.142 1.091
(0.337) (0.549) (0.725) (1.090) (1.062) (1.893)
Dummy if household head is sick 0.166 -0.106 -0.0961 -0.0496 -0.302 1.037
(0.139) (0.248) (0.246) (0.447) (0.479) (0.639)
Dummy if household head suffers disease -0.0713 0.177 0.131 0.230 -0.304 -0.233
(0.119) (0.202) (0.197) (0.385) (0.395) (0.512)
Dummy if household is farming -0.0890 0.0478 -0.000632 -0.0561 -0.0768 0.302
(0.0819) (0.155) (0.156) (0.266) (0.300) (0.406)
Income per household (in Baht) -0.0178 -0.0457 -0.0996** 0.0544 0.0230 -0.0158
(0.0119) (0.0453) (0.0465) (0.0384) (0.0876) (0.121)
Total consumption per capita (in Baht) 0.200* 0.452** 0.0513 1.149*** -0.451 -0.485
(0.119) (0.215) (0.178) (0.384) (0.420) (0.463)
Total food consumption per capita (in Baht) -0.0186 -0.0118 0.0792 -0.723** 0.0327 0.447
(0.107) (0.175) (0.136) (0.345) (0.338) (0.353)
Production asset endowment (in Baht) 0.365*** 0.306*** 0.299***
(0.0456) (0.0434) (0.0484)
Savings (in Baht) 0.0135 -0.0357 0.0209 0.000951 -0.00961 -0.0408
(0.0130) (0.0235) (0.0180) (0.0419) (0.0454) (0.0468)
Total loan volume formal lenders (in Baht) -0.00567 0.00201 0.00620 -0.0487 -0.0330 -0.0768*
(0.0109) (0.0210) (0.0168) (0.0351) (0.0406) (0.0441)
Total loan volume semiformal lenders (in Baht) -0.00804 -0.0215 0.00232 0.00885 0.0667 -0.0275
(0.0137) (0.0237) (0.0219) (0.0444) (0.0458) (0.0570)
Total loan volume informal lenders (in Baht) 0.0137 0.00169 0.00731 0.0139 -0.0318 -0.0439
(0.00983) (0.0191) (0.0168) (0.0317) (0.0372) (0.0436)
Borrowed from formal lenders due to shock -0.284 -0.179 -0.123 -0.755 -0.880 1.623
(0.264) (0.434) (0.448) (0.850) (0.838) (1.167)
Borrowed from semiformal lenders due to shock -0.401** 0.550* 0.0543 -0.307 0.643 -1.260
(0.182) (0.302) (0.346) (0.588) (0.584) (0.901)
Borrowed from informal lenders due to shock -0.273 -0.963*** -0.375 -0.696 -0.397 1.341
(0.196) (0.371) (0.413) (0.632) (0.728) (1.077)
GDP 5.777*** 3.091 1.447 36.57*** 21.31*** 24.55***
(1.980) (3.210) (3.184) (6.668) (6.381) (8.677)
Constant -42.15** -20.05 -2.645 -327.0*** -181.2*** -215.4***
(17.44) (28.73) (28.36) (58.79) (57.06) (77.21)
Observations 844 708 750 844 708 750
Number of hhid 422 354 375 422 354 375
R-squared 0.104 0.127 0.046 0.227 0.186 0.160
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
asset endowment farming assets 
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Table 14 gives the effect of informal loans on total per capita consumption 
(specifications (1), (2) and (3)) and on food consumption per capita (specifications (4), 
(5) and (6)) for all groups of households. The treatment effect is only significant and 
positive for relatively rich households whereas it is negative but insignificant for all 
other groups of households. Informal loans lead to higher consumption values per 
capita, but only for the richest households in the sample. Their total per capita 
consumption is 15% higher than that of non-treated relatively rich households and their 
food consumption per capita even rises by almost 20%.  
 
3.4.4 Use of informal loans and reasons to borrow from informal sources 
To sum up informal loans increase asset endowment for relatively poor households and 
consumption of relatively rich households. This section provides further insights into 
the results and examines the reasons why certain households borrow from informal 
sources.  
Relatively poor households may increase their asset endowment due to two 
reasons. First, they may build up a “buffer stock” (Kaboski and Townsend, 2011) which 
they can sell promptly if they need money at short notice. These “buffers” consist of all 
kinds of assets and if not sold households simply put them to use. Second, they may try 
to improve their standing at more formal institutions by accumulating assets which can 
be used as collateral. The lack of collateral is one important reason why households are 
credit rationed or completely excluded from the formal credit sector (Boucher and 
Guirkinger, 2007; Yadav et al., 1992). Indeed there is some evidence for credit rationing 
of relatively poor households. Panel A in Table 15 shows the percentage of credit 
rationed households across waves. When looking at relatively poor treated households it 
becomes evident that almost 15% of them are credit rationed in 2007 but in 2008, after 
receiving an informal loan, only 7.5% of them remain credit rationed. Obviously, 
informal loans ease the problem of being excluded from the more formal sector. 
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Table 14: Treatment effect on consumption 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich
Dependent variable
Treatment effect -0.0746 -0.0402 0.188** -0.0831 -0.117 0.236**
(0.100) (0.0903) (0.0881) (0.112) (0.112) (0.115)
Age of household head -0.0154 -0.00717 -0.0245** -0.00518 0.00900 -0.0117
(0.00983) (0.00514) (0.0113) (0.0110) (0.00635) (0.0148)
Household size (adult equivalence scale) -0.116** -0.303*** -0.327*** -0.0689 -0.337*** -0.279***
(0.0565) (0.0478) (0.0421) (0.0632) (0.0592) (0.0551)
Dummy if household head is married -0.328* 0.0985 0.0808 -0.366* 0.0971 0.0843
(0.185) (0.127) (0.131) (0.206) (0.157) (0.172)
Female headed household head 0.0688 -0.205 0.575** -0.226 -0.195 0.776**
(0.243) (0.192) (0.256) (0.272) (0.238) (0.335)
Dummy if household head is sick -0.0123 0.0690 0.240*** -0.0649 -0.0444 0.144
(0.100) (0.0864) (0.0865) (0.112) (0.107) (0.113)
Dummy if household head suffers disease 0.178** -0.0305 -0.112 0.242** -0.0625 0.0297
(0.0855) (0.0708) (0.0696) (0.0956) (0.0876) (0.0912)
Dummy if household is farming -0.0292 0.0289 -0.0324 -0.0387 0.0351 -0.00415
(0.0592) (0.0543) (0.0555) (0.0662) (0.0671) (0.0727)
Income per household (in Baht) -0.000306 0.0259 0.0298* -0.000879 0.0440** 0.0336
(0.00862) (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.00964) (0.0195) (0.0217)
Asset endowment (in Baht) 0.0955*** 0.0542*** 0.0137 0.0831** 0.0454* 0.0219
(0.0356) (0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0398) (0.0234) (0.0247)
Savings (in Baht) 0.00719 0.00842 0.00485 0.0104 0.0170* -0.00214
(0.00935) (0.00822) (0.00641) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.00839)
Total loan volume formal lenders (in Baht) -0.00138 -0.00188 -0.00493 0.00184 0.00428 -0.00175
(0.00786) (0.00734) (0.00597) (0.00879) (0.00908) (0.00782)
Total loan volume semiformal lenders (in Baht) 0.00357 0.00898 -0.0149* -0.00409 0.00898 -0.0123
(0.00990) (0.00829) (0.00775) (0.0111) (0.0103) (0.0101)
Total loan volume informal lenders (in Baht) -0.00464 -0.00824 -0.0200*** -0.000505 -0.00476 -0.0209***
(0.00710) (0.00667) (0.00586) (0.00794) (0.00825) (0.00768)
Borrowed from formal lenders due to shock 0.0622 0.0945 0.320** -0.0557 0.0889 0.424**
(0.190) (0.152) (0.158) (0.213) (0.188) (0.207)
Borrowed from semiformal lenders due to shock 0.0295 -0.0298 -0.140 0.0890 -0.0844 -0.139
(0.132) (0.106) (0.123) (0.148) (0.131) (0.161)
Borrowed from informal lenders due to shock 0.0633 0.0959 0.140 -0.0208 0.151 0.110
(0.142) (0.131) (0.147) (0.158) (0.162) (0.193)
GDP 0.717 -1.905* -4.127*** 2.747* 0.698 2.022
(1.434) (1.111) (1.085) (1.604) (1.374) (1.422)
Constant 3.802 27.16*** 48.64*** -15.50 2.266 -7.981
(12.59) (9.863) (9.533) (14.08) (12.20) (12.49)
Observations 844 708 750 844 708 750
Number of hhid 422 354 375 422 354 375
R-squared 0.063 0.163 0.277 0.055 0.125 0.146
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
total consumption (per capita) food consumption (per capita)
 
 
Relatively rich households increase (food) consumption if informal loans have 
been received. This is a somewhat unexpected finding and needs closer investigation. I 
address four issues in this respect: 
1) Some relatively rich households may be credit rationed in the formal sector 
and therefore have to rely on informal loans. 
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Table 15: Credit rationing, farming and shock-related borrowing over time 
Panel A: Percentage of credit rationed households 
2007 2008 2007 2008
vulnerable 7.6% 4.5% 13.0% 3.0%
relatively poor 7.6% 3.7% 14.9% 7.5%
relatively rich 3.7% 2.7% 6.3% 9.4%
Panel B: Percentage of farming households 
2007 2008 2007 2008
vulnerable 50.0% 53.3% 49.0% 48.0%
relatively poor 39.8% 49.2% 41.8% 35.8%
relatively rich 28.5% 41.1% 25.0% 31.3%
Panel C: Percentage of households who borrowed due to shock 
2007 2008 2007 2008
vulnerable 8.1% 10.4% 14.0% 26.0%
relatively poor 10.2% 8.5% 11.9% 20.9%
relatively rich 7.7% 5.3% 7.8% 17.2%
Note: "All households" include households who borrowed in both waves (n=1,151); "treated households"
are households who received at least one informal loan in 2008 (n=231). A household is considered to be
credit rationed if it has not been granted any  loan or not the full amount applied for; farming households
are households whose income from farming is at least 20% of the total income.
all households treated households
all households treated households
all households treated households
 
 
2) It is especially food consumption that rises. In general relatively rich 
households might be less likely farmers and therefore do not produce food on 
their own. They may borrow from informal sources to buy food because they 
cannot consume own food production. 
3) Using informal loans to buy food might still be an unusual event and could be 
explained by shocks relatively rich households are affected by. As a 
consequence of these shocks they borrow short-at-hand informal loans.   
 54 
 
4) If households need money on short notice it is still striking why households 
demand expensive informal loans instead of using savings or cheaper formal 
loans. To address this issue savings and loan costs (interest rates) should be 
examined more closely. In this context it would also be interesting to learn 
which informal lenders give loans to those households.  
If relatively rich households are excluded from more formal credit sources we 
would find a high share of credit rationed households. Panel A of Table 15 shows that 
almost 9.4% of the relatively rich households who received informal loans in 2008 are 
credit rationed. This is a higher share compared to the year 2007 in which it was only 
6.3%. For all other groups, informal loans ease credit constraints over time except for 
the relatively rich. They remain credit rationed even if informal loans are available.  
Regarding the second issue relatively rich households would have need for food 
consumption if they are non-farming. Panel B in Table 15 shows that indeed relatively 
rich households are less likely farmers compared to the other groups of households. 
Still, the fact that relatively rich households borrow from informal sources has to 
be explained. Informal loans are known to be available on short notice. The choice of 
households to borrow from informal sources might be driven by the fact that they need 
short-term finance. Information on shock-related borrowing can be found in Panel C of 
Table 15. The share of treated relatively rich households who borrow because of a 
shock in 2008 is more than three times higher compared to all households in the sample 
(treated and non-treated). Furthermore the share of shock-related borrowing for 
relatively rich households increases from 7.8% in 2007 to 17.2% in 2008. 
So far, relatively rich households seem to be credit rationed to a large degree so 
that even informal loans cannot ease their situation. Furthermore they are more likely 
non-farmers and as a consequence do not consume own food production. This makes 
them especially vulnerable if they are hit by a shock since they cannot smooth food 
consumption by consuming self-produced goods. Data shows that indeed they borrow 
due to shocks. If all these findings are true it is still striking that relatively rich 
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households borrow from informal sources instead of using savings or, if they have 
access, cheaper formal loans.6 
Table 16 gives the savings of treated and non-treated households over time and 
lists interest rates for informal loans. Savings of treated households do not change much 
from 2007 to 2008 and even increase if households borrow due to shock. Savings of 
non-treated households decrease over time. Obviously, treated households do not 
deplete their savings whereas households who do not receive informal loans in 2008 
deplete their savings. As for the interest rates, treated households who borrow due to a 
shock in 2008 have to pay very low interest rates of 6.1%. 64% of their loans come 
from family members (FAM).    
  
Table 16: Savings, interest rate and informal lenders for relatively rich households over time 
non-shock shock non-shock shock non-shock shock non-shock shock
Variable
32 24 1 22 18 22 3
(99) (67) (79) (1) (56) (15) (52) (5)
Interest rate 8.85% 12.42% 14.37% 12.17% 9.12% 7.09% 13.47% 6.08%
(13.88) (21.06) (53.73) (14.62) (17.53) (2.72) (33.99) (11.77)
informal lenders
ML 2% 2% 6% 17% 0% 0% 8% 14%
BP 7% 2% 12% 0% 0% 0% 22% 0%
FAM 2% 5% 10% 33% 0% 0% 16% 64%
FRI 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0%
no. of households 305 24 63 5 302 9 61 11
no. of loans 761 43 164 6 488 19 144 14
Note: Number of loans is a bit lower than in Table 3.3 since there are some loans for which information
on shock-related borrowing is missing.
Savings (in 1,000 Baht)  30
2007 2008
non-treated treated non-treated treated
 
 
                                                 
6
 Guirkinger (2008) argues that informal loans may be cheaper and less risky for households because loan 
application is easier and faster and renegotiation of loan terms is possible. 
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To sum up, we know that relatively poor households use informal loans to 
increase their assets. According to the buffer stock model, informal loans help to reduce 
risk since the household is able to bridge income gaps by selling assets. Furthermore 
they enhance creditworthiness by providing tangible collateral and therefore facilitate 
formal borrowing. Finally, they ease credit constraints if households are denied formal 
loans. Relatively rich households increase consumption and especially food 
consumption. They are credit rationed to a high degree and often non-farming. Hence, 
they do not produce food on their own and have to spend more money for (food) 
consumption if they are hit by a shock. They prefer to borrow informal loans rather than 
using their savings since interest rates are low. Whereas informal lenders seem to be a 
helpful credit source and often the “regular” credit source for relatively poor 
households, informal loans serve as “emergency” loans for richer households. 
 
3.5 Robustness  
One could argue that assets and loan size may be dependent from each other. In other 
words, there might be an endogeneity problem due to reverse causality: loans affect 
asset endowment but at the same time higher asset endowment may lead to higher loan 
volumes.7 A household with high asset endowment is able to pledge more collateral or 
might be considered as less risky in general. To explore this issue further I include the 
value of collateral that households have to pledge for informal loans to check whether 
the treatment effect changes. Results are presented in Appendix 1. As before, the effect 
is positive for relatively rich households and even stronger than in the regression 
without the value of collateral. Informal loans lead to 82% higher asset endowment and 
doubles farming assets for relatively poor households compared to non-treated 
households. The value of collateral (here logarithmic values are taken) is slightly 
                                                 
7
 I directly test whether the amount of informal loans is endogenous using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
Therefore I instrumented informal loan volume by total expenditures and money that has been spent for 
celebrations and funerals. A test on overidentification reveals that the instruments are appropriate. The F-
statistic for the test of endogeneity is 4.09 and the p-value is 0.0433. The hypothesis of endogeneity can 
be rejected at the 5% level but not at the 1% level.   
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significant only for total asset endowment of relatively rich households. As expected the 
value of collateral is positive related to asset endowment.    
As mentioned in Section 3.3.3 some informal loans may indicate instalment 
purchases. In this case an observed loan does not represent a real loan decision but the 
purchase of a good that will be paid off in many small amounts and asset endowment 
would be affected directly. Therefore it is crucial for the results to eliminate instalment 
loans and see whether the effects are still valid. Appendix 2a shows that the effect for 
relatively rich households on total asset endowment is still visible and even slightly 
stronger than before. However, the effect on farming assets is not significant anymore. 
The results suggest that instalment loans are rather used to buy farming assets than other 
kind of assets.           
Appendix 2b shows the effect on per capita consumption. Former results have 
shown that informal loans increase total per capita consumption and food consumption 
per capita for relatively rich households. If instalment loans are excluded the effect on 
total consumption remains but the effect on food consumption is not significant 
anymore. Though, after all, the effect is still positive for relatively rich households 
whereas it is negative for all other households.     
So far household groups are defined according to income. Since income is a very 
difficult measure in emerging countries another variable should be used to make sure 
that the effects remain evident. In Appendix 3 household groups are defined according 
to total expenditures in 2007. Poor households have total expenditures of less than the 
mean value, which is 52,700 Baht, rich households have total expenditures of more than 
52,700 Baht. Specifications (1) to (4) show the effect on assets. Total asset endowment 
and farming assets increase for poor households as shown before. Specifications (5) to 
(8) show no significant effects on total consumption or on food consumption. This 
might be due to the definition of income which is not only defined by incoming salaries 
but also include rents from housing, assets and savings. Households who are defined to 
be rich according to income may not necessarily have high inflows of wages and if hit 
 58 
 
by a shock they have to borrow from informal sources more likely. Households who are 
rich according to expenditures may have higher regular incomes so that shocks will not 
get them into financial trouble so easily. As a consequence we do not see a significant 
effect on (food) consumption. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
Understanding borrowing needs and use of credit in developing countries help to 
explain why informal loans still play such an important role for household finance. The 
terms “informal lenders” or “informal loans” should be used cautiously since this 
category can comprise of very different types of lenders which are very different from 
each other. This paper defines the following groups of lenders to be informal: 
professional moneylenders, business partners, family members and friends.  
Using a panel data set of Thai rural households I find that informal lenders are 
still an important source of credit, independent of income levels of borrowing 
households. Their loans are large, have relatively long maturities and are collateralised 
to a high degree. Thus, in some ways these loans are different from the described 
findings in former studies. However, a lot of characteristics depend on the type of 
informal lender. Whereas moneylender loans are very expensive, loans within the 
family are not.  
A difference-in-differences estimation approach shows that asset endowment for 
relatively poor households increases if households receive informal loans. There are 
good reasons for this. First, they build up buffer stocks which can be sold if they need 
money; second, they improve their credit worthiness by accumulating assets which can 
serve as collateral if applying for formal loans and third, if they are excluded from the 
formal sector informal loans are their ‘regular’ sources of finance if investments have to 
be undertaken. For relatively rich households no statistically significant effect on assets 
can be observed. Instead their food consumption increases when they receive informal 
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loans. This effect is in turn not observable for relatively poor households. Relatively 
rich households are less likely to be farming households and if hit by a shock they 
cannot produce food on their own. They have to rather rely on informal loans to get 
short-term finance.  
There have been several attempts to reduce the reliance on informal loans for rural 
households in developing countries. Microfinance institutions all over the world attest 
to the efforts of governments and non-governmental organizations in this respect. This 
paper gives some insights into why informal loans are still needed in developing 
countries. They serve different purposes and satisfy specific needs, which depend on the 
economic standing of borrowing households. Informal lenders provide credit access for 
poor people who are excluded from the formal sector but they also provide loans at 
short notice for rich people. Any credit program that aims to minimise reliance on 
informal credit sources should take this into account.  
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4. The use of collateral in formal and informal lending*** 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We offer a new test of the ex ante theory of collateral. Theory states that lenders rely 
less on collateral if they have better information about borrowers. We test this by 
contrasting the use of collateral between formal and – better informed – informal 
lenders in a developing financial market. Indeed, formal lenders rely about 40% more 
often on collateral than informal lenders, controlling for conventional determinants of 
collateral. Moreover, having better information about borrowers has implications within 
lender groups: formal lenders rely less on collateral with longer borrower-relationship 
and informal lenders rely less on collateral with shorter distance to the borrower. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Collateral is a common element of loan contracts which is used to overcome 
information and incentive problems. Empirical studies have shown that collateral is 
indeed used in most loan contracts and that theoretically expected determinants are 
relevant (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). However, do we find the same use of 
collateral among diverse lenders which differ, in particular, in their degree of private 
information about borrowers? We examine this issue based on a sample of loans from a 
developing country. Developing markets are characterized by more opaque information 
as well as more severe problems in monitoring and enforcing of loan contracts. Due to 
this difference, specific financial institutions have emerged, in particular informal 
                                                 
***
 I would like to thank my co-authors Lukas Menkhoff and Doris Neuberger. For useful comments we 
would like to thank participants at several seminars and conferences, in particular Armando José Garcia 
Pires, Christa Hainz, Olaf Hübler, Toman Omar Mahmoud, Steven Ongena and Koen Schoors. Financial 
support by the German Research Foundation (DFG, grant FOR 756) is gratefully acknowledged. 
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lending. Informal lenders address information and incentive problems in lending by 
their proximity to the borrower. Proximity, indicated by relationship and near distance, 
may contribute to generating private information, thus reducing the need for collateral. 
Despite the prominence of informal lenders in developing countries (e.g., Kan, 2000; 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Barslund and Tarp, 2008), their use of collateral has rarely 
been examined and a comparison with formal lenders in this respect is missing. We 
contribute to filling this gap by making use of a novel data set. 
The use of collateral is an important issue in developing countries because 
widespread poverty limits the availability of collateral. Lack of collateral contributes to 
restricted access to finance which is a major concern in developing financial markets 
(Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt, 2008). From this perspective, an information advantage of 
informal lenders may contribute to better access to finance. It may also complement 
formal finance by contributing to the growth of small firms (Degryse et al., 2013) and 
by providing capital despite difficult loan contract enforcement (Giné, 2011). Moreover, 
a deeper understanding of the information environment in general may generate insights 
into how to improve lending technologies in order to make (semi-) formal financial 
institutions more inclusive. 
However, the differences in the informational setting between formal and 
informal lending are not just interesting for the analysis of developing financial markets. 
They also allow for more general insights into the use of collateral. Our examination is 
guided by the two dominating theories on the use of collateral in lending, the ex post 
and the ex ante theory (Berger et al., 2011a, 2011b). According to the ex post theory of 
collateral, borrowers have to provide collateral as a buffer against default risk. The 
testable implication of this theory is that loans with higher observable risk will have to 
pledge more collateral. As this is quite a general statement, the empirical relation is 
expected to hold across various types of lenders, in particular at formal and informal 
ones. This ex post theory has often been tested and has been confirmed in most cases, 
although there is a gap regarding informal lenders. 
 62 
 
By comparison, empirical evidence on the validity of the ex ante theory of 
collateral is rather rare. This theory starts with the assumption that lenders cannot 
(fully) observe the riskiness of borrowers. The resulting asymmetric information may be 
reduced by borrowers: less risky borrowers have an incentive to signal their superiority 
by pledging more collateral. Despite its theoretical appeal, this ex ante theory of 
collateral has hardly been tested because of the lack of available knowledge of 
borrowers’ riskiness which is not observable to lenders. Thus the researcher needs a 
degree of information which lenders do not have – this is rare and motivates the search 
for alternative approaches. 
Such approaches exploit an implication of the ex ante theory: The signalling 
incentive of less risky borrowers is weaker and thus their provision of collateral is lower 
if lenders have better information about borrowers. Therefore, if there are two cases 
which differ only in the information asymmetry between lender and borrower, the ex 
ante theory predicts that less collateral is used in case of better information. This has 
been analyzed in an event study approach where the information asymmetry changes 
due to new regulatory requirements (Berger et al., 2011a). We propose another 
approach which exploits the different degree of information asymmetry across lending 
institutions. 
Essentially, regular banks mainly use observable information about the riskiness 
of borrowers but informal lenders are able to use a richer set of information, including 
more private information, due to their intimate knowledge of borrowers. This difference 
in the degree of information between formal and informal lenders has testable 
implications regarding the role of collateral in their lending operations. 
Overall, by empirically examining four theoretically expected relations we get the 
following results: (1) As a baseline relation derived from the ex post theory, and thus 
independent from the degree of lender information about the borrower, we expect and 
find that more risky loans have more restrictive terms to a significant degree, including 
higher collateral requirements. (2) According to the ex ante theory of collateral, regular 
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banks require more collateral than informal lenders as they have less information about 
borrowers’ riskiness. On average, formal lenders require collateral about 40% more 
often compared to informal lenders. (3) As a further implication of the ex ante theory of 
collateral, we find that regular banks – but not informal lenders – improve their risk 
assessment over time: at the mean, about 7.5 years longer relationship with borrowers 
will reduce the probability of collateral by about 8%. (4) Another implication of the ex 
ante theory derives from the physical distance between lender and borrower: larger 
distance hampers information gathering, for informal lenders only. The effect at the 
mean is about 10% higher collateral probability with 17 minutes longer travel time. If 
borrower and informal lender are located in the same village, collateral probability 
decreases by even a third. 
This research program requires appropriate data. In this paper, we use a 
comprehensive household survey, conducted among more than 2,000 households in the 
rural areas of north-eastern Thailand. This data set is particularly useful for our purpose 
as these households make frequent use of the various financial institutions offering 
loans. Overall, about 65% of households have a loan at a certain point in time and on 
average these households take loans from 2.3 different institutions. Moreover, we 
observe the operations of a broad range of formal, semiformal and informal financial 
institutions which is important in identifying differing degrees of information 
asymmetry between lender and borrower. These financial market characteristics under 
review are necessary to implement our research strategy and distinguish our study from 
others in the literature, as we argue later in more detail (see Section 4.2). 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 links our research to the literature 
and carves out our contribution. Section 4.3 describes data, Section 4.4 presents and 
discusses results of the empirical examinations, Section 4.5 contains robustness checks 
and Section 4.6 concludes. 
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4.2 Literature and hypotheses 
4.2.1 Theoretical literature 
Economic theory explains collateral as an instrument to reduce adverse selection and 
moral hazard arising from ex ante and ex post information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders. This helps to reduce credit rationing (for reviews see Berger et 
al., 2011a, 2011b). According to the ex post theory of collateral, borrowers have to 
provide collateral as a buffer against default risk, which arises from moral hazard, 
difficulties in enforcing contracts, or costly monitoring. These ex post theories of 
collateral predict that the incidence of collateral is higher for observably riskier 
borrowers (Berger et al., 2011b) and that collateral provides incentives to monitor these 
borrowers (Longhofer and Santos, 2000). Observable risk depends on characteristics of 
the borrower and the loan contract. Ex post frictions such as moral hazard may not only 
be reduced by collateral, but also by shorter loan duration and lower loan volume. 
Therefore, the use of collateral is expected to increase with loan duration and loan size 
(Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). 
Ex ante, collateral may be used as a sorting or signalling device by inducing 
observationally equivalent loan applicants to reveal their default risk. From a menu of 
contracts offered, applicants with projects of higher quality choose secured debt with 
lower loan rates, while those with projects of lower quality self-select into unsecured 
debt with higher loan rates (e.g. Boot et al., 1991). According to these ex ante theories 
of collateral, the incidence of collateral is expected to increase with the ex ante 
information gap between borrower and lender (Berger et al., 2011a). A special aspect of 
this information asymmetry has been addressed by the lender-based theory of collateral, 
which states that the type of lender matters for information asymmetries and collateral 
requirements. A model of competition between a local lender with an information 
advantage and distant transaction lenders predicts that the incidence of collateral 
increases, if the information advantage of local lenders is reduced, e.g., by technological 
innovations in credit scoring (Inderst and Mueller, 2007). 
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Theories of relationship lending predict that ex ante and ex post information 
asymmetries between borrower and lender depend on the strength (length, breadth or 
intensity) of the lending relationship, because the proximity between lender and 
borrower facilitates ex ante screening and ex post monitoring (for an overview see Boot, 
2000). In a model of repeated lending, Boot and Thakor (1994) show that a bank 
initially requires high collateral from a firm, but reduces these requirements after having 
observed timely repayment of the loan. The strength of the bank-borrower relationship 
depends on the lending technology, which is categorized as relationship lending or 
asset-based lending (Berger and Udell, 2006; Egli et al., 2006). Relationship lending 
relies on soft, private information about the borrower’s risk obtained through a close 
relationship between bank and borrower, while asset-based lending is more transactions 
oriented and relies on hard, public information (Brick and Palia, 2007). A possible 
disadvantage of relationship lending for borrowers is that the proprietary information 
gained by the relationship lender increases his or her ex post bargaining power, so that 
the borrower is locked in (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). This lock-in can be used by the 
lender to increase collateral requirements. Then, collateral is the result of hold-up, and 
the incidence of collateral rises with the strength of the lending relationship. 
While these theories have been developed for banks in mature economies, 
relationship lending plays an even larger role in less developed economies with 
financial systems characterized by low transparency and weak legal enforcement (Egli 
et al., 2006). Especially in the case of small loans in not fully developed markets, the 
costs of evaluating and utilizing collateral may be excessive, which makes relationship 
lending especially attractive as a substitute for collateral. We therefore expect a negative 
influence of the duration of the lending relationship on collateral required by banks in 
emerging markets. Relationship lending can be seen as a strategy of regular banks and 
other formal lending institutions to improve their limited information. Beyond serving 
as strategy for formal lenders, relationship lending has emerged as a specific 
organizational form, called informal lenders. Informal lenders are closer to their 
customers than formal lenders and hence have a comparative advantage in reducing ex 
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ante information gaps about their borrowers. For the case of small loans in developing 
markets, ex ante theories of collateral are especially relevant, because hard information 
about the credit risk of rural households is missing or difficult to obtain (e.g. lack of 
credit registers). Therefore, we expect that collateral is less often used by informal 
lending institutions than by formal ones that provide loans at arms’ length, and that the 
distance to the customer matters for the use of collateral by informal lenders. The 
duration of the lending relationship is likely to play a larger role for collateral 
requirements of formal banks to reduce their larger ex ante information gaps. 
Summarizing, we derive the following hypotheses: 
H1: The incidence of collateral increases with observable credit risk at all types of 
lenders. 
H2: Regular banks require more collateral than informal lenders. 
H3: A longer duration of the lending relationship reduces collateral requirements 
of formal lenders. 
H4: A shorter distance between borrower and lender reduces collateral 
requirements of informal lenders. 
 
4.2.2 Empirical literature 
One way to test the validity of ex ante and ex post theories of collateral is to examine 
the relationship between borrower risk and collateral. While the ex post theories of 
collateral predict a positive influence of observable borrower risk on collateral, the ex 
ante theories predict a negative influence of unobservable risk on collateral due to its 
signalling role. The majority of studies find that observed risk, measured by borrower 
and loan characteristics, positively affects collateralization, consistent with H1 (for a 
review see Steijvers et al., 2010).8 Collateral and monitoring seem to be complements to 
reduce the risk of ex post information problems (Cerqueiro et al., 2012). Evidence in 
                                                 
8
 Studies include Berger and Udell, 1995; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Lehmann and Neuberger, 
2001; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Menkhoff et al., 2006, 2012; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006; Brick 
and Palia, 2007. 
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favour of the ex ante theories of collateral is less clear, because the first studies that 
found a negative relationship between borrower risk and collateral (Jiménez et al., 2006; 
Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001) do not isolate effects of private information from ex 
post incentive problems (Berger et al., 2011a, 2011b). To do so, Berger et al. (2011a) 
exploit exogenous variation in ex ante lender information related to the adoption of an 
information-enhancing loan underwriting technology and find a negative effect on the 
use of collateral, consistent with the ex ante theory of collateral. Berger et al. (2011b) 
isolate private from public information by using information about borrower risk from a 
credit registry which is not known to the lender. They find that ex post theories of 
collateral dominate, and that the ex ante theories seem to hold only for customers with 
relatively short relations to the lender. Berger et al. (2012) find that the mixed results of 
the risk-collateral studies may be explained by different economic characteristics of 
collateral in the different samples. 
Another set of empirical studies examines the influence of asymmetric 
information, measured by the duration of the lending relationship or the number of 
lenders, respectively exclusivity of the lending relationship, on the incidence of 
collateral (for reviews see Berger et al., 2011a; Steijvers et al., 2010). The evidence is 
mixed. Some studies find a negative effect of relationship duration on the incidence of 
collateral, consistent with H1 (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1995; Lehmann and Neuberger, 
2001; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007; Menkhoff et al., 2012), while 
others find a positive effect (e.g., Machauer and Weber, 1998; Ono and Uesegi, 2009) 
and again others find mixed signs or insignificant results (e.g., Degryse and Van 
Cayseele, 2000; Jiménez et al., 2006; Menkhoff et al., 2006; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 
2006). Also the effect of the number of lenders on the use of collateral is sometimes 
positive (Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Jiménez et al., 2006), sometimes negative 
(Menkhoff et al., 2006; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006) and sometimes insignificant 
(Menkhoff et al., 2012). These mixed results can be interpreted as being partly 
consistent with ex ante theories of collateral, ex post theories of collateral and the hold-
up hypothesis, and reflect the problem of isolating the ex ante information hypothesis 
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from the ex post one (Berger et al., 2011a). Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) find that 
switching to a new bank increases the likelihood of collateralization. This clearly 
supports the ex ante theories of collateral, because ex ante information asymmetries are 
higher for outside banks than for relationship lenders as inside banks. 
With respect to the role of distance in lending, Degryse and Ongena (2005) find 
that the geographical distance between borrower and lender is relevant for loan pricing, 
but they do not examine its influence on collateral. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) 
provide evidence that the proximity between bank and borrower is a source of local 
informational advantage and increases credit availability. Jiménez et al. (2009) show 
that the organizational distance, measured as the distance between the headquarters of 
the bank and the location of the borrower, matters for the use of collateral for business 
loans in Spain. In contrast to our expectations, the use of collateral is higher for loans 
that are granted by local lenders. This can be explained by the finding that hard data 
about the credit quality of the borrower (accounting variables) and organizational 
distance are substitutes in the collateral decision. If distant lenders can offset their 
informational disadvantage by the availability of hard data, they can grant loans with 
less collateral than local banks (Jiménez et al., 2009). 
The majority of studies focuses on mature markets. As theoretically expected, 
collateral requirements of banks tend to be larger in less developed markets and decline 
with financial development (Liberti and Mian, 2010; Nguyen and Qian, 2012). For a 
cross-section of 31 countries, Godlewski and Weill (2011) show that consistent with the 
ex ante theories of collateral, the relationship between collateral and risk premiums 
tends to be negative only in countries with higher levels of asymmetric information, 
measured among others by the presence of credit registries, accounting standards, 
creditor rights and the level of financial development. Relatively high rates of collateral 
have been found for business loans in transition countries (Hainz, 2003) and in the 
emerging markets of Mexico (La Porta et al., 2003) and Thailand (Menkhoff et al., 
2006), while the incidence of collateral is comparatively low in business loans in 
Bolivia (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010) and Peru (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). The 
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evidence for China is mixed (Allen et al., 2005; Lin, 2011).9 Collateral plays a limited 
role in rural household lending in Thailand (Menkhoff et al., 2012), and in lending to 
very small enterprises and households by microfinance institutions in developing 
countries (Conning and Udry, 2007; Hermes and Lensink, 2007). In these markets, 
collateral tends to be substituted by guarantees and relationships (e.g., Besley and 
Coate, 1995; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Menkhoff et al., 2012). Whether this depends 
on the formality of the lender is still an open question. In a cross-section of 43 
developing countries, loans from non-bank financial institutions were less often 
collateralized (Nguyen and Qian, 2012), consistent with H2. In commercial 
microlending in Mozambique, collateral is relevant, but decreases with informational 
gains from successive loans (Behr et al., 2011). This supports the mechanism 
underlying H3. 
Summarizing, there is a research gap in the empirical literature on the ex ante 
theories of collateral and the use of collateral by informal lenders which we address in 
this paper. 
 
4.3 Data 
This section contains data information, from general to specific: Section 4.3.1 is about 
the overall survey underlying our research, Section 4.3.2 describes the specific data of 
this survey which we use and Section 4.3.3 shows the reliance on collateral in our 
sample. 
 
                                                 
9
 While Allen et al. (2005) show that collateral is important in private sector loans in China, Lin (2011) 
finds only a limited role of collateral in China due to weakly protected creditor rights. 
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4.3.1 The underlying survey 
The data emanates from the project “Vulnerability to poverty in Southeast Asia” which 
started in 2006 to compile a long-run panel data set providing household information.10 
The survey covers more than 2,000 rural households in the north-eastern part of 
Thailand in which most people are engaged in farming activities. Households have been 
selected according to a three-stage stratified sampling procedure, in which 3 provinces 
were chosen according to their share of rural population. In a subsequent step sub-
districts in these provinces were randomly selected with probability relative to their 
population density. In each of these sub-districts two villages were chosen and 10 
households in each village were randomly identified. The generated sample is 
representative for the relatively poor rural population in Thailand’s Northeast. 
So far, three waves have been conducted during April and May in the years 2007, 
2008, and 2010. Each wave captures the period of the last 12 months so that there is a 
12 months gap for 2009. The range of questions is quite broad, capturing household 
dynamics, health, education, risks, shocks, economic activities, employment and 
financial issues. For our research purpose, we use information about borrowing and 
lending activities, repayment behaviour and savings of a household. It is this broad 
informational basis, notably the detailed data about households’ borrowing activities, 
which distinguishes our dataset from others. 
Due to the setting in Thailand, many lenders operate in rural areas. Roughly, one 
can differentiate between three diverse types of lenders according to their degree of 
formality, i.e. formal, semiformal and informal lenders. Formal lenders consist of 
commercial banks (CB) which have, however, only a very limited lending business in 
the rural Northeast, and a large state owned bank, the “Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives” (BAAC), which was set up to serve the agricultural sector of 
the economy, i.e. rural areas. 
                                                 
10
 Part of the data has been used in an earlier study on collateral, with a different research focus, too. 
Appendix 4 shows comparability of both studies as far as data and issues overlap. 
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Semiformal lenders consist of three groups: first, there are credit-granting 
institutions at the village level (CRED), such as village banks, credit cooperative or 
credit groups; these financial institutions have been analyzed in some detail by Kaboski 
and Townsend (2005). Second, the Thai government established in 2002/03 the so-
called Thai Village Fund Program (VF), i.e. a revolving fund set up in each village (see 
details in Boonperm et al, 2013). With respect to formality CRED and VF can be 
located between formal and informal lenders since they are operating according to 
binding regulations but these regulations are only valid for a specific clientele or linked 
to membership. Third, another type of loans can also be defined to be semiformal, i.e. 
loans given by political entities to specific borrowers such as very poor households or 
students (POL). 
Finally, despite Thailand’s economic progress over the last decades and despite 
the set-up of specific (semi-)formal institutions in rural areas, informal lenders still play 
an important role. They comprise professional moneylenders and pawnshops (ML), 
business partners such as traders and suppliers (BP), family members (FAM) and 
friends (FRI). 
 
4.3.2 Description of data 
This study is about the role of collateral. Thus out of the overall survey sample, we are 
only interested in those households who were interviewed in each of the three waves 
and who ever took a loan in the 12 months preceding one of the three interviews: 1,791 
households fulfil these conditions and thus form the sample for our empirical study11. 
These households and their borrowing behaviour are described in the following. 
Table 17 provides descriptive statistics about four areas of interest, i.e. (1) 
household demographics, (2) economic status of the household, (3) borrowing 
                                                 
11
 314 households (15% of all households) never borrowed. These households distinguish from borrowing 
households in that they are mainly retired people who have a relatively high but non-increasing income, 
high amounts of savings but only small land plots, low asset endowments and low consumption levels. 
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characteristics and (4) relationship variables. We comment on some of the data. 
Regarding demographic information, household heads are about 54 years old and spent 
slightly above five years in school, as compulsory schooling for the old cohort was 4 
years. The household size is more than four persons, which translates into about three 
when measured as adult equivalence units according to the OECD12. About 25% of all 
households are female headed and 80% of all household heads are married.  
Variables indicating the economic situation of households show that most 
households own a small area of land. Most variables become larger over time in 
nominal terms as the overall economy experienced average real growth rates of about 
2.5% annually between 2007 and 2010.13 This nominal increase applies to income, 
consumption expenditures and asset endowment. Finally, debt capacity, expressed by 
the ratio of income over total loan volume, slightly decreases over the years. 
Regarding borrowing behaviour, we have to ensure comparability over time, i.e. 
across three waves. Thus we capture only newly granted loans within our reference 
periods and do not consider loans that have been granted before the survey started in 
2006 nor loans that have been granted in the 12 months gap in 2009. The remaining 
sample consists of 1,791 households and 6,957 loans. 2,529 loans have been granted 
within the first wave, 2,497 within the second and 1,931 within the third wave.14 On 
average, households agree on about 1.6 new loans per year which is, of course, partially 
driven by the short duration of below 17 months. The percentage of loans with either 
(tangible) collateral or guarantees is increasing over time though collateral and 
guarantees exhibit a different development. The share of collateralized loans drops by 
2%-points from 18% to 16% in wave 2 and increases again in wave 3 to 21%. Wave 2 
                                                 
12
 The OECD assigns different weights to household members. The first adult member attributes to the 
measure with 1.0, all other adult attributes with a weight of 0.7 and each child is assigned a weight of 0.5. 
13
 Growth rates were 4.2% (2007), 1.8 (2008), -3.0 (2009) and 7.2% (2010), respectively. 
14
 These loans are mostly cash loans but there are also 433 installment loans and 116 in kind loans which 
are included in the descriptive statistics. However, we do not include them in the regressions due to the 
following reasons: 1) we want to avoid measurement errors for loan size and therefore do not consider in 
kind loans and 2) we do not want to mix purchasing decisions and their payment modalities with real loan 
decisions and hence exclude installment loans. 
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Table 17: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Mean/fraction Std. dev. Mean/fraction Std. dev. Mean/fraction Std. dev.
Household characteristics
Demographics
Age of household head (years) 53.49 12.87 54.48 12.74 55.54 12.20
Years of education of household head 5.15 2.68 5.25 2.79 5.27 2.72
Household size 4.11 1.69 4.13 1.73 4.15 1.74
Number of adult equivalence 2.93 1.03 2.95 1.05 2.98 1.06
Female headed household 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.44
Married household head 0.80 0.40 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.39
Economic status
Area of owned land (raia) 2.46 3.21 2.51 3.33 2.73 3.08
Household annual income (in 1,000 Baht) 116 167 135 269 165 239
66 49 104 58 88
Consumption expenditures (in 1,000 Baht) 90 56 115 92 175 115
     Food 39 22 46 30 94 65
Total assets of last 5 years (in 1,000 Baht) 149 270 174 490 209 501
Savings (in 1,000 Baht) 15 61 14 42 19 63
Livestock and stored crops (in 1,000 Baht) 19 181 20 46 19 32
Debt capacity (Annual inc./ total loan vol.) 2.78 9.67 2.52 8.81 2.32 6.29
Borrowing
Number of loans per household 1.72 1.12 1.68 0.97 1.49 0.77
134 72 212 77 186
Loan size (in 1,000 Baht) 37.76 89.95 40.67 150.85 49.28 140.53
Duration of loans (in months) 17.87 22.50 17.14 23.51 18.45 23.56
Average interest rate per household (%) 12.97 30.30 11.35 29.3 10.45 23.70
0.32 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.18
Percentage of collateralized loans 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.38 0.21 0.41
Percentage of guaranteed loans 0.73 0.44 0.76 0.43 0.74 0.44
Agricultural production purpose (in %) 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.39 0.49
Non-agricultural production purpose  (in %) 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.38
Consumption purpose  (in %) 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45
Payback or relend to others  (in %) 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36
Relationship variables
Relationship duration 5.40 5.30 6.16 5.28 7.77 6.48
Number of loans from same lender 2.59 1.18 2.58 1.18 2.64 1.21
Number of lenders 2.27 1.01 2.26 1.00 2.30 1.01
Number of households (loans) 1,407 (2,529) 1,410 (2,497) 1,239 (1,931)
Note: Sample contains 1,791 households and 6,957 loans. Only households who have been interviewed in all 3 waves
have been considered. Sample contains cash loans (6,408), installment loans (433) and loans in kind (116).
a
 One rai corresponds to 0.16 hectare.
b
 This figure gives the yearly number of loans that have been repaid late in percentage of all loans received in the   
   respective year. 
Percentage of late repayment (of total loans per hh)b   0.11
Volume of loans per household (in 1,000 Baht)               67
1st wave 2nd wave 3rd wave
Annual income per equiv. scale (in 1,000 Baht)              43
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can be considered as a crisis year since the financial crisis of 2007/2008 hit the country 
in these months what may explain the results. Consequentially the pattern for 
guaranteed loans is reverse: personal guarantees increase in wave 2 and decrease again 
in wave 3 suggesting a substitution of collateral and personal guarantees. Also the 
purpose of loans slightly changes over time. The share of loans used for agricultural 
production, which is the most important use of loans, increases from 38% (wave 1) to 
42% (wave 2) and decreases again to 39% in wave 3. The share of loans used for non-
agricultural production decreases from 18% to 13% and increases again to 18%, 
reflecting the economic crisis during wave 2. Consumption loans decrease from the first 
to the second wave and remain at the new level of 28%. Loans to pay back other loans 
or to relend to other households increase from 12% (wave 1) to 15% (wave 2) and also 
remain at that level in wave 3. 
Finally, there are three potential relationship variables: Relation duration between 
lender and borrowing household is on average more than six years and increasing. On 
average households have borrowed 2.6 loans from the same lender across waves, 
indicating close relations, and the average household is engaged with 2.27 different 
lenders, where less lenders indicate a closer relation. 
 
4.3.3 The reliance on collateral 
The sample includes a variety of lending institutions and the different institutions may 
have different collateral requirements. In particular, lenders with more information on 
borrowers, should have less need of collateral as the ex ante theory predicts (Berger et 
al., 2011a). Lenders with less information regarding the borrower should therefore have 
higher collateral requirements. According to theoretic reasoning (see Section 4.2 
above), we expect formal lending institutions having less intimate knowledge about 
borrowers and thus relying more on collateral than informal lenders. 
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Table 18 presents information about the use of collateral, relationship variables 
and loan characteristics for the nine different lending institutions operating in the rural 
Northeast of Thailand (Panel A) and for the three major groups of lending institutions 
(Panel B). Panel A shows that on average about 18% of all loans are collateralized. This 
share is rather low compared to collateralization in other developing countries. In Peru, 
Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) find collateralization of 24% of all loans. Berger et al. 
(2012) observe the same share for loans from formal institutions in Bolivia. As 
expected, in our sample formal institutions, i.e. CB and BAAC, have a high share of 
collateralized loans, i.e. roughly 40% (Panel B). Semiformal institutions are very 
diverse. The VF does not rely on collateral at all but on guarantees. Policy loans (POL) 
also do not use the instrument of collateral. Therefore it does not seem relevant to 
consider these two lending institutions when examining the role of collateral. Only 
credit institutions (CRED) use collateral to some extent, i.e. in 19% of cases and thus 
indeed less than formal lending institutions. 
Within the informal institutions we can distinguish between ML/BP and 
FAM/FRI. Former demand collateral similar to formal lenders and drive the results for 
the whole group. The motivation for ML and BP to give loans to households is 
economic reasoning. Furthermore it is likely that loan transactions, in particular from 
BP, are interlinked with other business transactions between the lender and the borrower 
which might influence loan terms. FAM and FRI in contrast do not follow economic 
reasoning in the first place. But it is possible that they want to gain advantages in case 
of own potential problems in the future by helping their kin. Overall, FAM/FRI use 
collateral to less than 10% and thus indeed seem to act in accordance with the 
theoretical expectations, whereas ML/BP use collateral to an unexpectedly high degree. 
We come back to this fact (in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3). 
Turning to the descriptive statistics about relationship variables and loan 
characteristics, we see some marked differences between lending institutions. As 
expected, for example, CB lend large loan amounts and ML charge high interest rates. 
However, we would also emphasize that many variables – such as average loan size and 
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loan duration – are not very different between formal and informal lenders, indicating 
some degree of homogeneity in loans across these institutions.  
 
Table 18: Incidence of collateral and relationship variables by lending institution 
total sample 
Panel A weighted 
CB BAAC VF CRED POL ML BP FAM FRI average average c
Collateral
Collateralized loans (in %) 43.6 37.4 2.3 19.1 1.4 40.5 48.5 6.4 9.7 18.0 31.1
Rate of collateralizationa 2.56 4.43 1.20 4.00 0.00 2.87 1.39 3.47 6.44 2.57 3.79
Guaranteed loans (in %) 54.4 74.3 96.3 75.0 80.9 14.7 42.9 5.6 8.3 74.4 57.4
Neither collat. nor guarantee (in %) 12.1 2.6 2.7 11.6 18.4 49.6 24.4 87.7 83.4 13.6 21.4
Relationship variables
Relationship duration 3.88 10.00 5.62 7.63 5.30 2.90 2.14 3.50 3.19 6.36 6.99
Number of loans from same lender 2.38 3.07 3.01 3.19 2.65 2.29 2.42 2.66 2.45 2.93 2.88
Number of different lenders per hh 2.99 2.48 2.40 2.71 2.94 2.72 2.91 2.90 2.98 2.57 2.68
Loan characteristics
Loan size (in 1,000 Baht) 184.10 55.59 17.03 51.84 13.59 49.16 143.38 30.62 20.18 43.65 65.97
Duration (in months) 33.40 24.44 12.40 17.14 21.51 15.05 28.44 12.28 11.18 17.69 21.37
Annual interest rate (in %) 13.8 9.2 7.3 12.0 2.6 49.9 25.3 11.8 42.7 11.9 16.1
Sample size 
Number of households 123 765 1,281 477 218 205 355 245 112
Number of loans 149 1,605 2,860 868 293 252 443 342 145 ∑ 6,957 3,804
total sample 
Panel B weighted weighted 
average average c
Collateral
Collateralized loans (in %) 18.0 31.1
Rate of collateralizationa 2.57 3.79
Guaranteed loans (in %) 74.4 57.4
Neither collat. nor guarantee (in %) 13.6 21.4
Relationship variables
Relationship duration 6.36 6.99
Number of loans from same lender 2.93 2.88
Number of different lenders per hh 2.57 2.68
Loan characteristics
Loan size (in 1,000 Baht) 43.65 65.97
Duration (in months) 17.69 21.37
Annual interest rate (in %) 11.9 16.1
Sample size 
Number of households
Number of loans ∑ 6,957 3,804
b
 information is for semiformal loans (weighted average of VF, CRED and POL), sample used in regressions comprises CRED only
c
 VF and POL loans are excluded since they seldom operate with collateral
weighted
745
1,182
1,456
4,021
informal
29.9
2.15
2.46
21.8
55.8
8.0
65.86
2.87
2.826.03
3.02
2.50
66.50
25.20
9.6
24.30
14.09
3.01
2.52
formal
37.9
4.24
semiformal b
5.9
72.6
3.5
9.48
3.14
90.5
5.9
19.28
27.3
a
 gives the average rate of collateralization (value of collateral/ loan size) for collateralized loans only
848
1,754
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As a consequence, differences in collateral requirements do not obviously 
emanate from differing loan characteristics but reflect different lending practices. 
 Turning to the descriptive statistics about relationship variables and loan 
characteristics, we see some marked differences between lending institutions. As 
expected, for example, CB lend large loan amounts and ML charge high interest rates. 
However, we would also emphasize that many variables – such as average loan size and 
loan duration – are not very different between formal and informal lenders, indicating 
some degree of homogeneity in loans across these institutions. As a consequence, 
differences in collateral requirements do not obviously emanate from differing loan 
characteristics but reflect different lending practices. 
 
4.4 Results 
This section documents results in four steps. In Section 4.4.1 we confirm standard 
results of the ex post-theory of collateral for our sample. On this basis we show in 
various forms that better information of lenders about borrowers reduces the use of 
collateral: this holds across different lenders (Section 4.4.2), it is corroborated by the 
influence of relationship across lenders (Section 4.4.3) and it is further supported by the 
role of distance across and within groups of lenders (Section 4.4.4). 
 
4.4.1 The empirical approach in examining the use of collateral 
Our empirical approach in examining the use of collateral follows standards in the 
literature (see Section 4.2). We analyze the determinants of collateral at the loan level. 
As households typically have several loans at the same time and over time, we take care 
of this fact by using standard errors being clustered at the household level. 
Moreover, we examine the use of collateral by applying a logistic regression in 
which the use of collateral is approximated by its incidence. If not indicated otherwise 
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we present the marginal effects at the means of explanatory variables. As a measure of 
collateral we prefer the “incidence of collateral” over the “degree of collateralization” 
because the latter is unusually high in our sample with about 200 to 400 percent on 
average, mainly due to indivisibility of land. Unfortunately, there is little information in 
rates of collateralization above 100%, so that the measure of degree of collateralization 
is much less informative than in other studies where loans are typically collateralized to 
less than 100 percent. 
We employ a logistic regression model to explain the incidence of collateral of the 
following form: 
 
           P(Inc.ijt) = f (Loan characteristicsijt, Borrower characteristicsijt,        (2) 
                                         Information proxyijt, γt, δj) 
 
where P(·) indicates probability, Inc.ijt is a dummy variable which equals one if 
collateral has been pledged and zero otherwise and γt and δj represent time and 
provincial fixed effects, respectively.15 The sub indices i,j and t correspond to loans, 
provinces and waves. 
Empirically analyzing the use of collateral requires considering various potential 
determinants as they have been found in the literature.16 These determinants include 
four groups: (i) information about Loan characteristics, i.e. in particular loan size, loan 
duration, annual interest rate, loan purpose, and eventually guarantees; (ii) information 
                                                 
15
 We prefer the logit model over the probit model since most variables are not normally distributed 
according to the Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia test. However, comparing the values of the Akaike 
and Bayesian information criterion (AIC and BIC) the models do not differ much. Accordingly marginal 
effects are almost unchanged when using a probit model. 
16
 We use a standard set of variables to describe household characteristics (see, e.g., Behr et al. 2011) and 
we derive loan terms from other papers such as Degryse and van Cayseele (2000), Ioannidou and Ongena 
(2010) and Berger et al. (2011a,b). Following Berger and Udell (1995) and more recently e.g. Jiménez et 
al. (2006) or Brick and Palia (2007), we proxy relationship by calculating the duration a household is 
engaged with the same lender in years. 
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about Borrower characteristics, i.e. income, age, education, household size, gender, 
total loan volume, earlier repayment behaviour, and (iii) Information proxies which 
capture information asymmetry between lender and borrower (we will mainly use 
relationship in years and distance between lender and borrower in minutes travel time). 
When pooling over all lenders and over three waves we get a standard outcome, 
because we find several determinants to be statistically significant in our sample and the 
sign of the marginal effects is in line with theory.17 Table 19 shows the regression 
results: specification (1) is the broadest one, where we consider a large set of potential 
determinants. We find that a larger loan size and longer duration increase the probability 
that collateral has to be pledged. This is consistent with H1 as we expect the risk for the 
lender to increase with increasing loan size and longer loan duration. Concerning the 
use of loans it is the marginal effect of consumption purpose which is significant. The 
negative sign indicates that loans borrowed for consumption purposes require less 
collateral than loans used for other purposes; this probably reflects short-term 
agreements on consumption loans (and possibly also effects from short duration and 
low volume beyond the average). If a loan is guaranteed for by other persons collateral 
requirements are less likely. Higher education of the household head lowers collateral 
requirements since higher education may indicate lower risk. Higher debt capacity of a 
household is also associated with lower use of collateral. Next, a higher loan volume per 
household lowers collateral requirements, basically because this represents richer and 
wealthier households. Finally, longer relationship duration is associated with a higher 
incidence of collateral: this is consistent with the hold-up hypothesis, however, it may 
also result from unconsidered heterogeneity among lenders because we know from 
Table 18 that lenders with more use of collateral, as BAAC, have longer relationship 
duration than others (we will see in Section 4.4.2, when we implement lender dummies, 
that the second interpretation is correct). 
                                                 
17
 The pooling over lenders and waves results from the analysis of loans. An analysis of households might 
use a panel approach but this would be a different research question than ours. 
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Table 19: Determinants of collateral 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all reduced wealth relationship relationship 
Incidence of collateral variables set indicator measure II measure III
Independent variables 
Loan size (Baht) 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.171*** 0.163***
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0160) (0.0158)
Loan duration (months) 0.00210*** 0.00208*** 0.00208*** 0.00200*** 0.00198***
(0.000429) (0.000422) (0.000423) (0.000410) (0.000419)
Annual interest rate -0.000231 -0.000261 -0.000277 -0.000362 -0.000359
(0.000263) (0.000265) (0.000270) (0.000277) (0.000274)
Agricultural production loan 0.0295 0.0314 0.0302 0.0322 0.0305
(0.0276) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0272) (0.0271)
Non-agricultural production loan 0.0406 0.0431 0.0435 0.0372 0.0369
(0.0342) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0339) (0.0339)
Consumption loan -0.0506* -0.0508* -0.0515* -0.0606** -0.0617**
(0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0277) (0.0276)
Guaranteed loan -0.437*** -0.435*** -0.435*** -0.421*** -0.425***
(0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0219) (0.0218)
Female headed household -0.0170
(0.0243)
Household size (adult equivalence) -0.00864
(0.00921)
Education of household head -0.00657* -0.00590 -0.00595 -0.00598 -0.00603
(0.00387) (0.00385) (0.00387) (0.00382) (0.00383)
Income per adult equivalence (Baht) 0.00330 0.00389 0.00482 0.00465
(0.00536) (0.00532) (0.00537) (0.00538)
Asset endowment (in Baht) 0.00229
(0.00640)
Savings (in Baht) 0.00319
(0.00334)
Debt capacity -0.00732* -0.00664 -0.00560 -0.00674 -0.00723*
(0.00436) (0.00424) (0.00402) (0.00424) (0.00436)
Dummy if repaid late -0.0147
(0.0339)
Total loan volume per hh (in Baht) -0.0474*** -0.0457*** -0.0457*** -0.0449*** -0.0337**
(0.0161) (0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0170)
Relationship duration 0.0306*** 0.0318*** 0.0322***
(0.00971) (0.00965) (0.00968)
Number of loans from same lender -7.69e-05
(0.00801)
Number of lenders -0.0180*
(0.00984)
Pseudo R-squared 0.314 0.313 0.313 0.314 0.316
Observations 2,963 2,992 2,991 3,051 3,051
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Note: All lending institutions included except VF and POL. For relationship duration, loan size, income, savings, asset 
endowment and total loan volume logarithmic values are taken. 
All specifications control for time and province effects via dummies.
Specification (1): Broad set of explanatory variables, relationship measured via relationship duration; 
Specification (2) Reduced set of explanatory variables according to established literatur;
Specification (3): Household's wealth is proxied by asset endowment instead of income; 
Specification (4):  Relationship is proxied by the number of loans a household borrowed from the same lender; 
Specification (5): Relationship is proxied by the number of lenders a household is engaged with. 
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Specification (2) reduces the number of determinants in order to continue our 
future examinations with more parsimonious specifications. More precisely we drop 
determinants which remain insignificant in all specifications. This applies to the 
following variables: female headed household, household size, savings and whether a 
household ever repaid late on a loan. Again, in specification (2) we find that the 
riskiness of loans is positively related to the incidence of collateral. This confirms the 
prediction made by the ex post theory of collateral (H1). 
Specification (3) just exchanges income by asset endowment to see whether this 
makes a difference, which is, however, not the case. Both marginal effects are positive, 
as theoretically expected, but far from turning significant. Nevertheless, we stick to the 
income variable because it seems to be crucial in general when explaining riskiness of 
borrowers and thus the use of collateral. 
In specifications (4) and (5), the relationship aspect between lender and borrower 
is measured in new ways. First, the “number of loans from same lender” indicates a 
stronger relation, whereas, second, the “number of lenders” the household is engaged 
with rather indicates a weaker relation between borrowers and each specific lender. 
These new relationship variables are insignificant in specification (4), but significant 
with a negative sign in specification (5) which implies that more lenders increase 
competition and thus reduce collateral requirements. In both specifications the other 
variables keep signs and significance so that results remain robust and there is no need 
to exchange the “relationship duration” variable in standard specifications. 
 
4.4.2 The use of collateral: formal vs. informal lenders 
In this section we test whether formal lending institutions use collateral to a higher 
degree than informal ones: in line with the ex ante hypothesis of collateral we expect 
that informal lenders rely less on the use of collateral because they have better 
information about the riskiness and behaviour of their borrowers (H2). 
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Consequently we would expect that CB and BAAC demand more collateral than 
other lending institutions. To test this hypothesis we rely on the parsimonious 
specification (2) from Table 19 and add dummies for the seven lenders which we still 
consider. The resulting specification (1) in Table 20 shows that indeed BAAC loans are 
collateralized most often followed by BP, CRED, CB, followed with some distance by 
ML, FRI (the reference category) and FAM. On average, formal institutions require 
collateral quite frequently, semiformal lenders require less often collateral and informal 
lenders have the lowest collateral requirement. Within the group of informal lenders, 
however, there are obvious differences which require attention. 
BP loans are collateralized more often than we would have expected from an 
informal lender. The reason is that BPs often finance the purchase of a product (such as 
a motorcycle) and simultaneously take this product as collateral. In this sense they 
follow a somewhat specific business model when granting loans. At the other extreme, 
FAM and also FRI do not often require collateral. This seems to be in line with earlier 
literature (Barslund and Tarp, 2008) because in these cases the reason to grant a loan 
may be influenced by altruistic motivation. This tends to lower collateral standards. In 
between the extremes of BP and FAM/FRI are ML, a traditional form of informal 
lenders. Specification (2) shows that formal lenders require collateral 30% more likely 
than ML, which is the reference category here. Overall, informal lenders use collateral 
much less than formal lenders, with the specific exception of BP. 
Another interesting result occurs while controlling for the type of lender: the 
influence of relationship duration changes from positive (Table 19) to negative (Table 
20). This can be explained by the correlation between relationship duration and type of 
lender. Formal lenders do not use longer relationships for hold-up, but for reducing their 
larger information gaps. This will be further examined below (Section 4.4.3). 
Specifications (3) to (5) are used to check the robustness of our finding above. In 
specification (3) we consider the fact that borrowers of formal and informal loans might 
be different in unobserved characteristics (we cannot control for in our regressions).  
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Table 20: Use of collateral across lending institutions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
formal banks formal/inf. formal/inf. formal/semif./inf.
Incidence of collateral all loans and ML institutions dummies dummies
Independent variables 
Loan size (Baht) 0.143*** 0.238*** 0.163*** 0.191*** 0.155***
(0.0157) (0.0344) (0.0313) (0.0241) (0.0159)
Loan duration (months) 0.00148*** 0.00274*** 0.00245*** 0.00269*** 0.00165***
(0.000395) (0.000678) (0.000665) (0.000574) (0.000432)
Annual interest rate -0.000245 -0.000377 0.000564 0.000347 0.000217
(0.000272) (0.000537) (0.000605) (0.000312) (0.000247)
Agricultural production loan -0.0180 0.0260 0.0202 -0.00576 -0.00814
(0.0253) (0.0495) (0.0545) (0.0357) (0.0261)
Non-agricultural prod. loan 0.0172 0.0877 0.0175 0.0422 0.0146
(0.0315) (0.0596) (0.0643) (0.0451) (0.0325)
Consumption loan -0.0452 -0.00338 0.0123 0.0115 -0.0402
(0.0287) (0.0627) (0.0703) (0.0429) (0.0289)
Guaranteed loan -0.602*** -0.719*** -0.624*** -0.619*** -0.600***
(0.0267) (0.0263) (0.0454) (0.0306) (0.0267)
Income per adult equiv. (Baht) -0.00395 -0.00842 -0.0128* -0.00465 -0.00325
(0.00473) (0.00921) (0.00724) (0.00649) (0.00469)
Debt capacity -0.00543 0.000272 0.000989 -0.00157 -0.00669*
(0.00350) (0.00954) (0.00823) (0.00436) (0.00367)
Total loan vol. per hh (in Baht) -0.0309* -0.0187 -0.00593 -0.0319 -0.0420**
(0.0160) (0.0326) (0.0297) (0.0230) (0.0166)
Relationship duration -0.0281*** -0.0319* -0.0248 -0.0169 -0.0191*
(0.0106) (0.0190) (0.0223) (0.0142) (0.0103)
Dummy for CB 0.462*** 0.563***
(0.110) (0.143)
Dummy for BAAC 0.510*** 0.520***
(0.0574) (0.0901)
Dummy for CRED 0.476*** 0.441**
(0.0787) (0.176)
Dummy for ML 0.287*** 0.349**
(0.0929) (0.161)
Dummy for BP 0.500*** 0.697***
(0.134) (0.0896)
Dummy for FAM -0.146*** -0.183***
(0.0322) (0.0621)
Dummy for formal 0.301*** 0.399*** 0.430***
(0.0391) (0.0300) (0.0339)
Dummy for semiformal 0.400***
(0.0497)
Pseudo R-squared 0.414 0.401 0.443 0.367 0.379
Observations 3,145 1,851 939 2,344 3,145
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Note: All lending institutions included except VF and POL, with respect to lender dummies reference category is 
FRI. For relationship duration, loan size, income and total loan volume logarithmic values are taken.
All specifications control for time and province effects via dummies.
Specification (1): Base line regression with reduced set of variables, reference category for lender dummies is FRI;
Specification (2): Tests collateral requirment of formal lenders against the reference category (ML);
Specification (3): Sample is reduced to households who borrowed from formal and informal institutions 
(irrespective of borrowing from semiformal lenders).
Specification (4): Baseline regression with formal and informal loans only, inclusive dummies for informal and formal
to show differences in collateral requirements.
Specification (5): Baseline regression with formal, semiformal and informal loans and respective dummies 
to show differences in collateral requirements.
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Therefore we reduce the sample quite radically to those 939 households who have 
loans from formal and informal institutions at the same time. Again, results are 
qualitatively unchanged. Even though the relationship variable turns insignificant, this 
is because variance increases in the small sample whereas the marginal effect almost 
has the same size. 
This pattern is confirmed in the final two specifications which give the regressions for a 
reduced sample (specification 4) and for the whole sample (specification 5). Dummy 
variables for formal and informal lenders show that controlled for characteristics of 
loans and borrowers, indeed formal lenders require about 40% more often collateral 
than informal lenders (ranging from families to business partners). 
 
4.4.3 The impact of relationship within lending groups 
In this section the possible private information influencing the use of collateral is further 
examined. If different reliance on collateral by formal and informal lenders (see Section 
4.4.2 above) is indeed driven by the different degree of information asymmetry between 
lender and borrower, this asymmetry may decline during enduring relations. The 
argument runs that longer lending relations provide private information about the 
economic situation and the behaviour of the borrower which cannot be obtained by 
inspecting files. This is why we expect that formal lenders profit much more from 
longer relations (H3), whereas informal lenders have better access to this kind of private 
information. This hypothesis gets empirical support, as shown in the following. 
As a first step we simply split the total sample into three groups with potentially 
different degree of private information about borrowers, i.e. formal, semiformal and 
informal lenders. In Table 21, specifications (1) to (3) give the respective results for the 
three groups of lenders. Indeed, the marginal effect of the variable “relationship 
duration” varies across the three groups. For formal lenders we get the theoretically 
expected result consistent with a reduction of information gaps by longer relationship 
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duration, i.e. the use of collateral (here as probability of collateral) declines with longer 
durations. The marginal effects of the relation variable for semiformal and informal 
lenders are insignificant; if at all, the size of the marginal effect for semiformal lenders 
is smaller than for formal lenders and for informal lenders it even turns positive. 
Overall, this supports our hypothesis H3. 
 
Table 21: Use of collateral for formal, semiformal and informal lenders 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Incidence of collateral formal semiformal informal ML/ BP FAM/ FRI
Independent variables 
Loan size (Baht) 0.223*** 0.0841*** 0.105*** 0.194*** 0.0273***
(0.0410) (0.0138) (0.0172) (0.0585) (0.00840)
Loan duration (months) 0.00302*** -0.000420 0.00131** 0.00259 0.000374
(0.000684) (0.000346) (0.000580) (0.00182) (0.000230)
Annual interest rate -0.00104 -0.000159 0.000183 -0.000251 -4.62e-06
(0.00130) (0.000464) (0.000152) (0.000540) (5.67e-05)
Agricultural production loan 0.0477 -0.0196 -0.0557** -0.155* -0.0338**
(0.0564) (0.0229) (0.0254) (0.0932) (0.0135)
Non-agricultural production loan 0.101 -0.0402* -0.0206 0.0876 -0.0220***
(0.0683) (0.0207) (0.0344) (0.130) (0.00852)
Consumption loan -0.0149 -0.0935*** -0.00483 -0.0156 -0.0139
(0.0754) (0.0231) (0.0287) (0.108) (0.0119)
Guaranteed loan -0.727*** -0.524*** -0.0300 -0.202** -0.0144
(0.0217) (0.0544) (0.0306) (0.0904) (0.0125)
Income per adult equivalence (Baht) -0.0180* -0.000257 0.00608 0.0264* -0.00205
(0.00928) (0.00446) (0.00462) (0.0137) (0.00306)
Debt capacity 0.00403 -0.00664* -0.00559 -0.00548 -0.00182
(0.00944) (0.00351) (0.00404) (0.0175) (0.00144)
Total loan volume per household (Baht) -0.0221 -0.0406*** -0.0313* 0.0233 -0.0154**
(0.0376) (0.0148) (0.0173) (0.0529) (0.00699)
Relationship duration -0.0342* -0.0114 0.0164 -0.0114 0.00550
(0.0206) (0.0109) (0.0139) (0.0478) (0.00737)
Pseudo R-squared 0.426 0.444 0.224 0.258 0.188
Observations 1,640 801 704 261 443
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Note: All lending institutions included except VF and POL.
For relationship duration, loan size, income and total loan volume logarithmic values are taken.
All specifications control for time and province effects.
Specification (1): Formal loans only; Specification (2): Semiformal loans only; Specification (3): Informal loans only;
Specification (4): ML and BP only; Specification (5): FAM and FRI only.
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Reassuringly, the marginal effects on other possible determinants of collateral still 
fit into the literature. Collateral requirement is robustly associated with larger loan size. 
Regarding further determinants, longer loan duration and the lack of guarantees are also 
related to collateral, although the significance of these variables may be borderline or 
partially missing which may be caused by smaller sample size. 
Motivated by the somewhat lower R-squared of the regression regarding informal 
lenders, we split this sample into two groups which may be more homogeneous than the 
total, i.e. ML and BP vs. FAM and FRI. Specifications (4) and (5) show that 
explanatory power is partially improved despite smaller samples but the structure of 
determinants is somewhat different, illustrating the heterogeneity of informal lenders. In 
particular, guarantees have a significant negative effect on collateral for ML/BP, but not 
for FAM/FRI, indicating that lending from family members or friends is the most 
informal form of finance with better ex ante information than ML/BP. 
 
4.4.4 The role of distance between lenders and borrowing households 
So far, we have seen that formal lenders require more collateral than informal lenders. 
An information-based explanation is supported by the fact that only formal lenders 
profit from increased relationship duration which allows them to operate with less 
collateral. We now test the significance of another proxy for good information of 
lenders about borrowers, i.e. their geographical distance to each other. Informal lenders 
are usually geographically closer to their borrowers, which is an important reason why 
they may have better information and increase credit availability, as shown by Agarwal 
and Hauswald (2010). In fact, the role of distance for lending was examined years ago 
(Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005) but has been linked with the 
issue of collateral by only one study (Jiménez et al., 2009) so far. 
In this section we include a variable that captures the distance between lenders 
and borrowing households. The survey includes two kinds of information about 
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distance: first, the travelling time in minutes the household takes to reach its lender, and, 
second, information about where lenders and borrowers are located (i.e. in the same 
village, same commune, same district or province, urban or rural area). This information 
provides a useful proxy for lender’s information on borrowers and allows to test 
whether the effect on collateral requirements varies with distance. Since this 
information is only available for waves 2 and 3 it reduces the sample which is used in 
this section to 1,659 households and 4,409 loans.18 
Table 22 shows regressions for different types of lenders, including the variable 
“distance to lender”. If informal lenders indeed gain their information through their 
closeness to the borrowers it is reasonable to assume that they have less information 
with increasing distance and therefore demand more collateral (H4). As first step we 
just add the distance variable to the other determinants and find that its marginal effect 
is positive and significant. This is a first indication that distance – as proxy for more 
information asymmetry – is related to more collateral. 
For formal and semiformal institutions (specifications (2) and (3)) distance has no 
significant effect on collateral requirements. Or, in other words: whether the borrower is 
located far away from the lender or not, information regarding borrower’s risk does not 
change consistently.19 This is completely different for informal lenders as presented in 
specification (4): their lending is significantly more often collateralized if the distance 
increases, consistent with H4. This contrasts the finding of Jiménez et al. (2009) that 
distance has a negative influence on the use of collateral for regular banks. A possible 
explanation is that the lending technology of banks in Thailand is stronger asset-based 
than relationship-based, so that distance does not matter consistently for them. In 
contrast to the Spanish banks examined by Jiménez et al. (2009), the Thai banks in our 
sample do not seem to be able to offset their informational disadvantage by the 
availability of hard data, and therefore use more often collateral than informal lenders. 
                                                 
18
 We drop 19 loans for which lenders are located in Europe and in Bangkok, which is still hundreds of 
kilometers away from our target group. 
19
 We note that coefficient signs on the distance variable are positive for formal and informal lenders and 
that coefficient size is largely comparable to informal lenders; however, standard errors are high. 
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In order to check this finding, we run the same regression but only exchange the 
indicator for distance, i.e. we replace the travel time indicator by the simple information 
whether the lender is located in the same village as the borrower (specification 5). This  
 
Table 22: The role of distance across lending institutions 
Table 6: The role of distance across lending institutions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Incidence of collateral all loans formal semiformal informal informal
Independent variables 
Distance to lender (in minutes) 0.108*** 0.0565 0.0253 0.0332***
(0.0168) (0.0370) (0.0175) (0.0112)
Lender and borrower in the same village -0.0964***
(0.0310)
Loan size (Baht) 0.161*** 0.195*** 0.0813*** 0.0865*** 0.0834***
(0.0206) (0.0462) (0.0229) (0.0209) (0.0212)
Loan duration (months) 0.00169*** 0.00268*** -0.000423 0.00135*** 0.00129***
(0.000477) (0.000842) (0.000465) (0.000454) (0.000451)
Annual interest rate -6.82e-05 0.00106 -0.000321 0.000375** 0.000323**
(0.000359) (0.00117) (0.000822) (0.000146) (0.000141)
Agricultural production loan -0.0256 -0.0255 -0.00852 -0.0755*** -0.0717***
(0.0302) (0.0612) (0.0348) (0.0239) (0.0228)
Non-agricultural production loan -0.000335 0.0604 -0.0509* -0.0405* -0.0343*
(0.0354) (0.0737) (0.0272) (0.0210) (0.0208)
Consumption loan -0.0652** -0.0175 -0.0820*** -0.0383* -0.0391*
(0.0322) (0.0854) (0.0309) (0.0224) (0.0230)
Guaranteed loan -0.511*** -0.727*** -0.641*** -0.0397* -0.0413**
(0.0274) (0.0252) (0.0562) (0.0211) (0.0194)
Income per adult equivalence (Baht) 0.00487 -0.0194 0.00609 0.00398 0.00345
(0.00799) (0.0132) (0.0109) (0.00418) (0.00387)
Indebt capacity -0.00684 0.00104 -0.00690 -0.00642 -0.00835*
(0.00595) (0.0143) (0.00741) (0.00467) (0.00462)
Total loan volume per household (Baht) -0.0402** -0.00457 -0.0218 -0.0464*** -0.0473***
(0.0198) (0.0426) (0.0253) (0.0153) (0.0152)
Relationship duration 0.0236** -0.0354 -0.0161 0.0122 0.0144
(0.0116) (0.0238) (0.0147) (0.0125) (0.0123)
Pseudo R-squared 0.352 0.419 0.493 0.351 0.354
Observations 2,038 1,129 502 407 418
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Note: VF and POL are excluded from semiformal institutions.
For loan size, income, relationship duration and distance to lender logarithmic values are taken.
All specifications ccontrol for time and province effects.
Specification (1): All lenders; Specification (2): Formal lenders (CB and BAAC) only; Specification (3): Semiformal 
lenders (CRED); Specification (4): Informal lenders (ML, BP, FAM and FRI); Specification (5): Formal lenders and 
dummies whether borrower and lender are located in the same village or not.
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rough split provides an indication that proximity within a village may define a critical 
point up to which distance provides an information advantage. Again, distance has a 
significant positive influence on collateral only in the case of informal loans. 
This can also be seen in Figure 1 in which predicted probabilities of pledging 
collateral are plotted against the distance between informal lenders and borrowers. The 
figure shows that at distances being larger than about 5 to 10 minutes, the distance 
effect is clearly at work: the probability of a collateral requirement jumps upwards and 
increases slightly with distance thereafter. 
 
Figure 1: The probability that informal loans require collateral and distance between lender   
                 and borrower 
 
 
 
4.5 Robustness checks 
This section contains robustness checks going beyond those already presented in the 
main text above. In detail, we examine six issues: results separated for the three waves 
(Section 4.5.1), results for the rate of collateralization instead of the incidence of 
collateral (Section 4.5.2), the role of marketability of collateral (Section 4.5.3), the 
contribution of social collateral (Section 4.5.4), results for other definitions of income 
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(Section 4.5.5) and further insights into a possible influence of competition between 
financial institutions on the use of collateral (Section 4.5.6). 
 
4.5.1 Results across the three waves 
The household survey underlying our analysis has been conducted in the years 2007, 
2008 and 2010, so that it may be interesting to see whether results are roughly 
comparable across these three waves. As a major change over waves, however, we have 
to consider that the macroeconomic environment worsened before wave 2 and improved 
again before wave 3. 
Detailed results are available in the Appendix in Appendix 5. The three panels A, 
B and C document results for the three waves each with 1,065, 1,098 and 982 loan 
cases, respectively. Columns (1) in the three panels show the outcome for all financial 
institutions at the respective wave and thus follows column (1) in Table 4, however, 
without presenting marginal effects for dummy variables. Columns (2) to (6) give 
results for groups of financial institutions and thus follow the five columns in Table 5. 
Overall, the structure of results is quite stable across all waves, although the number of 
significant coefficients becomes smaller, if the number of observations is reduced. 
Consistently significant variables with the theoretically expected signs are loan amount, 
loan duration and the use of guarantees.  
Comparing the three main groups of formal, semi-formal and informal lenders 
over time we find that the same three variables as for the total sample (loan amount, 
loan duration and the use of guarantees) keep their sign and are mostly significant. 
Further findings are specific to the three sub-groups: (1) Examining lending behaviour 
of the formal financial institutions, they appear to be tentatively more risk-averse during 
wave 2, because they require more often collateral for consumption loans and honour 
higher income with less collateral requirement. (2) In contrast, collateral requirements 
of semi-formal lenders are basically unchanged across waves and thus do not seem to 
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react to the macroeconomic environment. (3) Finally, regarding informal lenders there 
are no significant coefficients for loans from family and friends, so that the structure 
stems from moneylenders and business partners only. These lenders also seem to react 
more risk averse during the bad times of wave 2 as some risk proxies become more 
important: the coefficient on “loan amount” doubles and the one on “guarantees” turns 
significant. However, the role of this group is at the same time also unique: first, they 
slightly relax collateral requirements during wave 2 (wave dummies not explicitly 
shown in Table 21, column 3) and they tentatively do so on the three loan purposes 
given in Appendix 5, i.e. they rather require more collateral for loans to repay other 
loans. Indeed, we find that this loan purpose becomes slightly more important during 
wave 2 in which 15.5% of all loans are borrowed to repay other loans compared to 
12.5% and 15% in wave 1 and wave 3, respectively. This may indicate that these 
informal lenders help their borrowers to serve existing loans. Different from 
moneylenders’ and business partners’ declining importance over time, the group of 
family and friends does extend a larger number of loans in difficult times, i.e. during 
wave 2. 
Overall, the separate examination of the three waves mainly confirms the earlier 
analysis. In addition, we learn from observing behaviour during wave 2 when a severe 
negative macroeconomic shock hit the economy: first, formal lenders require rather 
more collateral, second, semi-formal lenders do not react at all, and, third, only informal 
lenders offer slight tendencies towards supporting their borrowers. 
 
4.5.2 Results for explaining the rate of collateralization 
In the following section we test whether main results still hold if we explain the rate of 
collateralization, i.e. the value of collateral over loan size, rather than the incidence of 
collateral. In the literature both empirical measures are common and most results do not 
depend on the preferred definition (Menkhoff et al., 2006; Behr et al., 2011). The reason 
that we do not prefer the rate of collateralization is its unusually large range, including 
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not only the “normal” rates from 0 to slightly above 1 but extending far beyond the rate 
of 1. Our data includes more than 200 loans with a collateralization rate of more than 5 
and the largest rates range above 10. Due to these extreme rates, we document results 
for the original rate and for an upper limit of the rate of collateralizations.  
Appendix 6 reproduces Table 20 column (1) in various specifications. 
Specification (1) uses institution dummies with “friends” as reference category, 
specification (2) excludes the semi-formal institutions and specifications (3) to (5) use 
groups of formal, semiformal and informal lenders. In specification (6) the rate of 
collateralization is limited to 1.5 and in specification (7) all collateralization rates higher 
than 1.5 are set to 1.5. All specifications show that formal lenders demand higher 
collateral in relation to loan size than informal lenders while important risk 
determinants (loan size, guarantees and debt capacity) remain stable. 
 
4.5.3 Results depending on marketability of collateral 
Collateral, in particular land, is not marketable easily in Thailand (Menkhoff et al., 
2012). Land cannot be sold, if specific land titles are missing and in other cases the 
weak legal system hinders effective recovery of collateral. As a consequence we test 
whether main results still hold if we consider only collateral which can be claimed more 
easily and which should be therefore of particular importance to the lender. We 
implement this by excluding those collateralized loans where land would be difficult to 
sell due to a missing respective land title. 
Appendix 7 shows our standard set of regressions. Formal lenders still require 
more often collateral. Also the other variables of interest mainly keep their sign and 
significance. In particular, relationship duration still has a negative effect on collateral 
requirements for formal lenders which is even significant to a higher degree than in our 
standard regression. This indicates that the consideration of land that is hardly 
marketable may somewhat blur the economic relations we uncover. 
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4.5.4 Results depending on consideration of social collateral 
The proximity between lender and borrower in informal lending reduces the degree of 
asymmetric information. However, as both sides know each other better they are also 
tentatively closer to each other regarding social relations. These social relations may 
work as a kind of social enforcement to properly pay for the loan which can be termed 
“social collateral” (Karlan et al., 2009; Karaivanov and Kessler, 2013). As we know that 
the use of collateral depends on the use of alternatives, such as guarantees and loan 
terms (e.g. Menkhoff et al., 2012), a missing consideration of social collateral may 
contribute to overestimating the effect of better information on reduced collateral 
requirements. 
However, there are also reasons limiting this potential effect: First, the better 
information of lenders about borrowers aims for predicting their repayment behaviour. 
In this sense good information about a borrower includes information about this 
borrower’s social relations which create social collateral; thus proximity creates good 
information and social collateral at the same time, although not necessarily to the same 
degree. Second, the institutional environment in rural Thailand is different from much 
more closed poor communities that often serve as reference case when studying 
informal lending (e.g. Behr et al., 2011): Households in Thailand potentially have 
several lenders competing with each other, households are mobile due to public 
transport, private motorcycles etc., they are potentially informed as most of them use 
mobile phones and many of them have family networks including migrants. Thus social 
collateral is expected to play a more limited role. 
In the end it may be an empirical question whether social collateral is very 
important. In order to test this, we include two rough proxies for stronger social 
relations in our standard regressions for informal lenders in general and for ML/BP and 
FAM/FRI in particular. We assume that social collateral is strengthened within small 
and remote villages and that therefore tangible collateral may be used less often in these 
cases. Thus the first proxy for more social collateral is that borrowers live in a smaller 
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village, the second proxy is the larger distance of the borrower’s village from the next 
district town. We expect that with increasing village size, and hence lower social 
collateral, tangible collateral increases. Larger distance to the next district town, 
however, indicating higher social collateral decreases tangible collateral. Appendix 8 
shows the marginal effects for the social collateral proxies which are insignificant in all 
specifications. We conclude that the effect of social collateral may be of limited 
importance in our sample or that at least our proxies for social collateral do not indicate 
great importance.20 The negative marginal effect of village size may indicate a lock-in 
of borrowers in small villages. 
 
4.5.5 Results depending on other transformations of income 
In our earlier regressions we use a logarithmic transformation of income which is 
standard in the literature (e.g. Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Behr et al., 2011). 
However, some households have negative incomes at certain points in time, which 
occurs mainly due to negative shocks from farming business. These negative incomes 
values are set to one in order to be able to apply a logarithmic transformation. 
Alternative approaches also seem to be plausible. First, one may exclude extreme 
income values from further consideration, such as incomes beyond four standard 
deviations from the mean. Second, one may simply exclude all observations with 
negative household income. Third, one may choose a different transformation of the 
small incomes, such as dividing all incomes by 1,000, setting negative ones to the value 
of one and those which are exactly one to 1.1. Afterwards the logarithm is taken. 
However, all of these alternative transformations of income do not have major effects 
on our variables of interest. Appendix 9 refers to our standard regressions when using 
                                                 
20
 This is not a contradiction to Karaivanov and Kessler (2013) due to the studies different set-up. They 
assume the existence of social collateral in the group of FAM/FRI which is not distinguished from better 
information. They also do not focus on collateral in the regressions, possibly because it is assumed to be 
ideally zero in FAM/FRI-lending. Finally, their theoretically derived implication that formal loans should 
have larger loan size is also consistent with our data (if we exclude ML/BP from informal lenders as they 
do). 
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the respective alternative income measures, but just gives two coefficients of interest: 
“relationship duration” has a negative sign at formal lenders, and “distance” has a 
positive sign for informal lenders – this is what we find in our standard regressions too, 
indicating that our findings are robust to modified income definitions. 
 
4.5.6 A possible influence from competition among financial institutions 
It can plausibly be assumed that the use of collateral also depends on the degree of 
competition among financial institutions: less competition reduces negotiation power of 
the borrower and allows the lender to require more collateral (see Hainz, 2003; Hainz et 
al., 2013). As the competition between lender groups may be weak in rural Thailand, we 
test whether there are effects within lender groups. 
Basically, we complement the standard regressions from Table 22 by adding 
available travel times to some major financial institutions, i.e. the BAAC (public 
agricultural bank), the CRED (semiformal credit institutions), the GSB (public savings 
bank, usually considered as commercial bank), and the CB (commercial bank). Results 
in Appendix 10 show, that there is indeed evidence being consistent with the expected 
competition effect among formal financial institutions: they use more often collateral if 
the distance to the next commercial bank is larger. Moreover, the sign of the marginal 
effect for the travel time to the next BAAC points into the same direction. As the BAAC 
has far more offices in the rural areas than all commercial banks taken together, the 
marginal effect of travel time to the next CB may also be interpreted as a noisy indicator 
of local centrality. That means collateral has less often to be pledged at more centrally 
located places which are characterized by more lender competition. 
The further evidence is less clear: the marginal effect on credit institutions in 
specification (3) has the expected sign (which is reasonable since CRED is the granting 
institution in this specification). At the same time travel time to the next CB would lead 
to lower collateral required by CRED. Possibly, semiformal lenders behave special in 
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that they require less collateral at more remote locations (i.e. where travel time to the 
next CB is longer). Finally, there is no significant effect for informal lenders in 
specifications (4) and (5) which makes sense as we do not have information about the 
distance to the next competing informal lender. 
Overall, the evidence about the role of competition for the use of collateral is 
limited but points into the theoretically expected direction. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
This research is at the intersection of banking and development. Both fields are 
interested in the use of collateral: From a banking perspective, collateral is a regular 
characteristic of loan contracts whose use is still not fully understood; in particular there 
is little evidence on the so-called “ex ante theory” of collateral. We provide novel 
evidence by testing this theory in a new way, i.e. by contrasting the lending behaviour 
of two financial institutions in the same market which differ in their private information 
about borrowers: formal lenders know tentatively less than informal lenders. From a 
development perspective, the need of pledging collateral is often seen as limiting access 
to finance, which contributes to explaining the existence and role of informal lenders 
who rely less on collateral in their lending decisions. 
Our dataset is based on a largely representative household survey in rural 
Northeast Thailand, covering more than 2,000 households over three waves during the 
years 2007 to 2010. This data includes all loans that households have taken from the 
variety of up to nine different kinds of lenders, ranging from conventional commercial 
banks over specialized lending institutions to informal lenders. Due to some specialized 
institutions which secure their loans exclusively via guarantees and not via (tangible) 
collateral, the average incidence of collateral is just 18%. For the whole sample as well 
as for groups of lenders we find that collateralization is related to indicators of risk. This 
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confirms – as did many other studies before – that the ex post-theory of collateral is 
valid, i.e. collateral serves as buffer against repayment risk. 
Based on these relations we examine the ex ante theory, claiming that “a reduction 
in the ex ante information gaps between borrowers and lenders is associated with a 
lower incidence of collateral” (Berger et al., 2011a, p.56). In the cross-section, informal 
lenders should have a smaller information gap than formal lenders, which implies that 
they rely less on collateral and this is indeed what we find. 
We proceed by testing two implications of the ex ante theory: if asymmetric 
information drives (controlled for other determinants) the reliance on collateral, we 
hypothesize that a reduction of information asymmetry via relationship duration should 
be related with less collateral. Finally, the information advantage of informal lenders 
should work best if their geographical distance to borrowers is short. Again, we find 
empirical support for both conjectures. 
Overall, we provide new kind of evidence supporting the rarely tested ex ante 
theory of collateral. At the same time, we learn about the operation of formal and 
informal lenders with respect to collateral. The variety of institutions seems to perform 
different roles: whereas formal lenders operate to a large extent as they do in more 
advanced market settings, informal lenders indeed seem to rely on their assumed 
information advantage. Interestingly, the group of informal lenders in itself is quite 
heterogeneous and differentiation is necessary to understand their rationale when using 
collateral. In this sense formal and informal institutions seem to complement each other. 
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5. Final remarks 
This dissertation examines the role of financial development for the rural poor in three 
provinces in Thailand’s Northeast. It is shown that rural credit markets clearly differ 
from those in more mature markets in several aspects: a policy-induced microfinance 
programme is in place to improve access to finance, the market is highly segmented 
with many operating lenders and lenders have different information on borrowers’ risk 
so that setting collateral requirements is different across lenders.  
The main findings are evaluated with respect to their contribution to households’ 
well-being. The setup of a microfinance programme shows some effort to improve 
access to finance which is still denied to many people. The results in Chapter 2 show 
that policy-subsidised microcredit reaches the target group and that it contributes to 
stabilising economic variables. However, it does not substitute more expensive informal 
loans and has no long-lasting effect on lending behaviour of poor households. With this 
in mind, one can question the overall efficiency of the programme and ask whether the 
overall costs of more than 1.5% of the GDP in the year 2001 can be justified.  
High segmentation may hinder economic growth and worsen the situation of the 
rural poor if borrowers are excluded from the formal credit markets and informal 
lenders are able to exploit them. The results in Chapter 3 indicate that segmentation 
accounts for different needs of borrowers. Informal loans are demanded by the poor and 
the rich people who use them in different ways. Whereas poor households enhance their 
asset endowment, informal loans enable rich people to maintain or even increase their 
consumption levels in lean times or after a shock occurred. 
Every type of lender has specific advantages which expand into loan terms. 
Formal lenders do not have intimate knowledge on borrowers so that they will demand 
relatively high collateral to control for potential default risk. If they can gain more 
information through long-lasting relationships, they reduce collateral requirements. 
Informal lenders have informational advantages which enables them to demand less 
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collateral in the first place. But if distances to borrowers increase they tend to increase 
collateral requirements.   
Overall, in providing targeted products for the poor and in using their specific 
advantages, lenders in rural credit markets are able to improve people’s situation. 
However, there is still need for improvement. The results in this dissertation allow the 
following suggestions: 
1. Loans from policy-induced microfinance products should be larger and longer in 
maturity so that they can be used for investments. Only then they would really 
be an alternative to informal loans. 
2. Informal lenders are relatively expensive but they are demanded frequently by 
all people, rich and poor. They serve different needs throughout the whole 
population in rural areas. Any programme that aims at reducing reliance on 
informal loans should take this in mind. 
3. Informal lenders demand less collateral because they have better information on 
borrower’s risk. Formal lenders can catch up with information if the relationship 
with borrowers continues so that they are able to demand less collateral. 
Development measures should therefore focus on providing more transparency 
and strengthen the informational basis for lending institutions.   
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Treatment effect on asset endowment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich 
Dependent variable
Treatment effect 0.138 0.820*** 0.211 0.268 1.067** 0.197
(0.139) (0.256) (0.254) (0.448) (0.496) (0.657)
Age of household head -0.00658 -0.0116 0.00367 0.0525 0.0409 0.0358
(0.0138) (0.0149) (0.0321) (0.0445) (0.0290) (0.0835)
Household size (adult equivalence scale) 0.0733 0.438*** 0.212* 0.0804 -0.423 0.333
(0.0788) (0.143) (0.128) (0.256) (0.280) (0.332)
Dummy if household head is married 0.219 -0.413 0.159 -1.635** -0.0114 0.642
(0.257) (0.362) (0.370) (0.829) (0.704) (0.958)
Female headed household head 0.558* -0.398 0.170 -1.236 -1.124 1.122
(0.338) (0.548) (0.727) (1.092) (1.064) (1.891)
Dummy if household head is sick 0.174 -0.0895 -0.0977 -0.0651 -0.294 1.062*
(0.139) (0.247) (0.246) (0.449) (0.480) (0.639)
Dummy if household head suffers disease -0.0646 0.161 0.130 0.219 -0.310 -0.224
(0.120) (0.202) (0.197) (0.386) (0.396) (0.511)
Dummy if household is farming -0.0782 0.0722 -0.00119 -0.0773 -0.0653 0.311
(0.0829) (0.155) (0.156) (0.270) (0.302) (0.405)
Income per household (in Baht) -0.0172 -0.0395 -0.100** 0.0533 0.0259 -0.00463
(0.0119) (0.0453) (0.0466) (0.0385) (0.0880) (0.121)
Total consumption per capita (in Baht) 0.197* 0.461** 0.0512 1.154*** -0.445 -0.491
(0.119) (0.214) (0.178) (0.385) (0.421) (0.462)
Total food consumption per capita (in Baht) -0.0150 -0.0274 0.0799 -0.731** 0.0249 0.435
(0.107) (0.175) (0.136) (0.345) (0.339) (0.352)
Production asset endowment (in Baht) 0.367*** 0.305*** 0.309***
(0.0459) (0.0435) (0.0488)
Savings (in Baht) 0.0135 -0.0379 0.0205 0.000697 -0.0107 -0.0327
(0.0130) (0.0235) (0.0182) (0.0419) (0.0455) (0.0471)
Total loan volume formal lenders (in Baht) -0.00569 0.000108 0.00631 -0.0487 -0.0340 -0.0802*
(0.0109) (0.0210) (0.0168) (0.0352) (0.0407) (0.0441)
Total loan volume semiformal lenders (in Baht) -0.00818 -0.0257 0.00237 0.00922 0.0647 -0.0290
(0.0138) (0.0238) (0.0219) (0.0444) (0.0461) (0.0569)
Total loan volume informal lenders (in Baht) 0.00856 -0.0198 0.00511 0.0231 -0.0421 -0.00234
(0.0115) (0.0229) (0.0203) (0.0372) (0.0445) (0.0527)
Borrowed from formal lenders due to shock -0.292 -0.191 -0.126 -0.743 -0.885 1.692
(0.264) (0.433) (0.449) (0.852) (0.839) (1.167)
Borrowed from semiformal lenders due to shock -0.405** 0.575* 0.0497 -0.301 0.656 -1.159
(0.182) (0.302) (0.347) (0.588) (0.586) (0.902)
Borrowed from informal lenders due to shock -0.253 -0.938** -0.375 -0.731 -0.388 1.327
(0.198) (0.371) (0.414) (0.637) (0.729) (1.075)
Value of collateral for informal loans (in Baht) 0.0110 0.0434* 0.00412 -0.0200 0.0210 -0.0784
(0.0129) (0.0257) (0.0214) (0.0419) (0.0498) (0.0561)
GDP 5.697*** 3.061 1.417 36.81*** 21.27*** 25.64***
(1.983) (3.201) (3.192) (6.694) (6.390) (8.700)
Constant -41.39** -19.93 -2.381 -329.2*** -180.8*** -225.0***
(17.47) (28.65) (28.43) (59.03) (57.14) (77.42)
Observations 844 708 750 844 708 750
Number of hhid 422 354 375 422 354 375
R-squared 0.106 0.135 0.046 0.227 0.186 0.165
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
asset endowment farming assets 
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Appendix 2a: Treatment effect on asset endowment excluding instalment loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich 
Dependent variable
Treatment effect 0.0144 0.863*** 0.167 -0.151 0.784 0.457
(0.161) (0.309) (0.300) (0.503) (0.579) (0.761)
Age of household head -0.00918 -0.0128 0.00289 0.0407 0.0439 0.0313
(0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0324) (0.0476) (0.0288) (0.0824)
Household size (adult equivalence scale) 0.0883 0.403*** 0.212 0.0423 -0.474 0.0876
(0.0816) (0.153) (0.134) (0.257) (0.288) (0.339)
Dummy if household head is married 0.160 -0.469 0.192 -1.728** -0.0907 0.661
(0.265) (0.369) (0.374) (0.830) (0.694) (0.949)
Female headed household head 0.598* -0.424 0.205 -1.069 -1.611 0.898
(0.358) (0.594) (0.734) (1.121) (1.115) (1.869)
Dummy if household head is sick 0.164 -0.149 -0.0774 -0.128 -0.359 1.077*
(0.142) (0.257) (0.253) (0.444) (0.482) (0.642)
Dummy if household head suffers disease -0.0627 0.200 0.186 0.167 -0.296 -0.203
(0.122) (0.212) (0.206) (0.381) (0.401) (0.521)
Dummy if household is farming -0.0874 0.0727 -0.00319 0.0871 -0.137 0.168
(0.0840) (0.163) (0.161) (0.264) (0.306) (0.408)
Income per household (in Baht) -0.0196 -0.0459 -0.116** 0.0490 0.00914 0.0532
(0.0122) (0.0468) (0.0507) (0.0383) (0.0882) (0.129)
Total consumption per capita (in Baht) 0.187 0.450** 0.0166 1.107*** -0.290 -0.686
(0.121) (0.223) (0.184) (0.380) (0.424) (0.468)
Total food consumption per capita (in Baht) -0.0367 -0.0488 0.110 -0.701** -0.0795 0.474
(0.109) (0.182) (0.140) (0.340) (0.341) (0.354)
Production asset endowment (in Baht) 0.357*** 0.280*** 0.323***
(0.0457) (0.0438) (0.0487)
Savings (in Baht) 0.0208 -0.0354 0.0224 -0.000592 -0.00267 -0.0227
(0.0134) (0.0242) (0.0186) (0.0420) (0.0454) (0.0472)
Total loan volume formal lenders (in Baht) -0.00806 0.00128 0.00175 -0.0422 -0.0339 -0.0320
(0.0118) (0.0213) (0.0178) (0.0368) (0.0399) (0.0455)
Total loan volume semiformal lenders (in Baht) -0.0141 -0.0210 -0.0262 0.0277 0.0763* -0.0251
(0.0150) (0.0246) (0.0245) (0.0469) (0.0461) (0.0622)
Total loan volume informal lenders (in Baht) -0.00987 -0.00894 -0.00994 0.0493 -0.00756 -0.0239
(0.0125) (0.0278) (0.0230) (0.0391) (0.0526) (0.0584)
Borrowed from formal lenders due to shock -0.412 -0.171 -0.171 -0.848 -0.811 1.381
(0.270) (0.450) (0.472) (0.844) (0.845) (1.200)
Borrowed from semiformal lenders due to shock -0.327* 0.477 0.0241 -0.681 0.391 -1.236
(0.172) (0.294) (0.352) (0.539) (0.552) (0.895)
Borrowed from informal lenders due to shock -0.0319 -0.909** -0.153 -0.625 -0.503 1.500
(0.209) (0.409) (0.454) (0.652) (0.782) (1.156)
GDP 5.693*** 4.135 0.181 37.14*** 23.94*** 27.61***
(1.943) (3.082) (3.124) (6.410) (6.028) (8.368)
Constant -40.83** -28.89 9.084 -331.2*** -204.7*** -241.0***
(17.05) (27.59) (27.81) (56.33) (53.91) (74.41)
Observations 816 686 720 816 686 720
Number of hhid 408 343 360 408 343 360
R-squared 0.090 0.113 0.048 0.221 0.170 0.176
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
asset endowment farming assets 
 
 
 
 
 
  XVIII   
 
Appendix 2b: Treatment effect on consumption excluding instalment loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich vulnerable relatively poor relatively rich
Dependent variable
Treatment effect -0.0844 -0.0371 0.237** -0.104 -0.149 0.204
(0.116) (0.108) (0.104) (0.130) (0.133) (0.137)
Age of household head -0.0180* -0.00785 -0.0249** -0.00855 0.00845 -0.0111
(0.0109) (0.00519) (0.0113) (0.0122) (0.00642) (0.0148)
Household size (adult equivalence scale) -0.0911 -0.316*** -0.358*** -0.0495 -0.353*** -0.321***
(0.0586) (0.0501) (0.0426) (0.0656) (0.0619) (0.0562)
Dummy if household head is married -0.377** 0.112 0.108 -0.438** 0.0967 0.108
(0.190) (0.128) (0.131) (0.213) (0.158) (0.172)
Female headed household head 0.0994 -0.0879 0.526** -0.181 -0.0799 0.735**
(0.258) (0.205) (0.255) (0.289) (0.254) (0.336)
Dummy if household head is sick -0.0169 0.0456 0.249*** -0.0761 -0.0734 0.160
(0.102) (0.0885) (0.0876) (0.114) (0.109) (0.115)
Dummy if household head suffers disease 0.187** 0.00546 -0.116 0.245** -0.0302 0.0147
(0.0871) (0.0732) (0.0716) (0.0975) (0.0905) (0.0944)
Dummy if household is farming -0.00505 0.0585 -0.0209 -0.0171 0.0671 -0.00551
(0.0606) (0.0562) (0.0563) (0.0678) (0.0695) (0.0742)
Income per household (in Baht) -0.00226 0.0255 0.0472*** -0.00223 0.0426** 0.0513**
(0.00884) (0.0161) (0.0177) (0.00990) (0.0199) (0.0233)
Asset endowment (in Baht) 0.0799** 0.0489** 0.0117 0.0650 0.0377 0.0250
(0.0363) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0406) (0.0235) (0.0249)
Savings (in Baht) 0.0102 0.00905 0.00460 0.0131 0.0149 8.72e-05
(0.00966) (0.00836) (0.00653) (0.0108) (0.0103) (0.00860)
Total loan volume formal lenders (in Baht) -0.00151 0.00101 -0.00547 0.00275 0.00636 0.000479
(0.00849) (0.00734) (0.00622) (0.00950) (0.00907) (0.00820)
Total loan volume semiformal lenders (in Baht) 0.00855 0.0103 -0.0120 -0.000266 0.0101 -0.00614
(0.0108) (0.00848) (0.00857) (0.0121) (0.0105) (0.0113)
Total loan volume informal lenders (in Baht) 0.00582 -0.00164 -0.0224*** 0.00673 -0.000711 -0.0197*
(0.00899) (0.00961) (0.00797) (0.0101) (0.0119) (0.0105)
Borrowed from formal lenders due to shock -0.0635 0.0103 0.318* -0.246 -0.0172 0.348
(0.194) (0.156) (0.164) (0.218) (0.192) (0.217)
Borrowed from semiformal lenders due to shock -0.00713 -0.00752 -0.159 0.0359 0.0176 -0.0892
(0.125) (0.102) (0.123) (0.140) (0.126) (0.162)
Borrowed from informal lenders due to shock -0.000926 0.0446 0.136 -0.0531 0.140 0.105
(0.150) (0.142) (0.159) (0.168) (0.176) (0.209)
GDP 1.350 -2.051* -3.559*** 3.444** 0.778 3.070**
(1.403) (1.050) (1.040) (1.570) (1.298) (1.371)
Constant -1.615 28.50*** 43.48*** -21.37 1.662 -17.54
(12.28) (9.308) (9.140) (13.74) (11.51) (12.05)
Observations 816 686 720 816 686 720
Number of hhid 408 343 360 408 343 360
R-squared 0.058 0.163 0.300 0.057 0.123 0.151
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
total consumption (per capita) food consumption (per capita)
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Appendix 3: Treatment effect on asset endowment and consumption for different household 
groups defined according to total expenditures 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
poor rich poor rich poor rich poor rich
Dependent variable
Treatment effect 0.427** 0.343* 0.848** -0.111 0.0381 0.0693 -0.0654 0.148
(0.180) (0.192) (0.381) (0.577) (0.0566) (0.0938) (0.0769) (0.121)
Age of household head -0.00943 -0.0269 0.0408 -0.0395 -0.0128** -0.0226*** 0.00127 -0.0106
(0.00783) (0.0189) (0.0257) (0.0357) (0.00537) (0.00837) (0.00436) (0.0156)
Household size (adult equivalence scale) 0.195** 0.276*** -0.171 0.556* -0.268*** -0.218*** -0.231*** -0.195***
(0.0806) (0.0903) (0.214) (0.311) (0.0697) (0.0496) (0.0695) (0.0568)
Dummy if household head is married -0.129 0.206 -0.685 0.791 -0.0986 -0.0329 -0.0501 -0.0901
(0.173) (0.272) (0.501) (1.117) (0.102) (0.205) (0.115) (0.231)
Female headed household head -0.0776 0.169 -0.627 1.349 0.0758 0.280 -0.0352 0.471
(0.405) (0.420) (0.865) (1.303) (0.180) (0.203) (0.197) (0.307)
Dummy if household head is sick -0.00570 0.150 -0.188 0.915 0.0262 0.234*** -0.0219 0.0456
(0.116) (0.163) (0.351) (0.584) (0.0713) (0.0870) (0.0794) (0.110)
Dummy if household head suffers disease 0.112 -0.0763 0.210 -0.554 0.0481 -0.0467 0.0931 0.0429
(0.119) (0.130) (0.308) (0.450) (0.0885) (0.0713) (0.0900) (0.0937)
Dummy if household is farming -0.000119 -0.0145 -0.133 0.554 -0.0419 0.0933* -0.0308 0.0710
(0.0757) (0.132) (0.213) (0.338) (0.0317) (0.0565) (0.0430) (0.0615)
Income per household (in Baht) -0.0198 -0.0283 0.00299 0.0907 0.00630 0.0239*** 0.00365 0.0149
(0.0138) (0.0301) (0.0407) (0.0577) (0.00765) (0.00809) (0.0101) (0.0110)
Total consumption per capita (in Baht) 0.163 0.191 0.123 -0.168
(0.135) (0.138) (0.307) (0.471)
Total food consumption per capita (in Baht) 0.0451 -0.103 0.0527 0.157
(0.116) (0.0972) (0.244) (0.369)
Total asset endowment (in Baht) 0.0470*** 0.0169 0.0489** -0.00395
(0.0179) (0.0183) (0.0199) (0.0192)
Production asset endowment (in Baht) 0.357*** 0.218***
(0.0377) (0.0671)
Savings (in Baht) 0.0133 -0.0273 -0.0414 0.0192 0.00574 0.0137** 0.00980 0.0112
(0.00977) (0.0251) (0.0318) (0.0447) (0.00511) (0.00666) (0.00692) (0.00967)
Total loan volume formal lenders (in Baht) 0.00788 -0.00769 -0.0551** -0.0273 -0.000874 -0.000551 0.00442 -0.00131
(0.00850) (0.0124) (0.0279) (0.0416) (0.00442) (0.00600) (0.00618) (0.00815)
Total loan volume semiformal lenders (in Baht) 0.00553 -0.0216 0.0477 -0.0184 0.000541 -0.00353 -0.00193 -0.00616
(0.0103) (0.0158) (0.0386) (0.0553) (0.00511) (0.00786) (0.00697) (0.00970)
Total loan volume informal lenders (in Baht) 0.0168 -0.0137 -0.00401 -0.0175 -0.0135** -0.00998* -0.00521 -0.0107
(0.0107) (0.0149) (0.0249) (0.0339) (0.00608) (0.00509) (0.00702) (0.00689)
Borrowed from formal lenders due to shock -0.342* -0.0100 -0.271 0.733 0.125 0.283 0.174 0.195
(0.185) (0.255) (0.577) (1.373) (0.102) (0.216) (0.107) (0.203)
Borrowed from semiformal lenders due to shock -0.100 0.803 -0.196 -0.0381 -0.0540 0.170 -0.0508 0.0945
(0.154) (0.860) (0.446) (0.926) (0.0731) (0.154) (0.0918) (0.113)
Borrowed from informal lenders due to shock -0.424 -0.884*** -0.819* 0.438 0.134* -0.138 0.0523 -0.130
(0.341) (0.275) (0.469) (0.813) (0.0804) (0.115) (0.108) (0.126)
GDP 5.216*** 2.691 29.55*** 28.66*** -0.319 -7.157*** 2.642*** -1.503
(1.544) (2.935) (4.505) (8.343) (0.705) (1.225) (0.879) (1.512)
Constant -37.42*** -11.90 -260.7*** -250.5*** 13.67** 75.28*** -14.34* 23.67*
(13.66) (26.56) (39.86) (74.97) (6.184) (10.76) (7.766) (13.21)
Observations 1620 682 1620 682 1620 682 1620 682
Number of hhid 810 341 810 341 810 341 810 341
R-squared 0.082 0.069 0.207 0.129 0.096 0.267 0.063 0.085
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Groups are defined according to the median value of total expenditures in 2007. Poor households have total expenditures of less than 52,700 Baht. 
total assets farming assets total consumption (p.c.) food consumption (p.c.)
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Appendix 4: 
This research is based on a household survey which has been used for other purposes 
before. In this respect there is a paper which also analyzes the role of collateral, 
focusing on possible substitutes (Menkhoff et al., 2012). This earlier paper differs from 
ours in some limited respect: the main difference is that we use three waves of the 
survey, whereas the other research is based on the first wave only. However, the other 
paper examines all loans that a household held in 2007, whereas we only consider all 
new loans at each point in time. 
In few cases we also use slightly different definitions of variables. This applies to 
asset endowment, where we consider only assets bought within the last 5 years due to 
depreciation calculations. In addition the area of owned land is denominated in rai (the 
common surface measure in Thailand) in our paper. We undertake some changes in the 
lender definitions. Menkhoff et al. (2012) distinguish between CB, BAAC, CRED, ML 
and RELA. “ML” comprises loans from professional moneylenders, business partners 
and family and friends if the interest rate is positive. RELA comprises all loans from 
professional moneylenders, business partners and family and friends if the interest rate 
is zero. We use a more precise definition which is based more on the institutions than on 
the interest rate. To show that our estimations are still comparable to the other paper we 
use data of our first wave and rerun the regressions shown in Menkhoff et al. (2012) as 
far as our own sample allows generating the same variables.  The sample still differs 
from the one used in the other paper in that we use newly granted loans only. 
Appendix 4a shows that the sign and most often size of marginal effects are quite 
similar despite different samples and definitions used. However, there are three 
differences regarding the statistical significance in that the other paper has more 
significant coefficients, which may be supported by more observations: (1) Whether or 
not a loan is used for agricultural production is significant only in one of our 
specifications. In the other paper it is always significant except for one small subsample. 
(2) Education is not significant in our regressions but it is in the paper of Menkhoff et 
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al. (2012). (3) The other paper finds a significant impact for “number of lenders a 
household is engaged with” for a small subsample. In our subsample the marginal effect 
has the same sign but is not significant. 
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Appendix 4a: Comparison to Menkhoff et al. (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Specification (sample) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent variables 
Loan size (Baht) 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.133*** 0.181***
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0222) (0.0487)
Loan duration (months) 0.00163*** 0.00160*** 0.00210** 0.00337**
(0.000593) (0.000618) (0.000823) (0.00150)
Annual interest rate -0.000869* -0.000801* -0.000978* -0.00196
(0.000492) (0.000450) (0.000572) (0.00163)
Agricultural prod. loan 0.0527 0.0518 0.0981** -0.168
(0.0379) (0.0382) (0.0498) (0.142)
Non-agricultural prod. loan 0.130** 0.143** 0.237*** 0.176
(0.0633) (0.0659) (0.0867) (0.178)
Guaranteed loan -0.584*** -0.591*** -0.706*** -0.380***
(0.0588) (0.0603) (0.0555) (0.105)
Female headed household 0.0254 0.0427 0.0330 0.0902
(0.0431) (0.0446) (0.0554) (0.148)
Age of household head -0.00132 -0.00115 -0.00213 -0.00552
(0.00140) (0.00141) (0.00184) (0.00466)
Household size (adult equiv.) -0.00724 -0.00868 -0.0106 -0.0170
(0.0154) (0.0158) (0.0210) (0.0701)
Education of household head (years) -0.00290 -0.00107 -0.00325 -0.0220
(0.00556) (0.00568) (0.00764) (0.0171)
Income per adult equ. 0.000636 0.000969 0.000319 0.0265
(0.00609) (0.00620) (0.00822) (0.0200)
Amount of savings -0.00437 -0.00389 -0.00184 0.0186
(0.00470) (0.00474) (0.00617) (0.0198)
Dummy if ever defaulted 0.126 0.126 0.137 0.0308
(0.113) (0.113) (0.134) (0.302)
Dummy if repaid late 0.0829 0.0904 0.0506 0.188
(0.102) (0.104) (0.114) (0.208)
Number of lenders hh is engaged 0.00595 0.000405 0.00299 0.0700
(0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0177) (0.0431)
Dummy for CB -0.146*** -0.363*
(0.0254) (0.199)
Dummy for CRED -0.144*** -0.149*** -0.192***
(0.0315) (0.0330) (0.0439)
Dummy for ML -0.139*** -0.141*** -0.182*** -0.187
(0.0289) (0.0295) (0.0398) (0.276)
Dummy for BP -0.0546 -0.0604 -0.0648
(0.114) (0.107) (0.158)
Dummy for FAM -0.242*** -0.247***
(0.0256) (0.0264)
Dummy for FRI -0.154*** -0.155***
(0.0249) (0.0256)
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.465 0.459 0.463 0.407
Observations 886 847 723 128
Cluser- robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification (1) includes loans from CB, BAAC (base category); CRED, ML, BP, FAM and FRI;
Specification (2) includes BAAC, CRED, ML, BP FAM and FRI; Specification (3) includes BAAC,
CRED, ML and BP; Specification (4) includes CB, ML and BP. Province dummies are considered.
Only loans that have been granted within the 12 month period of the first wave are considered.
  XXIII   
 
Appendix 5: Incidence of collateral across waves 
Panel A: 1st wave
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incidence of collateral all loans formal semiformal informal ML/BP FAM/FRI
Loan size (Baht) 0.128*** 0.316*** 0.0529*** 0.0815*** 0.173** 0.000115
(0.0195) (0.0695) (0.0189) (0.0286) (0.0731) (0.000226)
Loan duration (months) 0.00231*** 0.00311*** -0.000806 0.000901 0.00323 1.35e-06
(0.000603) (0.00113) (0.000576) (0.00187) (0.00328) (3.60e-06)
Annual interest rate -0.000475 -0.00456** 0.000314 5.77e-05 -0.00171 -2.04e-09
(0.000305) (0.00201) (0.000446) (0.000210) (0.00131) (6.96e-07)
Agricultural production 0.116** 0.307*** -0.0355 0.0309 -0.0952
(0.0467) (0.114) (0.0263) (0.0746) (0.168)
Non-agricultural production 0.120* 0.308** -0.0147 0.0752 0.216 -7.73e-05
(0.0662) (0.152) (0.0256) (0.111) (0.229) (0.000207)
Consumption loan -0.0222 0.1000 -0.0656** 0.0618 -0.0442 0.000311
(0.0474) (0.158) (0.0300) (0.0776) (0.187) (0.000696)
Guaranteed loan -0.384*** -0.767*** -0.477*** -0.0179 -0.190
(0.0344) (0.0384) (0.0902) (0.0817) (0.183)
Income per adult equivalence (Baht) 0.00178 -0.0163 -0.00333 0.0131 0.0296* 0.000244
(0.00578) (0.0131) (0.00273) (0.00889) (0.0176) (0.000537)
Debt capacity -0.00700 0.0108 -0.00665** -0.00153 0.00740 -6.66e-05
(0.00470) (0.00700) (0.00282) (0.00380) (0.0221) (0.000116)
Total loan volume/household (Baht) -0.0407** -0.0556 -0.0404*** 0.00498 0.0345 -0.000105
(0.0196) (0.0568) (0.0150) (0.0298) (0.0690) (0.000202)
Relationship duration 0.0182 -0.0432 -0.00277 0.0223 0.00154 -5.67e-05
(0.0142) (0.0363) (0.0126) (0.0262) (0.0783) (0.000162)
Pseudo R-squared 0.310 0.484 0.434 0.183 0.247 0.227
Observations 1,065 507 284 274 117 120
Panel B: 2nd wave
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incidence of collateral all lenders formal semiformal informal ML/BP FAM/FRI
Loan size (Baht) 0.152*** 0.188*** 0.0565*** 0.0794*** 0.301*** 0.0171
(0.0194) (0.0679) (0.0167) (0.0266) (0.0885) (0.0169)
Loan duration (months) 0.00114** 0.00279*** -0.000486 0.000582 0.00321 -0.000126
(0.000527) (0.00107) (0.000362) (0.000416) (0.00284) (0.000221)
Annual interest rate -0.000899 -0.00207 -0.000448 0.000122 0.000345 -2.17e-05
(0.000701) (0.00199) (0.000501) (0.000108) (0.000514) (5.72e-05)
Agricultural production -0.0138 0.0627 -0.0288 -0.0464** -0.312*** -0.00922
(0.0330) (0.0817) (0.0211) (0.0193) (0.104) (0.0118)
Non-agricultural production 0.0337 0.174 -0.0251 -0.0160 -0.0484 -0.00471
(0.0447) (0.113) (0.0178) (0.0153) (0.0880) (0.00510)
Consumption loan -0.0301 0.285** -0.0600*** -0.0284 -0.0924 -0.0139
(0.0391) (0.126) (0.0222) (0.0202) (0.106) (0.0168)
Guaranteed loan -0.422*** -0.752*** -0.524*** -0.0322** -0.232**
(0.0365) (0.0389) (0.0979) (0.0159) (0.105)
Income per adult equivalence (Baht) -0.00650 -0.0411** 0.00292 -0.00178 -0.0319* -0.000949
(0.00739) (0.0182) (0.00540) (0.00304) (0.0175) (0.00152)
Debt capacity 0.000575 0.0160 -0.00673 0.000458* 0.0299 3.58e-05
(0.00152) (0.0148) (0.00717) (0.000264) (0.0285) (7.88e-05)
Total loan volume per household (Baht) -0.0299 0.0329 -0.0305** -0.0385** -0.0132 -0.0126
(0.0195) (0.0587) (0.0127) (0.0169) (0.0826) (0.0111)
Relationship duration 0.0441*** -0.0375 0.00322 0.000990 -0.0963 0.00217
(0.0142) (0.0378) (0.0118) (0.00938) (0.0595) (0.00514)
Pseudo R-squared 0.337 0.440 0.512 0.438 0.538 0.445
Observations 1,098 551 305 242 79 153
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Appendix 5: Incidence of collateral across waves, continued 
Panel C: 3rd wave 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incidence of collateral all loans formal semiformal informal ML/BP FAM/FRI
Loan size (Baht) 0.228*** 0.229*** 0.135* 0.0817*** 0.154 0.00189
(0.0379) (0.0658) (0.0694) (0.0300) (0.151) (0.00264)
Loan duration (months) 0.00198** 0.00285** 2.82e-05 0.00182* 0.00370 9.23e-05
(0.000785) (0.00115) (0.000949) (0.000965) (0.00412) (0.000142)
Annual interest rate 0.000610 0.00559** 7.07e-05 0.000618** 0.00107 1.81e-07
(0.000531) (0.00268) (0.00165) (0.000305) (0.00112) (2.91e-05)
Agricultural production 0.00754 -0.0646 0.0994 -0.0552 0.0472 -0.00800
(0.0536) (0.0878) (0.101) (0.0452) (0.229) (0.0152)
Non-agricultural production -0.0268 -0.00521 -0.103 -0.0484 0.153
(0.0579) (0.0995) (0.0662) (0.0500) (0.304)
Consumption loan -0.119** -0.223** -0.152* -0.00779 0.159 -0.00378
(0.0532) (0.101) (0.0803) (0.0481) (0.240) (0.0102)
Guaranteed loan -0.525*** -0.737*** -0.738*** -0.0119 -0.189 0.00519
(0.0351) (0.0311) (0.0678) (0.0461) (0.207) (0.0134)
Income per adult equivalence (Baht) 0.0258** 0.00680 0.0229 0.00777 0.0444 -0.000316
(0.0115) (0.0153) (0.0324) (0.00639) (0.0364) (0.00123)
Debt capacity -0.0234** -0.0305 -0.00939 -0.0235** -0.101* -0.00359
(0.0111) (0.0221) (0.0201) (0.00925) (0.0608) (0.00342)
Total loan volume/household (Baht) -0.0867** -0.0688 -0.0172 -0.0472 -0.0162 -0.00146
(0.0389) (0.0640) (0.0806) (0.0292) (0.152) (0.00334)
Relationship duration 0.0265 -0.0447 -0.0255 0.0204 0.00915 0.00254
(0.0175) (0.0306) (0.0326) (0.0224) (0.100) (0.00353)
Pseudo R-squared 0.315 0.434 0.464 0.248 0.240 0.296
Observations 982 582 212 188 65 102
Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all specifications control for provincial effects.
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Appendix 6: Determinants of collateralization rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
formal/informal high values
Rate of collateralization all loans dummy formal semiformal informal trunc at 1.5 set to 1.5
Independent variables 
Loan size (Baht) 2.513*** 2.756*** 0.862 3.554*** 3.643*** 0.374*** 0.564***
(0.480) (0.479) (0.662) (0.841) (1.133) (0.0824) (0.0653)
Loan duration (months) 0.00992 0.0118 0.0171** -0.0318 0.0506** 0.00408*** 0.00382***
(0.00783) (0.00827) (0.00836) (0.0280) (0.0228) (0.00149) (0.00128)
Annual interest rate -0.00290 0.00623 -0.0143 0.0236 0.00904 -0.000459 0.00101
(0.00725) (0.00669) (0.0198) (0.0295) (0.00658) (0.00210) (0.00112)
Agricultural production loan -0.0469 0.273 1.872** -2.918 -2.387 0.0818 0.0230
(0.751) (0.747) (0.888) (1.958) (1.555) (0.152) (0.107)
Non-agric. production loan 0.149 0.139 1.885* -4.299* 0.797 0.365** 0.0661
(0.846) (0.848) (1.038) (2.435) (1.834) (0.163) (0.122)
Consumption loan -1.131 -0.935 0.772 -8.934*** 0.205 0.261 -0.105
(0.838) (0.825) (1.038) (3.318) (1.390) (0.179) (0.123)
Guaranteed loan -11.60*** -11.23*** -11.57*** -14.50*** -2.135 -1.769*** -1.812***
(1.203) (1.187) (1.348) (3.566) (1.579) (0.103) (0.0833)
Income per adult equiv. (Baht) -0.0140 0.000810 -0.141 0.234 0.229 -0.0136 -0.00807
(0.129) (0.124) (0.171) (0.265) (0.202) (0.0255) (0.0194)
Debt capacity -0.184* -0.224** 0.00740 -0.235 -0.531 0.0376** -0.0229
(0.103) (0.106) (0.154) (0.153) (0.343) (0.0186) (0.0149)
Total loan vol./hh (in Baht) -0.765 -0.992* -0.460 -0.792 -0.981 0.0528 -0.129*
(0.531) (0.535) (0.676) (1.154) (1.071) (0.0923) (0.0682)
Relationship duration -0.374 -0.153 -0.260 0.000242 0.564 -0.0345 -0.0538
(0.298) (0.282) (0.323) (0.682) (0.996) (0.0551) (0.0389)
Dummy for CB 4.948**
(2.508)
Dummy for BAAC 10.71***
(2.381)
Dummy for CRED 7.359***
(2.273)
Dummy for ML 4.698**
(2.199)
Dummy for BP 7.541***
(2.607)
Dummy for FAM -5.072**
(2.494)
Dummy for formal 2.878*** 0.379*** 0.420***
(0.732) (0.145) (0.103)
Dummy for informal -5.878*** 0.410* -0.926***
(1.106) (0.216) (0.143)
Constant -25.07*** -19.13*** -0.913 -25.64** -38.20*** -4.631*** -4.218***
(4.526) (3.995) (5.778) (12.91) (7.371) (0.952) (0.579)
Pseudo R-squared 0.116 0.105 0.091 0.177 0.094 0.310 0.218
Observations 3,142 3,142 1,639 801 702 1,942 3,145
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all specifications control for time and provincial effects.
Specification (1): All loans; Specification (2): Includes all loans plus dummes for formal and informal lenders; Specification (3): Formal  
loans only, Specification (4): Semiformal loans only; Specification (5): Informal loans only; Specification (6): Rate of collateralization is 
truncated at the value 1.5; Specification (7): Values for the rate of collateralization of higher than 1.5 are set to 1.5.
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Appendix 7: Use of collateral excluding non-marketable land 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incidence of collateral all loans formal semiformal informal ML/BP FAM/FRI
Independent variables
Loan size (Baht) 0.139*** 0.214*** 0.0756*** 0.0934*** 0.187*** 0.0178**
(0.0141) (0.0404) (0.0133) (0.0160) (0.0578) (0.00702)
Loan duration (months) 0.00121*** 0.00228*** -0.000286 0.00110* 0.00169 0.000297*
(0.000336) (0.000599) (0.000324) (0.000578) (0.00227) (0.000176)
Annual interest rate 0.000227 -0.000678 -8.14e-05 0.000175 -0.000275 4.95e-06
(0.000226) (0.00125) (0.000431) (0.000137) (0.000546) (3.84e-05)
Agric. production loan 0.00335 0.0668 -0.0147 -0.0442* -0.128 -0.0228**
(0.0236) (0.0533) (0.0218) (0.0236) (0.0945) (0.0112)
Non-agric. production loan 0.0205 0.102 -0.0343* -0.00759 0.124 -0.0151**
(0.0305) (0.0685) (0.0197) (0.0337) (0.131) (0.00673)
Consumption loan -0.0346 0.00526 -0.0835*** -0.0105 0.00182 -0.0162
(0.0262) (0.0731) (0.0221) (0.0262) (0.112) (0.00983)
Guaranteed loan -0.579*** -0.737*** -0.519*** -0.0295 -0.206** -0.00609
(0.0282) (0.0241) (0.0557) (0.0269) (0.0883) (0.0102)
Inc.per adult equiv. (Baht) -0.000766 -0.0103 -0.000986 0.00609 0.0271* -0.00117
(0.00438) (0.00825) (0.00416) (0.00435) (0.0142) (0.00234)
Debt capacity -0.00670* 0.00328 -0.00780** -0.00470 -0.00314 -0.00153
(0.00363) (0.00938) (0.00385) (0.00367) (0.0175) (0.00116)
Tot. loan vol./ hh (in Baht) -0.0381** -0.0240 -0.0366** -0.0279* 0.0308 -0.0117**
(0.0150) (0.0367) (0.0142) (0.0162) (0.0537) (0.00524)
Relationship duration -0.0230** -0.0412** -0.0124 0.0112 -0.0347 0.00699
(0.00939) (0.0195) (0.0104) (0.0131) (0.0495) (0.00551)
Dummy for formal 0.0918***
(0.0249)
Dummy for informal -0.214***
(0.0197)
Pseudo R-squared 0.381 0.426 0.457 0.231 0.265 0.216
Observations 3,021 1,542 791 688 253 435
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all specifications contain 
dummies for waves and provinces. Note: In specifications (1) - (4) land as collateral is excluded if households 
do not have proper title deeds for the land.
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Appendix 8: Marginal effects of proxies for social collateral on collateral requirements 
Proxy for social collateral informal ML/BP FAM/FRI informal ML/BP FAM/FRI
village size (log) -0.0285 -0.0162 -0.0109 -0.0213 -0.0254 -0.0065
(0.0227) (0.0675) (0.0130) (0.0179) (0.0088) (0.0065)
small village (< 157 households) 0.0288 0.0076 0.0102 0.0177 -0.0173 0.0092
(0.0245) (0.0853) (0.0104) (0.0206) (0.1226) (0.0067)
large village (> 157 households)
distance to district town (log) -0.0294 0.0016 -0.0084 -0.0237 -0.0036 -0.0026
(0.0193) (0.0627) (0.0079) (0.0153) (0.0807) (0.0046)
far town (> 20 min. travel time) -0.0269 -0.0109 -0.0071 -0.0193 0.0607 -0.0037
(0.0231) (0.0850) (0.0104) (0.0201) (0.1108) (0.0074)
near town (<= 20 min. travel time)
Note: Small villages and far towns are defined according to the mean values of village size (157 households) and travel time 
         from households to lender (20 min.)
2nd and 3rd wave (distance)
omitted category
1st, 2nd and 3rd wave
I
II
III
IV
omitted category
 
 
Appendix 9: Marginal effects of relationship and distance for different definitions of income 
formal semiformal informal formal semiformal informal
4 times -0.0379* -0.0118 0.0169 0.0445 0.0247 0.0331***
standard (0.0205) (0.0110) (0.0140) (0.0365) (0.0178) (0.0112)
deviation a
exclude -0.0342 -0.0125 0.0102 0.0658* 0.0230 0.0335***
incomes <0 b (0.0209) (0.0106) (0.0149) (0.0372) (0.0177) (0.0110)
transformation c -0.0349* -0.0111 0.0155 0.0555 0.0256 0.0329***
(0.0206) (0.0108) (0.0140) (0.0372) (0.0179) (0.0108)
b
 Negative incomes are exluded.
  logarithmic values of all incomes are taken.
relationship duration distance
a Incomes of more or less than 4 times the standard deviation from the mean are excluded. 
c
 Incomes are divided by 1,000 to adjust the large range. Negative incomes are set to 1 and finally     
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Appendix 10: The role of distance across lending institutions (including competition among lenders) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Incidence of collateral all loans formal semiformal informal informal
Independent variables 
Distance to lender (in minutes) 0.130*** 0.0204 0.0282 0.0300***
(0.0204) (0.0481) (0.0207) (0.0113)
Lender and borrower in the same village -0.0870***
(0.0317)
Loan size (Baht) 0.157*** 0.199*** 0.0893*** 0.0813*** 0.0803***
(0.0219) (0.0500) (0.0270) (0.0225) (0.0221)
Loan duration (months) 0.00165*** 0.00270*** -0.000643 0.00115*** 0.00116***
(0.000487) (0.000857) (0.000568) (0.000429) (0.000430)
Annual interest rate -0.000116 0.00102 -0.000449 0.000322** 0.000306**
(0.000362) (0.00114) (0.00105) (0.000134) (0.000133)
Agricultural production loan -0.0257 -0.0336 -0.00764 -0.0671*** -0.0675***
(0.0319) (0.0658) (0.0376) (0.0238) (0.0232)
Non-agricultural production loan 0.00249 0.0558 -0.0499 -0.0366* -0.0313
(0.0375) (0.0770) (0.0305) (0.0203) (0.0206)
Consumption loan -0.0560 0.00518 -0.0782** -0.0300 -0.0342
(0.0349) (0.0914) (0.0347) (0.0214) (0.0226)
Guaranteed loan -0.518*** -0.732*** -0.656*** -0.0349* -0.0361*
(0.0284) (0.0257) (0.0566) (0.0208) (0.0200)
Income per adult equivalence (Baht) 0.00551 -0.0177 0.00381 0.00546 0.00519
(0.00838) (0.0129) (0.00918) (0.00391) (0.00392)
Indebt capacity -0.00793 0.00266 -0.00651 -0.00802* -0.00932**
(0.00655) (0.0143) (0.00764) (0.00479) (0.00471)
Total loan volume per household (Baht) -0.0416** -0.00803 -0.0282 -0.0467*** -0.0473***
(0.0203) (0.0448) (0.0267) (0.0149) (0.0152)
Relationship duration 0.0253** -0.0327 -0.0131 0.0118 0.0135
(0.0121) (0.0259) (0.0157) (0.0117) (0.0120)
Travel time to next BAAC -0.00166 0.00513 -0.00183 -0.000811 -0.000441
(0.00240) (0.00480) (0.00189) (0.00160) (0.00144)
Travel time to next CRED -0.00122 -0.00386 0.00401** 0.000464 0.000631
(0.00242) (0.00459) (0.00179) (0.00167) (0.00157)
Travel time to next GSB -0.00156* -0.00300 0.000737 -0.000299 -1.69e-05
(0.000942) (0.00210) (0.000784) (0.000706) (0.000756)
Travel time to next CB 0.00198* 0.00480* -0.00349*** -0.000284 -0.000394
(0.00117) (0.00246) (0.00125) (0.00106) (0.00101)
(0.0437) (0.0791) (0.0762) (0.0330) (0.0330)
Pseudo R-squared 0.348 0.420 0.500 0.344 0.354
Observations 1,940 1,068 476 396 406
Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: VF and POL are excluded from semiformal institutions. For loan size, income, relationship duration and distance to
lender logarithmic values are taken. All specifications control for time and province effects. Specification (1): All lenders;
Specification (2): Formal lenders (CB and BAAC) only; Specification (3): Semiformal lenders (CRED); Specification (4):
Informal lenders (ML, BP, FAM and FRI); Specification (5): Informal lenders and dummy whether borrower and lender
are located in the same village or not.
 
